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Vedārtha Sangraha

OF

Sri Ramanuja

(Author of SRI BHASHYA)

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH

WITH

INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

By

M. R. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, M. A.

(Formerly of the Madras Educational Service)

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Preface

In this English rendering of Sri Ramanuja's *Vedarthasangraha*, I have tried to be as close and faithful to the original as the idiom of the English language would permit. Here and there, when I felt that the addition of words, phrases or sentences would make the author's meaning clearer, I have inserted them in the body of the text within brackets. In the section dealing with the doctrines of the Mimamsakas, the original is too terse to be easily understood. I have, therefore, made the translation explanatory, as I felt that a faithful and close translation might not be clear enough. When longer explanations are necessary, they are given separately as notes in small type.

I am bound to express my deep indebtedness to the late Sri Vangipuram Vasudevachariar Swami's excellent edition of *Vedarthasangraha* in Grantha script with Tamil translation and notes. Sri K. S. Patrachariar, M. A., scrutinised the English rendering with the Sanskrit original by his side and drew my attention to several omissions as well as inaccuracies. To go through an original treatise and make suggestions for its improvement is comparatively easy; but to go through a translation and compare it with the original, word by word and sentence by sentence, with a view to examining its accuracy requires much greater concentration and patience. Only those who have done this kind of scrutiny can appreciate the trouble involved in it. It is, therefore, impossible for me to thank him adequately for his kindness in having undertaken this task.

My grateful thanks are due also to my *guru*, Sri Ubhaya-Ve. Sinnamu Srinivasa Patrachariar Swami of

Kumbakonam, to whom I applied for the clarification of the meanings of certain passages. I am grateful also to Sri R. Kesava Ayyangar, B. A., B. L., Advocate, Triplicane, for elucidating a point that I referred to him. My heartfelt thanks are due to my friend, Sri K. Varadachariar, B. A., B. L., Advocate, Kumbakonam, for help readily and willingly given in connection with the reading of the proofs.

In conclusion, I should like to express my warm appreciation and gratitude to the Cauvery Colour Press for the speedy execution of their part of the work.

M. R. RAJAGOPALAN.

VEDARTHA SANGRAHA
of
SRI RAMANUJA

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SRI RAMANUJA'S VEDARTHA SANGRAHA

INTRODUCTION

Bhagavan Ramanuja, the great exponent of the Visishtadvaita system of philosophy, was the author of nine treatises: *Vedantha Sangraha*, *Sri Bhashya*, *Vedanta Deepa*, *Vedanta Sara*, *Gita Bhashya*, three prose works called *Vaikunta Gadya*, *Saranayati Gadya* and *Sri Ranga Gadya* and a book called *Nitya* which deals with the daily rites and duties that should be performed by every Sri Vaishnavite. Among these, *Sri Bhashya* is his famous commentary on Badarayana's *Brahma Sutras*. The commentary on the first *sutra* is a lengthy thesis in which the author shows the untenability of rival systems of philosophy and expounds a number of disputed passages in the *Srutis* and *Smritis* as being in favour of his own system. *Vedanta Sara* and *Vedanta Deepa* are also commentaries on the *Brahma Sutras*, but are briefer than *Sri Bhashya* and leave out lengthy controversial discussions. They were evidently intended by the author to suit the average reader who is unacquainted with the methods of logical and interpretative disputation. *Vedantha Sangraha*, which was written before *Sri Bhashya* and which is referred to in the later work, may be considered primarily as a dissertation on the Visishtadvaita doctrine to show that it is more in keeping with the spirit of the Vedas or *srutis* than Advaita or Bhedabheda. Though this seems to have been the author's purpose, he has also appended, to this discussion, short essays on the validity of the Upanishads as a source of true knowledge which had been questioned by the Mimamsakas, the truth concerning the Supreme Deity whether it is Brahma, Vishnu or Siva and the existence of a region of eternal glory (*Nitya vibhuti*), a transcendental world beyond this world of matter, where

Narayana, whom Ramanuja identifies with the Supreme Brahman of the Upanishads, ever dwells with His Consort and His attendants, in His mansions of wonderful beauty and grandeur and to which the souls of those that have attained release from the bondage of *samsara* proceed.

The other five treatises are not wholly philosophical. They are religious out-pourings and not dissertations on the doctrines of Visishtadvaita.

Vedartha Sangraha, being controversial in nature, is written in the usual manner of philosophical disputations in Sanskrit literature. Dialectic subtlety and ingenuity of interpretation are of the very essence of such treatises. Occasionally, however, when the author has to speak of the glory of Narayana and of His infinite compassion, he bursts into a rhapsody of devout fervour, which comes from the very depths of his soul. While arguing his case against the Advaitins and the exponents of other systems, Sri Ramanuja assumes that the reader is acquainted with their fundamental doctrines, as also their interpretations of well-known passages in the Upanishads. The reader who has no such acquaintance is likely to find the discussion unintelligible. In order to facilitate an easier understanding of the text, it may be necessary to present, in brief, the main doctrines of the systems of philosophy dealt with in the book. It is not the object of this introduction to give a comprehensive study of Visishtadvaita or to summarise all the arguments employed by Ramanuja to refute rival doctrines. Its purpose is just to provide, as it were, the back-ground of the controversial forum, in order to enable the reader to follow the disputation in the text without much difficulty.

Every system of Hindu Philosophy except that of the Charvakas has a bearing on religion and holds distinctive views on *tattva* or the real nature of what we see around

us and of what we believe to be around us and within us, on *purushartha* or the goal or aim of life and on *hita* or the kind of means or *upaya* which will enable us to attain the goal. A brief account of these views held by the exponents of rival systems is essential for a study of controversial treatises on these points.

Tattva or what is real

Our senses present to us a world with a wonderful variety of objects, men, beasts, birds, insects, worms, plants and the like, as also inanimate things like the sun, the moon and the stars, each with its own peculiar qualities like colour, form, flavour, fragrance and the like. There are also objects not capable of being perceived by the senses but believed to exist on the authority of the Scriptures. The question arises, "Are all these things that exist and are believed to exist real? If all of them are not real, is any of them real? If so, what are they?" Before answering this question, a preliminary definition of what is meant by 'real' or reality has to be given.

The Advaitins, who follow the teaching of Sri Sankaracharya, define reality as that which endures for ever, for all time, without any change or modification, whatsoever. In their view whatever exists only for a short time is unreal. It is a mere appearance or illusion similar to that which occurs when a serpent is seen by mistake in what is only a rope. There is only one 'real' which accords with their definition and that is Brahman. It alone lasts for ever without change. The world that we see around us, so varied and so wonderful, is a false and illusory appearance, *adhyāsa*, superimposed on the substrate or *adhishtana*, which alone is real and true, namely Brahman. Brahman, somehow, became associated with a factor causing this illusory appearance, which is called *Maya* or *Avidya*, (ignorance or nescience), and the illusory world is seen superimposed on Brahman in the same way as the form

of a serpent is super-imposed on what is really a rope. To this illusory appearance or creation Advaitins give the name, *vivarta*. The creation of the world means really the origin of the illusory appearance of the world on Brahman. If you ask the Advaitins why they consider the world, which appears so real, as illusory, they reply as follows:- "To sense-perception or *pratyaksha* the world seems real, but we know many instances in which *pratyaksha* misleads us into false knowledge or illusion (*bhrama*). The shell is often mistaken for silver by sense-perception; the rope, as has been stated before, is mistaken for a serpent; when in a moving railway train, the passenger sees the trees and other things as moving, while the train seems to be stationary. It is only a little later that the mistake is realised and the false knowledge replaced by the truth. So also in the case of the world's reality". If you ask the Advaitin, "If sense-perception is, as you say, deceptive and unreliable, is there any other means of knowing the truth?", he replies, "Certainly there is. The *Sastra* (*Sruti* or *Veda*) is always reliable and can give unmistakable knowledge of the truth of things. The '*sastra*' or Scripture is a sure and trustworthy means of knowledge and it says that only Brahman is real and that all the rest; namely, the world, is illusory. The *sruti* says "All this (namely, the world that we see) is Brahman" (*Chandogya Upanishad* III-14). This means that there is nothing else than Brahman. Again in the sixth chapter of the '*Chandogya Upanishad*, where Svetaketu is taught what is called *Sad Vidya*, it is stated, "This existed, my dear, as *Sat* at first, 'alone and without a second'". *Sat* here means Brahman, which is reality or true existence. The words 'alone and without a second' clearly state that nothing else existed then. 'This' means "the world." So the objects that we see around us are only modifications and names which have no real existence. The point is also thus illustrated, "If you know a lump of mud, you have known all things made of mud like pots, and pitchers,

because the latter are only forms and names which are unreal. Only mud is real. In the same way only Brahman is real like the mud in the illustration and the world, with all the sentient and non-sentient things in it, consists merely of illusory forms and names superimposed on Brahman. So when the one, namely, Brahman, is known, all the rest are known as well. This implies that these other things do not exist in reality". "Again", continues the Advaitin, "could there be anything more emphatic than the teaching addressed in the same *sruti* to Svetaketu namely, "That Thou art"? It states, in no uncertain terms, the identity between Brahman and the individual self (here, that of Svetaketu.) In other Upanishads, too, the same truth is taught in texts like "I am Brahman" (*Aham Brahma asmi.*) The existence of anything other than Brahman is, in the same way, denied in many *srutis* which say 'There is no such thing as plurality here (*neha nana asti kinchana.*) The existence of the manifold world is here stated to be false or illusory."

At this stage, if the student of Vedanta asks the Advaitin, "Well, what do you mean by Brahman about which you say that it alone exists?", he replies as follows:- "I have already stated that the *sruti* calls it the only reality *satyam*. Further since the self within us, the *Jivatma*, is said, by the *sruti*, to be identical with Brahman and since the self is self-luminous and shines without any other aid, it has to be called *chit* (i. e., it is different from the non-sentient things like pots and cloths which require to be lighted up by something else before they become manifest to perception. So Brahman is sentience or consciousness or, as the *sruti* calls it, *jnanam* (*Taittiriya Upanishad*)". The student might here interrupt the Advaitin with this question; "If Brahman is consciousness or knowledge, as you say, it must be conscious of something else. When we say we are conscious, we always mean that we are conscious of some object either within us or without.

If there is any such object of which Brahman, which is consciousness, is conscious, it would follow that there are other objects besides Brahman of which Brahman is conscious." The Advaitin is ready with his reply to this objection: "Brahman, it is true, is consciousness, but it is not conscious of anything else, for there is no such thing of which it could be conscious. It is pure consciousness without any discriminating features, like consciousness of pot, cloth and the like. There is an instance of such consciousness experienced by every one of us almost every day. In our waking hours, we are conscious of the external world and of the thoughts and feelings within us; when we go to sleep and dream (*svapni*), we are conscious of a world of illusory shows or phantasms. But when we are in deep sleep, without dreaming of anything *sushupti*, there is consciousness, pure and alone, for otherwise the man would be said to have died and yet the sleeper is not conscious of anything. That is why *Taittiriya Upanishad* says of Brahman:- *Satyam, Jnanam, Anantam, Brahma*, Brahman is Reality, Consciousness, Infiniteness. You see what *Anantam* means. Brahman is everywhere and there is nothing else." The student of Vedanta is likely to put the following question now:— "Do you mean to say that Brahman has these three attributes, reality, consciousness, and infiniteness? Is the *sruti* that you quoted just now a definition of the nature of Brahman?"

The Advaitin hastens to correct the misapprehension in the following words: "No, no. Brahman has no attributes or qualities. If it had, there would be not only Brahman but its attributes, as well. But the *Srutis* clearly say "Brahman is one, without a second". Further there are texts in the *Srutis* which expressly state that Brahman is without parts (*nir-avayava*), without activity (*nishkriya*), and without qualities (*nirguna*) or differentiating features (*Sheda*). It can be described only in negative terms. It is not this, not this,

neti neti. "What, then, do you mean", the student asks, "by 'satyam' 'jnanam', 'anantam', if they are not attributes?" The Advaitin answers: "When the *sruti* says 'satyam jnanam anantam' 'Brahma', it means to say what Brahman is not. Brahman is other than the unreal or non-existing (*satyam*); it is other than non-sentience (*jnanam*), it is other than the finite (*anantam*). That does not mean three different attributes. The three negatives mean only a single thing, "Brahman". If these words mean three different attributes, it would follow that there are three objects or substantives (*viseshyas*) of which they are attributes (*viseshana*). But there is only Brahman. According to our Advaita doctrine, Brahman is knowledge or consciousness, not the knower or possessor of knowledge. It is infiniteness and not the possessor of infiniteness. Some *Srutis* add also 'ananda' to the three words already quoted from the *sruti*. It means that Brahman is other than 'dukkham' or pain and misery."

From what has been said so far, it may have become clear that Advaita, in its purest and most uncompromising form, does not recognise the real existence of anything other than Brahman. Then what about the world of sentient and non-sentient things which are said to exist? Advaita recognises three orders or degrees of existence (*satta*). One is transient or temporary appearance or existence, *pratibhasika satta* like that of the serpent which appears in the rope as an illusion. In a few moments the illusion disappears, or, as it is termed, is sublated by true knowledge; far higher or superior is the existence of the world with all that it contains. It is real for all practical purposes (*vyavaharika satta*). This existence persists as long as the Jivatma is in the bondage of *samsara*, but when the *atma* attains release or *mukt*, the world disappears like any other illusion and the pure *atma* shines alone and without a second. This *atma* which is the same as Brahman is the only true Reality (*paramarthika satta*).

There are some schools of Advaitins who hold also that there is only one *Jiva* in *samsara*, namely, the speaker or thinker himself and that all other sentient beings (*Jivas*) which appear to exist are as unreal as the non-sentient things. This view is called *Ekajiva Vada* and Sri Ramunuja makes a reference to it, while refuting Advaita in general.

It was stated before that Advaitins consider *Sastra* or *Sruti* as a more reliable authority or *pramana* than *pratyaksha* or sense-perception. This statement has now to be qualified and clarified. There is one form of *pratyaksha* which they look upon as a reliable source of knowledge. Take the case of a pot in front of us. Even before we perceive the pot as a pot, we perceive, says the Advaitin, that there is existence or *sat* or what corresponds to *is* (*asti*). At the very first instant, moment or *kshana*, what *pratyaksha* reveals is *is* or mere existence and in the perceptions that follow in later instants, 'pot' appears illusorily on the *is* and we say "There is a pot." This second or later perception is illusory and presents differentiating features like the quality of being a pot and others (*bheda*) which mark it off from, say, a cloth; when the pot is taken away, and a cloth is seen in its place, the perception of the cloth is super-imposed on bare existence, namely, the *is* spoken of before and later still, other things like table, chair, pen etc., are super-imposed, illusorily, on it. The one permanent feature that persists throughout and for ever is *is* or bare existence or *sat* and the other percepts, pot, cloth, table and the like supersede one another without persistence. So this bare existence or *sat* is alone real, being persistent; the temporary appearances, such as pot, cloth etc., are unreal. The first instant's perception which does not present differentiating features is called *nirvikalpa pratyaksha* and it is a source of true knowledge and the later perceptions presenting differentiating features are called *savikalpa pratyaksha* and are illusory. What persists for ever is alone

true or real and this is one of the fundamental doctrines of Advaita, viz., whatever is temporary or transient is unreal or illusory. When the Advaitin claims greater authority for *Sastra* or *Sruti*, other students of Vedanta are tempted to ask, "According to your doctrine, everything other than Brahman is false or illusory. This would mean that the *Sruti* i-e *Veda* is illusory and false. How, then, could the *Sruti*, which is itself false, give true knowledge such as Brahman alone being real, the identity between the Jivatma and Brahman, and the like? Is not the knowledge given by an illusory or tainted source likely to be false also?" To this the Advaitin replies as follows:- "Sometimes information coming from an illusory source may be true or give a knowledge of the truth. Those who have made a special study of the science of dreams say, for example, that if one dreams of a man with black teeth, one's death will soon follow. Such prognostications are afterwards found to be true. The dream is, however, unreal."

A further question might be asked also, "If *Sruti* or *Sastra* destroys all illusions and reveals the only Reality, Brahman, what about the *Sruti* itself? Is there anything else that destroys *Sruti*, which itself is also an illusion?" The Advaitin answers thus:— "The fire in a forest burns away all trees, creepers, bushes and the like and when they are all burnt away, the fire is consumed of itself and perishes without any other agency causing its destruction." If, according to Advaita, the only Reality is Brahman and if Brahman has no attributes, no activities, no parts, no desires, no knowledge and no will, one might ask, "Is there no place in the Advaitic scheme for the Personal God of religion who is omniscient, omnipotent and full of compassion for all the beings created by Him and who is worshipped with love and

devotion for the sake of His grace and for final salvation?’ The Advaitin says in reply:— “Yes, there is. The only Reality is, of course, Brahman, but as stated before, this Brahman, which is without form, without colour, without attributes, or in other words, without differentiating features of any kind, becomes associated ‘somehow’ with a factor which obscures it or shadows it, called, *maya* or *avidya*. When Brahman is shadowed by *maya*, *Saguna Brahman* or *Iswara* or the Personal God of religion with attributes like omniscience and omnipotence results and it is He that is the cause, maintenance, and destruction of the world-appearance and that is the object of veneration and worship. But as *Saguna Brahman* results from *maya*, He is as unreal as the *Jivatma* shadowed by the same principle which, in the case of the *Jiva*, is usually called *avidya* or ignorance or nescience. But *maya* and *avidya* are not essentially different. *Saguna Brahman* or God exists, of course, but His existence is of the second order referred to, namely, *vyavaharika satyam*. He is true for all practical purposes, and may be adored or worshipped as long as the *Jiva* is in bondage or *samsara* due to *avidya* and may even be the means of the *Jiva* proceeding thence to the realisation of Brahman or *mukti* which will be defined presently. *Saguna Brahman* dissociated from *maya* is identical with the *Jiva* dissociated from *avidya*, for such dissociation would mean pure Brahman.

The student of Vedanta has one more doubt which he would like to get cleared. He might ask the Advaitin:— “You say that Brahman is the only Reality and that there is no other Reality at all, but from what you have said just now, it appears that there is another principle, *tatva* or reality named *maya* or *avidya* which, by its association with Brahman, causes the illusion of God and

the world of sentient and non-sentient beings. If this is so, would there not be two 'Reals' Brahman and this *avidya*? The Advaitin has a ready answer.— "No. *avidya* has no real existence and is not real." What then, is *avidya*, one might ask. The Advaitin says:— '*Avidya* is not '*sat*' or a really existing thing, which is Brahman alone, nor can it be said to be non-existent like the horn of a hare or the flower in the sky which does not exist at all. So *avidya* is not *asat* or a non-existing thing.' The student may find this curious and ask himself how a thing can be neither *sat* nor *asat* neither true nor untrue. The Advaitin's explanation is as follows:—*Avidya* is a thing that exists for all practical purposes, but may, sometime or other, cease to exist. So its existence is something peculiar, it is different from both the real and true on one side and the untrue and the non-existent on the other, like the horn of a hare. As an instance of this peculiar existence which can be defined neither as *sat* nor as *asat* and which has to be called an indefinable kind of existence (*anirvachaniya*) we may take the mirage that is seen by travellers in hot countries. Something like a pond appears before the weary traveller; the images of trees and other objects are seen in the water, as it seems to be, of that pond. He proceeds thither perhaps with the object of quenching his thirst, but when he is actually on the spot, there is neither pond nor water. The mirage existed and was seen for sometime. So you cannot say it did not exist; it disappeared when the man came to the spot; so it cannot be called real. So it is neither real nor non-existent. *Avidya* now exists for us, but when we arrive at *mukti* or release from bondage, it would cease to exist and only Brahman will then remain, alone and without a second".

It would be evident from what has been said that Advaita postulates two Brahmans, a higher or *Para Brahman*

which is *Nirguna*, *Nirvyaṇi*, *Nishkriya* without attributes, without parts, without activity, which can be called only Pure Consciousness and a lower or *Apara Brahman* or *Iswara*, who is omniscient and omnipotent, who creates the manifold world of appearances and sustains it. But this lower Brahman is unreal, being the effect of *maya*. He exists, it is true, for all practical purposes (*vyavaharika satyam*) but would cease to exist after *mukti*. Since Brahman alone is real, according to Advaita, it follows that the individual self or *Jiva* (to which class you and I and all other sentient beings belong) is also unreal. But we should clearly discriminate what is unreal in the *Jiva* from what is real. Brahman, it has already been stated before, is pure consciousness or experience which is conscious of nothing and experiences nothing. The *Jiva* says, "I see the pot, I know this is a pot" and so on. Here, in "I see" and "I know", there is an element calling itself "I" and it looks upon itself as a seer or one who does the act of seeing or as a knower, who does the act of knowing. This "I" which is the knower, the doer, the one who sees and so on is superimposed illusorily on pure consciousness or Brahman which underlies the *Jiva* and is the substratum of the knower, the seer, the doer. This substrate is alone real and that which gives rise to the notion of 'I', of the knower, seer, doer etc., is illusory. Consciousness, which is pure, can have no such thing as the feeling or notion of 'I' or of its being a knower seer, doer, and the like. So the *Atma* or pure consciousness on which these illusions appear is alone real and it is identical with Brahman. It is no such thing as being a knower, seer, doer and the like. These are unreal appearances and are of the nature of *jada* or nonsentient things. In dreamless sleep the notion or feeling of 'I' and of being a knower and doer disappears and pure consciousness or Brahman alone remains. Such will be the state in *mukti* also. The *atman* or

Brahman or pure consciousness (or *anubhūti*), has no qualities or relationships such as being a knower or doer. In every form of knowledge, such as "I know the pot", there are three concepts, that of the knower 'I', that of the pot which is the object of knowledge and knowing. These three are illusory, what is true or real is mere consciousness and this is *Atman* or Brahman.

PURUSHARTHA or the Supreme Goal of Life in Advaita

Every system of Hindu philosophy which is religious has to answer the question, "What is the ultimate aim or supreme goal of life?" The great majority of us go on living without this thought ever rising in our minds, but the moment we begin to think and feel that we should not drift like logs on the sea without any aim or object, this question will ask for a reply.

Since Advaita considers that we, Jivas, are really Brahman but that we have, owing to beginningless *avidya* or ignorance, fallen into the current of births and deaths, subject to the sufferings of *samsara*, it would follow that the supreme goal or *purushartha* would be, according to Advaita, to get rid of this *avidya* which has been the cause of our identifying ourselves with the body and the mind and to realise that we have all along been and are really Brahman (*Aham Brahma Asmi*).

In the Upanishads, however, there are some passages where the soul or self is said to be led along a luminous path (*Archirādi*) by Amanava Purusha to Brahman, where it enjoys perfect bliss. The Advaitin explains away these passages as describing a lower form of *mukti* or release from bondage, where the self which has been meditating on *Saguna Brahman* or Brahman with attributes reaches the region of *Saguna Brahman*.

To such souls there is no coming back to *Samsara* but it is not the final state of *mukti*. It is what Advaitins call *krama mukti*. There is yet another step to be taken by the self or soul which it will realise as the result of *Jnana* and that is Pure Consciousness or Brahman. This alone is real *mukti*.

The means of attaining Mukti or upaya or Sadhana

Since Advaita teaches that the bondage of *Samsara* is due to *avidya* or ignorance, the only means by which *avidya*, the cause of this bondage, could disappear is *Jnana* or knowledge. The *Sastra* or *Sruti* teaches this knowledge by which the self understands that, in reality, it is Brahman, ('*Tat Tvam Asi*: That thou art') The knowledge of the identity of the Jiva with Brahman is the only means by which the ignorance or *Avidya* could be got rid of.

The *Gita* describes three ways or *Yogas* to be followed by the seeker after salvation or *mukti*. One of them is *karma yoga*, the performance of the rites and duties pertaining to the man's station in life, his *varna* and his *asrama* in a spirit of complete detachment, without any thought of their consequences or fruits (*nishkama karma*.) The rites and duties are to be performed as forms of worship to the Lord. The *Gita* also teaches a second way, *bhakti yoga* which consists in loving devotion, adoration and meditation of the Lord (*upasana*.) The third way is *jnana yoga* or the way of knowledge or *jnana* and the *Jnani* is praised highly in several passages. The Advaitin holds that, the direct means or *sadhana* which leads directly and at once to *moksha* or liberation is only *jnana*. In support of his view, he cites the authority of such passages in the *Srutis* as the following: "He who

knows Brahman becomes Brahman," "Having 'known' Him (Brahman) he attains immortality and there is no other way."

The performance of *karma* in the spirit of utter detachment is, of course ordained, but it can, at best, create only a desire for attaining true knowledge of Brahman by causing mental purity (*chitta suddhi*). Devotion adoration and meditation (*upasana*) or what is called *bhakti yoga* is concerned only with *Saguna Brahman* and its fruition will result only in *karma mukti* or sojourn in the world of *Saguna Brahman*. Thereafter attaining true knowledge of the identity of the self with Brahman, the self will realise that it has all along been and is in reality Brahman. Thus in the Advaitic system, only *jnana* is the means of *mukti*. The *jnani* might give up the performance of the rites and duties ordained in the *Sastra* as he no longer needs these props.

Sri Ramanuja's Visishtadvaita

I. On Tattva

After this preliminary study of Sri Sankaracharya's views on *Tattva*, *Purushartha* and *Upaya* in the system of Advaita philosophy, we may proceed to the study of Sri Ramanuja's views on these points as set forth in his *Vedantha Sangraha*. The reader would have noticed that the Advaitin approaches the inquiry into these points in two ways; first, through the *Srutis* or revelation, which he considers as superior even to sense-perception, inference and reason and afterwards through reason, inference or *yukti*.

Sri Ramanuja adopts the same method in his approach. Taking the evidence of the *srutis* first, what do we find? There are some *srutis* or passages in the Upanishads which describe Brahman as being without imperfections, without qualities or attributes, without change or modification, without activity and as being of the nature of pure conscious-

ness or *jnana* and bliss *ananda*. In the *Katopanishad* and *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad*, it is said that there is no such thing here as the many, or as plurality. "These and other such texts deny the existence of the many. There are other *Srutis*, however, which say of Brahman; "He is omniscient" (*Mundaka Upanishad*;) "By his mere will, He creates the Universe" "He gives forms and names to all things". "He is free from faults, from old age, from death, from sorrow, from hunger and thirst and is all-perfect and omnipotent" (*Chandogya Upanishad*). These *Srutis* deny the existence of faults and imperfections and affirm the existence in Him of positive qualities and attributes like omniscience and omnipotence. A third set of passages in the *Srutis* declares:— "All this is Brahman, because all things are created by Him, sustained by Him and are merged in Him". "All this has Brahman for its *Atma*." These affirm the world with all its varied contents as the creation of Brahman and also their oneness with Him. There are, however, other *Srutis* which say, "Man can attain immortality by realising that the individual self is different from the Supreme Self which inspires and directs it." "Having understood the difference between the self that enjoys or experiences, the object that is enjoyed or experienced, and also the Supreme Self that directs everything etc". (*Svetasavatara Upanishad*) "He has all things under His control and rules over all". (*Brihadaranyaka Upanishad*) and again, "He is the Lord of the world," "He is the Supreme Ruler among all rulers and is the Supreme Deity over all deities." These *Srutis* state that Brahman is different from all else and that He rules over all. Other *Srutis* again declare as follows:— "He has entered into all beings and rules them from within as their self or soul. This *Atma* is the Inner Ruler, Immortal. "The earth is His body, the waters are His body, Light is His body, the soul (or the *jiva*) is His body. He is

the inner self that controls all from within" (*Brihadāranyaka Upanishad*). These passages state that the relationship that exists between Brahman and the world consisting of sentient and non-sentient beings is that which exists between the soul and the body.

When there are such apparent inconsistencies in the *Srutis* regarding the essential nature of Brahman, how are we to explain them? One explanation might suggest itself at first sight, namely, that the *Srutis* were composed by different seers at different times and that these seers held divergent views about the nature of Brahman; but none of the orthodox commentators of the Upanishads or *Brahma Sutras*, would subscribe to this view, neither Sankara, nor Ramanuja, nor Bhaskara, nor Madhvacharya nor any others. They all agree in thinking that the *Srutis* are not divided among themselves and that all of them declare the same truth without any inconsistency or contradiction. The *Srutis*, they say, are not the work of any human or divine being and are eternal revelations of *Tattva*, *Purushartha* and *Hita* or *Upaya*. Their authority is unquestioned. If inconsistencies or contradictions are noticed, they are only apparent and due to wrong interpretations of the meaning of the passages.

How Advaitins explain away these apparent inconsistencies and contradictions has already been indicated. According to them, the *Srutis* describe two Brahman, a higher *Para* or Supreme Brahman without attributes and without activity, change or modification and a lower or *Apara Brahman*, who has the attributes, and activities mentioned in some passages. This lower Brahman is Iswara who is called the Ruler of the world, its director and so on. But He is unreal in the ultimate reckoning. Only pure, attributeless Brahman is real. Another explanation of theirs is that the passages which assign attributes and activities to Brahman express the *prima-facie*

view which is rejected by the passages which deny attributes and activities. The passages which deny attributes are later than the passages which affirm and therefore sublate or supersede them.

Sri Ramanuja is a realist. To him, Brahman, Iswara or God is real, so also the Jivatma or the individual self or soul. These souls are infinite in number and not one. Further matter or *prakriti* with all its modifications or evolutes is real. So there are three 'Reals' or *Tattvas*, Brahman or Iswara, the Soul or self (Jiva), (speaking of it as a class) and *Prakriti* or matter (inclusive of its evolutes).

Speaking of the first *Tattva*, namely, Brahman or Iswara, Ramanuja is emphatic in declaring that the *Srutis* do not speak of the existence of two Brahman, a higher and a lower, and that the one Brahman, the Supreme Being which is described in the *Srutis* has infinite auspicious qualities. Those passages which seemingly deny attributes in Brahman and call it *Nirguna* deny the existence in Brahman only of the three qualities ascribed to *Prakriti*, namely, *sattvam*, *rajas* and *tamas*. What is denied is only the existence in Brahman of faults and imperfections. How else could we explain such attributes as omniscience and omnipotence which are ascribed to Brahman in the very passages which deny a number of attributes? *Nirguna* means "without blemishes, faults or imperfections". In reply to the Advaitin who states that the passages in which Brahman is said to possess attributes express the *prima facie* view and that they are superseded or sublated by the passages which deny attributes, Sri Ramanuja says:— "All the knowledge concerning the nature of Brahman has to come to us only from Scripture or *Sruti*. We can have no valid knowledge of it from any other source. It would indeed be funny if the *Srutis* first said that Brahman had qualities and activities only to deny it afterwards. Why should the *Srutis* state at first something that is not true and then deny its truth?"

The Advaitin may ask: "But how do you explain those passages which state that Brahman can be described only in negative terms (*Neti-Neti*)? Do they not mean that Brahman is without attributes and that it is not this, not this, not that and so on?"

Rāmanuja answers the question as follows;—The *Sruti* which says *Neti-Neti* "not this", "not this" really means that Brahman's nature or *Svarupa* and qualities are incapable of adequate and complete description and that what is at all possible is only a partial or fragmentary description. What the *Sruti* states by saying "not this" "not this" is that Brahman is not to be considered as being limited to this or that, but that it is these and an infinity of others as well, which defy adequate enumeration. The passage in question is in *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad* IV. iii. 6. It is said there that Brahman is two-fold, that it has a tangible form and is also formless. Then follows the statement *neti - neti*, which means *Iti na, Iti na*, 'not this only', 'not this only'. The author of the *Brahma Sutras* has explained the meaning of this text or *Sruti* in III, ii, 21 as follows:—"What is denied is, of course, (that Brahman is only) this much. Therefore the *Sruti* proceeds further to describe Brahman. What is said in the *Sruti* after *Neti-Neti*, is that there is nothing superior to Brahman and that it is the real (*Satyam*) of all reals (*satyasya*); for the individual souls (*pranas*) are real and Brahman is the Real among all reals". The individual self is called 'Real' because, in its essential nature, it does not undergo any change or modification like matter or *prakriti*.

The Advaitin will now ask, "But what do you say to the passage: 'There is no such thing here (ie) in Brahman as the many or plurality (*nana*)? Does it not clearly say that only Brahman exists and that there is nothing else, no other real and not even any attributes within itself?"

Sri Ramanuja's answer is to this effect:— "This idea that there is no such thing in Brahman as the many (*nana*) is found in the *Kata Upanishad* II, and in the '*Brihadaran-yaka Upanishad*' VI. Immediately after this statement, the *Sruti* declares that Brahman has all things under His control (*sarvasya vasi*) and that He rules over all (*sarvasya isanah*). In the face of these later passages, how can it be maintained that Brahman has no attributes at all, while rulership and control are ascribed to Him?" It may be said by the Advaitin that the passage in question denies the existence of anything other than Brahman. To this Ramanuja would reply as follows:— That is certainly not the meaning". To decide what the true interpretation of the text is, we should go back to a consideration of the apparently divergent *Srutis* quoted before, some seemingly denying the existence of anything other than Brahman, some stating that all this is Brahman, because it is created and sustained by Brahman and is merged in it, which seem to recognise the reality of the world with its sentient and non-sentient beings and others stating that Brahman is different from the individual self which enjoys or experiences, and from matter which is the object of such enjoyment or experience. What are we to make of these apparently inconsistent statements? The Advaitin flatly declares that the *Srutis* which speak of the reality of the world and of the differences between Brahman and the *jivas* on the one hand and Brahman and matter on the other, are not valid and that only those passages like "This existed, my dear, as *Sat* without a second" are authoritative. This would imply rejection of all the passages in the Upanishads which speak of the *Jiva* and of *Prakriti* or matter and of the attributes of Brahman as real. Similarly if we take the *Svetasvatara* passage cited before, which says that Brahman, the *Jiva* and *Prakriti* are real and different from one another as valid and authoritative, we shall have to reject the authority

of those texts which declare that Brahman is the only reality and that there is no such thing as the many. Is there any interpretation or view which would enable us to explain and reconcile these apparently divergent *Śrutis* without rejecting any of them as invalid? Ramanuja says, "Yes, there is and this key which would reconcile all the texts is found in the *Bṛihadaranyaka* text usually called *Antaryami Brahmanam*. It says that the world of matter or non-sentient things is the body of Brahman and that Brahman is its soul. Likewise, it says that all sentient beings or *Jivas* are Brahman's body, Brahman being their soul. This relationship between body and soul existing between the world and Brahman is the key-doctrine of Sri Ramanuja's Visishtadvaita system. According to it, Brahman has *chit* and *achit*, which are as real as Brahman itself, as His body. He is their soul, their Inner Self, controlling and directing them from within. If this central doctrine of Sri Ramanuja's system which is explicitly stated in the *Antaryami Brahmanam* is accepted, it would enable us to reconcile all the divergent texts referred to before, without rejecting the validity of any of them. Since Brahman is the soul or inner self of all, Brahman with *chit* and *achit*, the sentient and non-sentient things, as His body, forms a unity or a Single Real and there is indeed nothing else, for the world with all its variety is included in Brahman as its body. This body is really an attribute or *prakara* of the soul; and we often speak of the soul of a man with its *prakara* or body as a single thing or unity. In the same way Brahman is, according to the *Śrutis*, a single Real and there is nothing else, for all else form the body of Brahman which is inseparable from it and may therefore be included as one with the *Svarupa* or the substantive part of Brahman which has, for its attributive *amsa* or part, the world of *chit* and *achit*. Thus the texts that, in the opinion of the Advaitin, teach unity, find an easy explanation with-

out denying the reality of the world and calling it an illusion. At the same time, the body of man is different from his soul. So also the world of *chit* and *achit*, which is the body of Brahman, is different from the Inner Soul or self of all, namely, the *Svarupa* of Brahman and the *Svetasvatara* and other texts which speak of the differences between Iswara, the individual self, and matter or *prakriti* are easily explained as being consistent with this *Sruti* called *Antaryami Brahmana*. Thus Brahman with *chit* and *achit* as its *prakaras* or attributes is the only Reality and Ramanuja's system is therefore *Visishta Advaita*.

The student of Vedanta is likely to raise an objection to what has been said about the world being the body of Brahman, Iswara, or God. The body of the *Jiva* is usually said to be due to past *karma* and to be the cause of all the ills of *samsara*. If Brahman has a body like ourselves, does it not follow that He, too, is subject to *karma* and the consequent sufferings of *samsara*? Ramanuja would answer this question as follows;—"Brahman's body is not the result of any past *karma* of His. In order to understand this aright, we should first define what is meant by the term 'body'. The body is sometimes defined as composed of matter and as being the seat of the senses and of pleasures and pains. But this is not a proper definition. The body of a sentient being is something that is supported and controlled by its soul or self and that exists solely for the fulfilment of the purposes of the soul or self. If this definition is a true definition (and its truth cannot be denied), the question of Brahman suffering from *samsara* owing to the possession of a body will not arise".

The *Srutis* which say that Brahman is without change or modification (*nirvikara*) are easily explained in *Visishtadvaita*, because the *Svarupa* or substantive part or *Viseshya amsa* of Brahman never undergoes any change and remains

ever *Satyam*, *Jnanam*, *Anantam*, ('Reality, Consciousness and Infiniteness.) In the attributive part or *amsa* of Brahman which is its body, there are two reals, *chit* and *achit*. These alone undergo changes. The *achit* portion or *prakriti*, which is in such a subtle state or *sukshma dasa*, in *pralaya* (ie) before creation, that it can hardly be said to exist at all, becomes modified in creation or *Srishti* into *Sthula* or gross matter and evolves into various forms like earth, water, fire, air, ether (*akasa*), the senses, etc., and we see them in the pot, cloth, wood, metal, the bodies of animals and so on. The *chit* or sentient part, which also lies in Brahman during *pralaya* as indistinguishable and insignificant, so much so that it may be said not to exist at all, becomes associated with *prakriti* in the gross or *sthula* state in accordance with its past *karma* and is seen as the self in gods, men, animals, plants and so on. And let us remember that Brahman is the Inner Self of *chit* and *achit*, both in their subtle and in their gross state; the sentient being *chit* thus enclosed in the body, enjoys or experiences pleasures and pains due to *samsara*, while the *Svarupa* of Brahman, the substantive, which has the *chit* as its body, remains changeless and unaffected by the sorrows of the latter.

We are now in a position to understand Ramanuja's interpretation of what is stated in *Sadvidya* which Advaitins consider as strongly supporting their doctrine. "This, my dear, existed before as *sat*, alone and without a second." This is the text in question. "Before" says Ramanuja, means "during *pralaya*". "This" means, of course, the world of *chit* and *achit*. *Sat*, which, Advaitins say, means pure existence (*satyam*) or Brahman, means, according to Ramanuja, Brahman with *chit* and *achit* in their subtle state. *Sat* does not mean "pure and mere existence"; for, in other Upanishads, the same sentence occurs with substitutes like *Atma* or the Self, Brahman and even Narayana; so it refers

to the Supreme Being with attributes; for, immediately after, the *Sruti*, says:— 'It willed to become the many'. Then follows a description of *srishti* or creation. So will is ascribed by the *Sruti* itself to *Sat* in this very passage which is considered to support the Advaita doctrine of a Brahman without attributes.

This naturally leads us to another passage in the *Chandogya Upanishad*: Chapter VI, where *Sadvidya* is taught by his father to Svetaketu, The father asks, at the beginning of the chapter, whether Svetaketu asked his teachers about that, by knowing which everything else becomes known. Svetaketu does not know how, by knowing one thing, all things could become known and the father afterwards explains his meaning to Svetaketu, The Advaitins explain the meaning of this passage thus: "Brahman being the only Reality, when it is known, all other things become known, because they are only illusory appearances which have no reality. Since no other 'reals' exist, by knowing Brahman all become known." Svetaketu finds it difficult to understand this. So the father, says the Advaitin, gives illustrations to explain the statement as follows:- "When you know a single lump of mud, all things made of mud are known (such as pots and pitchers), for all changes and modifications are mere forms and names which have no reality. Only mud is real". The passage in the *Sruti*, says the Advaitin, means, that Brahman alone is real like the mud in the illustration and that other things which are super-imposed on it are mere forms and names having no reality. Ramanuja denies that the original statement and the mud illustration which follows it are a statement of the Advaitic doctrine of Brahman being the only "real". His explanation of the passage is to this effect:— Svetaketu is here taught the truth that Brahman with *chit* and *achit* as His body in the subtle state in *pralaya*, (ie) before creation, gives rise to Brahman

with *chit* and *achit* in their gross state (namely the world that we see). The former is the material cause (*upadana karana*) from which arises the effect (*karya*) namely the world with Brahman as its Inner Self. What the father teaches his son is this: When Brahman, the cause, is known, the effect, namely, the world of *chit* and *achit* with Brahman as its soul is also known, for the effect, *karya*, is only the cause, *karana*, with new states, forms and names which enable it to serve certain practical purposes. This does not deny the reality of the world. Pots and pitchers are modifications or new states of mud with new forms and names and serving certain new purposes, but as substance, they are only mud and are not essentially different from mud which has only entered a new state or condition.

Towards the end of this same sixth chapter of *Chandogya Upanishad*, the well-known sentence, *Tat Tvam Asi*, is repeated several times, as it were, to enforce the teaching in Svetaketu's mind. To the Advaitin this is a *Maha Vakya* teaching the identity of the Jiva with Brahman. *Tat* is Brahman, the ultimate and only Real, on which the illusory world appears. *Tvam* (thou) is Svetaketu, who is addressed by his father. The two are said to be the same. The Advaitin asks, "Can there be a more emphatic declaration of the unity or identity of Brahman and the Jiva than these words which are repeated ever so many times in that context? This *Mahavakya* declares that there is only one 'real', namely, Brahman, which is the cause or substrate of the origin, maintenance and dissolution of the world and it is declared to be the individual self of Svetaketu in "That Thou Art"; but on the face of it, the sentence would appear to convey no coherent meaning, for how can the individual self of Svetaketu with its limited powers be the same as Brahman which is infinite? So the direct or primary meaning of the word "Thou" will have to be given up as being incongruous

and a secondary or indirect meaning (*lakshana*) will have to be taken. The result of this would be: "That" would mean pure Brahman without attributes, activity, change or relations of any kind and 'thou' should be taken to mean not the individual self of Svetaketu, which is the direct meaning, but Brahman without the limitations, attributes, activities etc., of the individual, a meaning arrived at by having recourse to the indirect meaning (or *lakshana*). There would then be no equation of two different things but an identity or unity, namely, Brahman". The Advaitin, who gives this explanation of the *Mahavakya* "That thou art" illustrates it with an example from ordinary life. Having seen a person, called, say, Devadatta, in the past, in a certain place, we now see him, say, in some other place and say, 'This is that Devadatta'. Since the Devadatta seen formerly in one place cannot be the same as the Devadatta seen now in a different place, we have to resort to *lakshana* and give up the qualifications and relationships such as 'formerly' 'in one place' and 'now' 'in a different place'. What results in thus giving up the direct meanings which would not convey a coherent meaning, is the bare identity, namely, Devadatta. So also, Brahman in 'That Thou Art'.

In reply to this Advaitic explanation of identity as contained in 'That thou art', Ramanuja submits the whole question of appositional or coordinative use of words, as in 'That thou art' "Janaka is a king", "This is that Devadatta", 'Ayodhya was the capital of the Raghus' and so on, to a careful investigation. It is really a question for grammarians to decide. What do we really mean when we say 'Janaka is a king'? Is it simply the identity of Janaka or something more? So also in "Ayodhya was the capital city of the Raghus", is the purport merely 'Ayodhya' or something more? This kind of grammatical apposition or

co-ordination of two substantive words is called *samanadhikaranya* in Sanskrit and as 'That thou art', the Advaitin's *Mahavakya*, is an instance of *samanadhikaranya*, Ramanuja considers it necessary to determine the meaning and purpose of this appositional use more than once in *Vedarthasangraha*. The purpose of *samanadhikaranya* is to show that two or more different attributes, qualities or relationships refer to a single object. For example in 'Janaka is a king', the word 'Janaka', signifies a person with a specific form and with that name. The word 'king' means something different, namely, his being the ruler of a kingdom. The sentence having the co-ordination or *samanadhikaranya* aims at showing that these two sets of different attributes meet in the same person and not the bare identity of Janaka. In the example cited by the Advaitin, 'This is that Devadatta', Ramanuja says that there is no incoherence or absurdity in taking the direct meaning of the words just as they are (ie) the Devadatta seen formerly in the place A is the same as the Devadatta seen now in the place B. The same person could have been in one place in the past and in a different place at present. Where is the absurdity in it? So we may take the direct meaning of the words 'the Devadatta seen in the past in the place A, 'is' the Devadatta seen at present in the place B.' In fact the aim of the *samanadhikaranya* is just to show that 'being present in A at a former time' and 'being present now in B' are both in Devadatta. There is absolutely no reason why we should give up the direct and primary meaning. It may be asked what is the relevancy of all this discussion of the meaning of *samanadhikaranya* to the interpretation of the *Mahavakya* "That thou art"? Ramanuja replies as follows:—When the direct and primary meanings of 'That' and 'thou' may be taken just as they are and a sound, coherent and valid meaning can be had for the sentence, where is the need for resorting to *lakshana* or the indirect

and secondary meaning' ? He then proceeds to explain what he considers to be the real meaning of *Tat Tvam Asi*, 'That thou art'; 'That' of course signifies the Supreme Brahman who is the cause of the origin, maintenance and dissolution of the world. 'Thou', at first sight, would seem to mean Svetaketu or Svetaketu's self but it really means here the soul or the Inner Self within the soul of Svetaketu. When we use the word or name 'Devadatta', it refers to the bodily configuration of Devadatta, but does not stop there. It is not merely his body that is meant by the word 'Devadatta' but his *Atma* soul or self as well. The denotation or meaning of the word does not stop there; it refers also to the soul or Inner Self or *Antaryami* who has the soul of Devadatta for His body, as set forth in the *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad*. So 'That thou art' means Brahman who is the cause, the support etc., of the world, is also the inner Self or *Antaryami* who dwells within the soul of Svetaketu. Here two different attributes, that of being the cause etc., of the world and that of being the inner self of Svetaketu are ascribed to the same object, namely, Brahman, and this is the real purport or significance of *samanadhikaranya* as understood by grammarians, whose authority in a matter like this should be unquestioned. But it may be asked: "Is not Ramanuja also giving up the primary and direct meaning of 'thou' namely, Svetaketu's self and taking up *lakshana* or an indirect and secondary meaning *viz.* the inner self within the self of Svetaketu ?" Ramanuja's answer is as follows, 'Take any word, say, cow. It has three meanings, all primary and direct, namely, the bodily configuration of the cow, the self or soul of the cow and likewise, the Inner Self within the soul of the cow, which is Brahman or God or Iswara. Laymen who are not acquainted with Vedanta are not aware of this third significance or meaning which is as direct and as primary as the other two.

So my interpretation is sound and in accordance with the *Antaryami Brahmanam* and the science of grammar.

To sum up: In 'Visishtadvaita' as expounded by Ramanuja, the Upanishads impart to us knowledge of only one Brahman and that is *Saguna Brahman* or Brahman with infinite auspicious qualities. He has *chet* and *achit* as His body. The words *Nirguna*, *Niranjana*, etc., mean only that Brahman has none of the faults and the imperfections found in the Jiva. Visishtadvaita agrees with Advaita in holding that the essential nature or *Svarupa* of Brahman is *Jnana* or consciousness, but maintains, in addition, that Brahman, who is consciousness, has for its attribute, *jnana*. Brahman is thus the knower as well as knowledge or consciousness. Without a knower, there can be no such thing as bare consciousness. The knowledge or *jnana* which is an attribute of Brahman is called *dharmabhuta jnana* or attributive knowledge, to distinguish it from the *Svarupa* (or substance) of Brahman which is also called *Jnana*. As has been pointed out, the Brahman of the Upanishads is also the God of religion who creates, maintains and sustains the world. It is He who rewards the Jiva with *mukti*, when he strives for it.

The *Jiva* in Visishtadvaita is as real as Brahman itself. Its essential nature *svarupa*, is also *jnana* but it differs from Brahman in being atomic (*anu*), whereas Brahman is all-pervasive or omnipresent (*vibhu*). The Jivatma, has knowledge for one of its attributes and this knowledge is called *dharmabhuta jnana*, or attributive knowledge. Though the individual self or *Jivatma* is *anu*, its attributive knowledge is capable of infinite reach. Owing, however, to beginningless *avidya* or *karma*, this attributive knowledge has undergone contraction, but in the state of *mukti* or release from *samsara*, it will become infinite in its reach and will be capable of

understanding all things at the same time. Sri Ramanuja states also that there is another class of individual souls called *Nityas* in the region of eternal glory, which he calls *Nitya Vibhuti*. Their attributive knowledge has always been infinite in its range as they have never been in the bondage of *samsara*. The arguments by which he establishes this will be seen in chapter-9.

Prakriti or matter is also real in Ramanuja's system. It undergoes modifications into various *tattvas* (24 in number) which are the same as the 24 reals in the Sankhya system. *Prakriti* and its evolutes exist for the enjoyment or experience of the individual souls in accordance with their past *karma*.

PURUSHARTHA in VISISHTADVAITA.

The ultimate or supreme goal of life is to attain release from *samsara*, and enjoy the bliss of Brahman and not, as in Advaita, to become Brahman. The *avidya* which is the same as *karma* belongs to the *jiva* and not to Brahman. Ramanuja accepts the view that the released soul will enjoy infinite bliss in *Nitya Vibhuti* or God's Region of Eternal Glory.

THE MEANS or UPAYA.

Of the three *Yogas*, taught in the *Gita*, *bhakti* or devotion with its highest development, which Ramanuja calls *parama bhakti*, is the direct and only means of attaining *mukti*. *Karma* and *jnana* are essential but are only accessories to *bhakti*; *karma* or the rites and duties prescribed for each *varna* and each *asrama*, have to be performed as long as life lasts and are, on no account, to be given up.

One of the texts in the *Mundaka Upanishad* says that Brahman reveals Himself only to him with whom He is pleased. Brahman would be pleased only with him, who has deserved well of Him by supreme devotion in accordance with the *Sastras*. *Bhakti* is, therefore, the only means or *upaya*

for attaining the bliss of Brahman. At the same time, Ramanuja states that *bhakti* and *jnana* are not essentially different. *Bhakti*, too, is knowledge or *jnana*. When *jnana* deepens sufficiently, it attains the form of *bhakti*. It is this deep *jnana* which has developed into *bhakti* that is the *upaya* or means to *mukti*.

It was said above that the *Svarupa* or essential nature of Brahman and of the individual self in its purity is *jnana* and that Brahman and the Jiva have *jnana* or knowledge as an attribute. It may be asked how *jnana* which is a substance or *dravya* could be an attribute of *jnana* (*svarupa-jnana*). Attributes are usually of the nature of *gunas* or qualities and not substances or *dravya*. Ramanuja replies to this objection by stating that there is no such invariable rule. Even a substance may be an attribute of another substance as when we speak of a *dandi* or a man with a stick or *danda*. Here *danda* or stick, which is a substance, is an attribute of the *dandi*. The only difference is that the stick is not inseparable from the man, whereas attributive knowledge is inseparable from the knowledge which is the *svarupa* or substance of the *Jiva* or Brahman. So also the *Jiva* and *Prakriti*, or matter, though substances (*dravya*), are inseparable attributes of Brahman, being His body.

It was pointed out before that the Advaitin postulates a factor called *maya* or *avidya*, which, by some kind of shadowing or association with Brahman, causes the illusory appearance of the world. Ramanuja submits this theory to an elaborate and critical examination and shows that *maya*, cannot be defined in any manner to the satisfaction of others and that it lands *Advaita* in inconsistencies and contradictions. These arguments may be studied in the text itself of *Vedarthasangraha*.

So far the evidence of the *Srutis*. Approaching the question from the point of view of reason, Ramanuja does not accept the Advaitin's contention that only what persists for ever is real. It may be remembered that in *pratyaksha*, according to the Advaitin, there is only one aspect that persists right through, namely, mere existence or what corresponds to *asti* or 'is' and that this existence or *asti* alone is real and that pot, cloth, table, etc., as in the perceptions 'this is a pot,' 'this is a cloth,' 'this is a table', and so on, do not persist, as they replace one another and are therefore unreal. Ramanuja states in reply that if an object like pot is seen to exist in a certain place, at a certain time and another object, say, cloth, is seen there at the next instant or afterwards, it does not follow that the thing which does not persist is unreal. To put it in other words, the Advaitin holds that only what exists for ever and is not superseded or sublated by anything else, is real. Ramanuja, on the other hand, maintains that the reality or unreality of a certain thing has nothing to do with the duration of its existence. A thing may exist only for a short time and yet be real. The Advaitin might ask thereon, 'The objects that we see in dreams are seen only for a very short time and are replaced or superseded by others. Do you think that these objects or experiences in dreams are real? Is it not agreed on all hands that dreams are unreal?' Ramanuja would reply to this effect:— "I do not admit for a moment that because a thing exists only for a short time, it is unreal. Dreams, too, are real in our system. They are created by Iswara to reward or punish the Jivatma for his *karma*. The fact of their transience cannot be considered as a reason to deny their reality. So it would come to this that in Visishtadvaita, there is no experience or object that is unreal."

The Advaitin may ask, "What about the shell that is mistaken for silver owing to a defect in the vision or in the

light?" Ramanuja's answer is that, in the shell there is an 'element' or aspect of real silver which accounts for the mistake or illusion. It is this fraction of real silver that is taken to be all silver.

In Visishtadvaita, Brahman, Iswara or God, for all these mean the same, is both the cause and the effect. As has been indicated before, Brahman with *chit* and *achit* in their subtle state is the *upadana karana* or material cause and Brahman with *chit* and *achit* in their *sthula* state as the world is the effect.

In reply to the Advaitin's contention that first perception (*pratyaksha*) or perception at the first instant or *lshana* presents only bare existence without any differentiating features (*bheda*) and that this *nirvikalpaka pratyaksha* is alone true and valid, presenting as it does, pure Brahman without any differentiating features, Ramanuja denies that, even in the first instant, there is any such thing as *nirvikalpaka pratyaksha* and that even in that instant, the perception presents not bare existence but the configuration or physical structure of the object which has differentiating features. All perceptions, whether of the first instant or of the later, are only *savikalpaka* or *sakara pratyaksha*.

Besides the criticism of Advaita which occupies the greater part of *Vedarthasangraha*, brief references are made also to the *Bhedabheda* systems of Bhaskara, and Yadava-prakasa.

In Bhaskara's system, *mayavada* or the theory of the world being an illusory appearance due to the shadowing of Brahman by *maya*, is strongly condemned. The reality of the world is affirmed as strongly as in Visishtadvaita; but the identity of the *Jiva* with

Brahman, which is the apparent purport of such texts as 'That thou art' is sought to be explained in a manner different from that adopted by Advaitins and Visishtadvaitins. Brahman is considered to be full of infinite auspicious qualities, as in Ramanuja's system. But owing to some limiting adjuncts or *upadhis* Brahman becomes the *Jivas* subject to *samsara* and its ills. Unlike *maya* in Advaita, which is postulated to account for the *Jivas*, these adjuncts or *upadhis* are real in Bhaskara's system. Brahman, in a sense, is different from the *Jiva*, as it has been conditioned by the *upadhi*. At the same time, in *mukti* when the adjuncts will be got rid of, the *jiva* or individual self becomes one with Brahman by knowing its unity with Brahman as taught in such passages as "He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman". Thus in another sense, there is no difference between Brahman and the individual self. This system is therefore called *Bhedabheda*. In holding that in *mukti*, the individual self becomes Brahman, from which its difference is only adventitious, Bhaskara's system has affinities with Advaita.

The adjuncts or *upadhis*, are the body, the senses and the mind. The means of attaining *mukti* or becoming Brahman are both *karma* and *jnana*, neither of them being merely accessory. In Yadhavaprakasa's system, Brahman has, within itself, a certain power or energy by which it evolves (*parinama*) into Iswara, *chit* and *achit*.

The means of attaining *mukti*, which is the same as becoming Brahman, are *karma* and *jnana*, both being equally important as in Bhaskara's system. The *jiva*, which is a modification or *parinama* of Brahman, becomes Brahman again and this explains the purport of the *Mahavakya* 'That thou art'. This system is also called *Bhedabheda*, as the *Jiva*, in one sense, is different from Brahman and, in another, the same as Brahman.

Sri Ramanuja's criticism of these two systems may be studied in the text itself.

The short essays on 'The Supreme Deity,' '*Nitya Vibhuti*,' and Brahman's being both the '*Upadana Karana*,' and the '*Nimitta Karana*' of the world are easy and do not require any explanatory notes. A separate introduction is, however, given at the beginning of the essay on the views of Mimamsakas.

NOTE:—In Yadavaprakasa's system, the *Jiva* in *mukti* becomes one with Brahman by remaining within it as its *sakti* with a separate consciousness of its own.

(See *Srutaprahasika*; 4-4-4) '

Vedārtha Sangraha

by

Sri Ramanuja

I offer adoration to Vishnu on whom depend all things without exception, sentient as well as non-sentient—Vishnu who reclines on the serpent Sesha and who is free from all imperfections and is, likewise, the treasure-house of all auspicious qualities.

NOTE :—In this *Mangala Sloka*, Sri Ramanuja offers his obeisance to his *Ishtadevata* and, at the same time, implicitly and explicitly states briefly, some of the doctrines of his philosophical system. By stating that all things, sentient and non-sentient, depend upon Vishnu, he refers to what is called Vishnu's *Lila vibhuti*, namely, this world of ours with all its variety, which exists for His play or sport. By saying that Vishnu reclines on the serpent Sesha, He hints at the region of eternal glory, which is Vishnu's *Nitya vibhuti*. As against Advaitins who hold that Brahman is without attributes and differentiating features (*Bheda*), Ramanuja states that Vishnu, who is Brahman, has attributes which are innumerable and auspicious. By the words *Aseshachitachit* (all sentient and non-sentient things), the author also hints at the existence of many souls and not a single self or *atman*, as Advaitins hold. The word *Vastu* which *aseshachitachit* qualifies hints at sentient and non-sentient things being real and not illusory as Sankara maintains. By offering his adoration, it may also be inferred that Ramanuja suggests to us the means of attaining Brahman. Sanskrit critics have laid down a rule that the introductory *sloka* or *mangala sloka* should give the gist of the book briefly, or at least hint at it.

2. Pre-eminent shines the sage Yamuna by whom was dispelled the darkness of delusion (1) which maintained that Brahman was subject to ignorance or *avidya* and fell into the bondage of births and deaths (*samsara*), (2) the delusion which held that Brahman became helpless owing to its connexion with adjuncts other than itself (*para-upadhi*) and likewise, too, the delusion that Brahman

is the seat of imperfections (owing to its evolution into the sentient and the non-sentient world).

NOTE:—In the second *sloka*, Sri Ramanuja pays his homage to his great *Guru*, Yamunacharya (otherwise known as Alavandar) who, by his treatises, *Atmasiddhi*, *Samvit Siddhi*, *Iswara Siddhi*, *Gitartha Sangraha* and the like, refuted the doctrines of rival systems like Advaita by showing that they were against the *Srutis* and against reason.

In (1) the delusion is that of the Advaitins; in (2) it is that of Bhaskara, the exponent of one school of *Bhedabheda* and in (3) Ramanuja refers to the view of Yadavaprakasa who favoured another school of *Bhedabheda*.

This is the gist of the Upanishads whose aim is to impart distinctive knowledge of what is good to the whole world:— Meditation, adoration, obeisance, etc., of the two feet of the Supreme Being, done with intense love, are the means of attaining Him, when they are accompanied by the performance of the duties of one's *varna* (caste) and *asrama* (stage of life) and preceded by a knowledge of the real nature of the *Jiva* and of the Supreme Being. "He who is in the soul and within the soul, whom the soul is not aware of, He whose body is the soul (of the *Jiva*), who controls the soul, that spirit is the Inner Ruler Immortal". *Brh. Up.* (5—7—22) "This (Being) is the innermost soul of all beings, free from all imperfections, resplendent, the same everywhere. He is Narayana". *Subala Upanishad* (7).

"The seers of Brahman long to know Him with the help of the Vedic texts, by the performance of sacrifices (*yajna*) in accordance with *varna* and *asrama*, by charitable gifts, by *tapas* (meditation) and by freedom from desires. *Brh. Up.* 6—4—22.

"He who knows Brahman attains the supreme". (*Taittiriya Upanishad*).

NOTE :—According to Ramanuja, the word *knows (veda)* here means *adores*

“ He who knows Him in this manner becomes immortal (free from bonds). There is no other way of attaining” (*Purusha Sukt*), and there are other texts like it.

NOTE :—*Knows* means *worships* or *adores*. *Vide* Note above.

The soul of the Jiva, in its real nature, has none of the varied differences arising from the specific modifications of *Prakriti* or matter, such as gods and men and has knowledge and bliss alone as its attributes. When the difference such as exists between gods, men and the like, arising from *harma* has been destroyed, the difference between one soul (*Jiva*) and another is not capable of being expressed in words and can only be felt by themselves. Only this much can be said of the soul, that it is of the nature of knowledge or consciousness. This is true of all souls.

The Inner Ruler Immortal is Bhagavan Narayana who, as Purushottama, is different from all else. He is the sole cause of the origin, continuance and dissolution of the Universe of sentient and non-sentient things described above, as also of granting release from *samsara*. His nature is different from that of all things other than Himself by virtue of His being at variance with all imperfections and by virtue of His being the home of infinite bliss. He possesses hosts of infinite and countless auspicious qualities. He is referred to in all the Upanishads in varied terms like *sarvatma* (the Universal Soul), Parabrahman (the Supreme Brahman), *Parajyotis* (the Supreme Light or Splendour), *Paratattva* (the Supreme Truth), *Paramatma* (the Supreme Spirit) and *Sat* (Reality).

In their attempt to explain His greatness, the *Srutis* (Vedantic texts) refer to the world in phrases like *tacchakti* (His power), *tadamsa* (a fragment or portion of His), *tadvibhuti*, (His magnificence), *tadrupa* (His form), *taccharira* (His body), *tattanu* (His body) and so also by co-ordinating Him with the world because He controls it by being the inmost soul of all things, sentient and non-sentient.

NOTE:—Samanadhikaranya. When two things are put in grammatical apposition with each other, there is said to be *Samanadhikaranya* between them. In the famous Upanishadic text *That Thou art*, That and Thou are in apposition or coordination with each other. When we say "Janaka is the king", Janaka and the king are put in coordination with each other. Two words having different meanings are employed to describe the same object. In the text, "That Thou art" addressed to Svetaketu, *That* and *Thou* are used in co-ordination or grammatical apposition with each other. According to Ramanuja, *That* refers to the Supreme Being who creates, sustains and destroys all things; *Thou* refers to the Supreme Being, the Inner Ruler who controls the soul of Svetaketu from within. The meaning of the text is, therefore, as follows:— "The Supreme Being who is the Lord of the Universe is, O Svetaketu, the Inner Ruler who is the soul of your soul". Ramanuja argues thus: When we say 'Svetaketu', we refer not only to the bodily form of Svetaketu but to the soul of Svetaketu as well. The signification of the term does not stop there. It refers also to the Supreme Being who is the soul of Svetaketu's soul and of whom Svetaketu's soul is the body. Sankara, on the other hand, maintains that *samanadhikaranya* or appositional use or coordination of words expresses identity between the two things. "That Thou Art" means, according to him, the identity of the individual self with the Supreme Spirit.

The philosophical systems of Sankara (*Advaita*), and of Bhaskara and Yadavaprakasa (*Bhedabheda*).

In their attempt to explain this co-ordination (between Brahman and the self as also Brahman and the world), as found in "That Thou art" and "All this is Brahman", whose purpose is to bring out the greatness of Brahman by stating that He is in all things, some (commentators) maintain the following view:—

“Brahman is pure knowledge or consciousness, devoid of any difference or specific particularity (*visesha*); though Brahman is eternally free and self-evident or self-luminous, it is identical with the individual self as understood from the coordination (*samanadhikaranyam*) contained in texts like *That Thou Art*. Brahman itself is in the bondage (of *samsara*) owing to ignorance or nescience (*avidya*); and that which obtains release is Brahman. The whole Universe with its endless differences like Iswara and sentient beings and non-sentient things controlled by Him which are other than pure consciousness without difference are illusory (*mithya*); the distinction that one is in bondage and that another is free from it has no basis; it is also illusory to think that some *souls attained salvation or release from bondage before now; only one body is animated by the soul or self and the other bodies are soulless; it is impossible to state which that one body is. The *acharya* or preceptor who teaches divine knowledge is illusory; *Sastra* or scripture is illusory too; the one who understands the scripture is illusory and likewise the knowledge arising from scripture; and all this is understood only from this illusory scripture.

NOTE:—This is Ramanuja's summing up of Sankara's *advaita* and his doctrine of *Maya* and illusory appearance.

* NOTE:—*Like Suka, Prahlada and Vamadeva.

Bhaskara's Bhedabheda.

Others maintain that Brahman, though possessed of all auspicious qualities like freedom from imperfections, should be considered, in the light of the texts declaring identity (between Brahman and the world and between Brahman and the individual self), as

becoming subject to bondage and release owing to its association with some limiting adjunct (*Upadhi*) and that it is also subject to various modifications of an impure nature.

NOTE:—This is Ramanuja's summing up of Bhaskara's Bhedabheda system.

NOTE:—*Modifications:* Changes in matter or changes into various non-sentient objects.

Yadavaprakasa's Bhedabheda.

Others still, in explaining the truth of the texts teaching identity hold that, though Brahman is the sea of unsurpassed and boundless qualities, it is of such a nature as to become gods, men, animals, dwellers in hell and in *Svarga*, and souls that have attained release. By nature, He is different as well as not different from them and is subject to various modifications of an impure nature.

NOTE:—What do the *Śrutis* mean when they speak of the individual self as being identical with the Supreme Self or Brahman and of all things being Brahman? The answer to this question is different in the different systems and it is this answer which gives each system its definite character. According to Sankara, since the individual self is Brahman shadowed by *avidya* (ignorance or nescience) and since this *avidya* is itself illusory, there is only one Reality, namely Brahman and no other. The individual self, when it realizes its identity with Brahman becomes Brahman. Brahman is pure *chit* or consciousness. It is not conscious of anything else, for there is nothing else that is real. Nothing can be predicted of this *chit* except that it is or that it is *sat*.

Bhaskara and his followers say that Brahman has attributes or qualities and that it is not mere indifferent *chit*. Brahman is possessed of countless auspicious qualities and is not bound by *Karma*; but owing to its association with *upadhis* or limiting adjuncts, it is seen as gods, men, animals and the like. These *Upadhis* are the bodies and senses like those of gods, men, animals and plants. Brahman changes into gods, men, animals and plants and so also into inanimate forms of matter. This explains, accord-

ing to Bhaskara, the statement of identity in texts like "That Thou art" and "All is indeed Brahman". The *Upadhis* are, in Bhaskara's system, real. Hence, the individual selves and the world of inanimate objects are real. Bhaskara condemns the doctrine of *Maya* and the theory of the world's illusory appearance. Brahman is, in reality, not different from the individual souls except for the latter's adventitious association with *Upadhis*. When the *Upadhis* disappear in *mukti*, there is no difference at all between Brahman and the individual souls. Brahman is, by nature, not different from sentient and non-sentient things. The difference between Brahman and non-sentient things is natural. In the case of sentient things the difference is due to the adventitious association with *Upadhis*.

Yadavaprakasa agrees with Bhaskara in describing Brahman as possessed of attributes or qualities. He holds that Brahman is capable of existing as gods, men, animals and plants and likewise as non-sentient objects. By nature, it is both different and non-different from them.

To Bhaskara, the difference between Brahman and the conscious self is adventitious, being the result of *Upadhi*. Essentially, there is no difference between them. In the case of non-sentient objects, the difference is natural and essential. To Yadavaprakasa, on the other hand, in the case of both sentient and nonsentient objects, the differences are natural and not adventitious and so also the non-difference. Even without *Upadhi*, Brahman has the capacity of becoming sentient and non-sentient things.

These two systems are called *Bhedabheda*: (ie) *bheda* and *abheda*, because, according to them, Brahman is both different from the *Jivas* and non-sentient objects and at the same time not different.

Criticism of Sankara's Advaita.

Against the first of these three views (Sankara's *Advaita*), those who have made a comprehensive study of the meaning of the *Srutis* adduce the following unanswerable objections:-

For instance: The word *That* (in "That Thou art") refers to Brahman as the subject treated in the context. The origin, sustenance, and dissolution of the world are said to arise from its will in such words as begin with "It willed to become many" and end with "The world with all the souls (*Prajas*) in it,

my child, has its origin in *Sat* (Reality) or Brahman, its support and sustenance in *Sat* (Reality or Brahman) and its dissolution in *Sat*". In other contexts, boundless, unsurpassed and innumerable auspicious attributes like omniscience, omnipotence, the lordship of all, the attribute of having all things as its modes (*prakaras*), having neither equals nor superiors, the nature of one who has all the means of satisfying whatever is desired and whose purposes are for ever realised and the power of illuminating all other things are predicated (in the *Srutis*) and likewise His being at variance with every form of imperfection as in the words "untouched by sin". All these are adversely affected on this view (*Advaita*), as it holds that Brahman is without any difference or particularity or attribute (*nirvishesha*).

(By way of answer) it might be said by the Advaitin, "At the beginning of that context (in *Chandogya Upanishad*), it is declared that, "by knowing the One, all things are known". This implies that only the ultimate cause is true. The *Sruti* then proceeds to explain how the cause alone is true and how all effects are false by giving the illustration of mud, after which, in the passage "*Sat* (Reality or Brahman) alone, my child, existed at first, One and without a second", all difference is said to be non-existent—difference from like things and from unlike things. Other texts in different contexts which clarify this passage teach Brahman's being without any difference, particularity or attribute. They are:—
 " *Brahman is truth, consciousness, infiniteness".
 " †(Brahman) is without parts, without action, without attributes and without faults." " ‡(Brahman)

*Taittiriya Upanishad.

† Taittiriya Upanishad.

‡ Taittiriya Aranyaka.

is of the nature of consciousness and bliss", and the like. It is wrong to say that, if many words are employed to signify the same object (as in truth, consciousness, infiniteness), they would become synonymous (and consequently tautological and unnecessary), for though the object signified is only one, all these words are appropriate as they bring out Brahman's being opposed to every form of difference or particularity (*visesha*).

NOTE:—When the Sruti says, Brahman is "truth, consciousness, infiniteness", the Advaitin explains its meaning thus:—Brahman is other than untruth or that which is unreal. It is other than that which is non-sentient, it is other than the finite. These are three negative statements about a single entity and are *not* three different and positive attributes.

NOTE:—*The illustration of mud*: When his father says, "By knowing the one all things are known", Svetaketu does not understand how that could be. His father explains the statement with an illustration. He says:— "In the same way as everything made of mud is understood from a single lump of mud" (out of which the others are made). The teacher elaborates the point by adding "The effects arising from mud are only words and names. Only the mud is real". This is the Advaitic interpretation of the text and is brought in to justify the view that only the primal cause, *Sat*, is true or real and that all the effects which appear thereon are mere names and appearances which are illusory". Ramanuja's interpretation of this text will be found elsewhere.

This is not a proper answer. According to this view (*Advaita*), since everything is illusory (*mithya*), there is nothing else that requires to be known. It cannot then be proved that all things are known by knowing the One. If the meaning of "all things are known by a knowledge of the One (i. e.) Brahman" is that, since they and the One are of the same nature, when the One is known, the rest are also known, it will have to be admitted either that Brahman and the world (its effect) are both real or that they are both unreal.

On the view (held by us) that everything (in the world) has Brahman as its innermost soul, it would be easy to understand how by knowing the One, everything (else) is known.

NOTE:—Ramanuja's view is this; The world has Brahman as its soul and is therefore an attribute (*Viśeṣana*) of Brahman. So, when Brahman is known, everything else is known, because Brahman is the substantive of which everything else is an attribute. The substantive being the same in both cases, when the One is known, the others are known as well.

This is the meaning (of the *Sruti*):- The father said to Svetaketu, "You are puffed up (with pride). Did you at all ask about that *Adesa*?" (You seem elated as if you knew everything; did you ask about that *Adesa* also?).

Adesa is one by whom everything is ruled. *Adesa* means *Prasasanam* (rule or government as in the text); "It is *in accordance with the rulership of this *Akshara* (Brahman), O Gargi, that the sun and the moon receive their support". Manu uses the word in the same sense: † "*Prasasitaram sarvesham*: the ruler over all". Here, too, after declaring by the word 'One' that Brahman is the material cause of the world, the idea that He alone is the ruler of the world is brought out by the word *Advitiya* "without a second", which denies the existence of any other ruler. So, what was said (by Svetaketu's father) means: Did you ask about the One who rules the Universe and who is also its material cause? It is by hearing of Him, by thinking of Him, by knowing Him, (all other things) that have not been heard of, thought of, or known, become heard of, thought of and known". The idea in the mind (of the father)

* Br. Up. 5, 8, 9.

† Manu: Smṛiti 12—1—22.

is this:— “Have you learnt (from your teachers about Brahman who is the ultimate cause of such things as the origin, the welfare and the dissolution of the whole world, who is also omniscient, who has always all objects of desire and who is the ocean of infinite and noble attributes ?”

NOTE:—*Adesa*: Sankara looks upon this word as synonymous with *Upadesa*, ‘teaching’ and that which is taught. It means according to him, Brahman, the subject matter of instruction and not Brahman who is the ruler. If the latter interpretation were accepted, it would imply that Brahman has attributes. So, he rejects it.

The cause itself is called the effect when it assumes varied and peculiar configurations (*samsthana*). Therefore, since Brahman is the cause of all, by knowing Brahman, the cause, which has, for its body, sentient and non-sentient things in their subtle state, the whole world, which is the effect, becomes known. Having this (truth) in mind, the father said to his son, “Did you ask about That by hearing of which everything is heard of, by thinking of which everything is thought of and by knowing which everything is known?”.

The son does not understand what is in the father’s mind, namely, that all these things have the same one cause. He thinks that when two things are different from each other, it is not possible to know one of them by knowing the other. So he asks, “Of what nature, revered sir, is that *Adesa*?”

The father being urged in this way proceeds to explain the idea in his mind. This idea may be stated as follows:— The Supreme Brahman who is characterised by consciousness, bliss and freedom from all imperfections, whose magnificence is infinite, who is possessed of infinite, unsurpassed

and innumerable collections of attributes including omnipotence (*satyasamkalpatva*) and who is ever the same without change or modification (*avikari*) has, for His body, sentient and non-sentient things and, by His *leela* or sportful activity and by His will, assumes, in a part or portion (*amsa*) of Himself, the configuration of the world with its countless and varied forms consisting of things that move and things that do not move. Hence, by knowing Him (Brahman), all the rest is known. He explains, with the help of an example, what is seen in the world of everyday life, *viz.*, that the effect is none other than the cause.

NOTE:—According to Visistadvaita, the world is the body of Brahman. It may be asked what is meant here by the *body*. The body should not be defined as the seat of movement and of the senses. That substance which is invariably supported and controlled by another and which exists to serve the purposes of that other is the body of that other substance. In this sense the world of inanimate matter and the souls of sentient beings are the body of the Supreme Lord. In Himself there is no change or modification (*vihara*): changes and modifications occur only in His body as a result of His will.

“In the same way as, by knowing a single lump of mud, my dear, all things made of mud would become known; in order to become fit for the interchange of thoughts in words, modifications and names are attained by mud. The truth is that they are all mud”. (The meaning of the *Śruti* is as follows):— The same substance, mud, attains modifications which are of the nature of varied configurations or states, such as pots and dishes, and acquires also varied names, but since all these states are only particular configurations of mud, it is only the substance, mud, that exists in these forms and not any other substance. “In the same way as by knowing a lump of mud, its modifications like

dishes which are only particular configurations thereof become known". This is the meaning.

Thereafter, the son, who does not know how Brahman is the sole cause of the whole world, says, "Revered Sir, kindly explain this to me". In order to show that Brahman, who is omniscient and omnipotent, is alone the cause of all, he (the father) says, "This * was, at first, my dear, only *Sat*, only One without a second".

In this passage, "*this*" refers to the world. "At first" means "before creation". By (the words) *only Sat*, (the truth) that the world existed in the form of *Sat* (its cause) is brought out; even during creation, it is likewise in the form of *Sat*; but, before creation, the world existing as *sat* could not be distinguished by names or forms. From this explanation itself, it is clear that *sat* is the material cause (*upadana karana*). The word *advitiya* (without a second) explains how Brahman alone is the instrumental or operative cause (*nimitta karana*) and denies the existence of any *nimitta karana* other than Brahman.

NOTE:—In the case of the pot, mud is called the material cause and the potter the instrumental cause.

The thought in his mind that the one who governs (or controls) is also the material cause (*upadana karana*), as implied in the question put at the very beginning, *viz.*, "Did you ask about that *Adesa* by hearing of which everything else that is unheard of becomes heard of — this thought he now explains very clearly; *Sat* which is itself the material cause and the instrumental cause willed (as follows):—

* Ch. Up. 6-1, 4.

“I will become the many; I will be born (as the many)”. Chandogya Upanishad: 6-2-3

The Supreme Brahman Himself, who is referred to in the word *Sat*, who is omniscient and omnipotent and whose purpose is ever realised, willed to become the world with all its diverse and countless beings, sentient and non-sentient, (saying), “I will become the many and, for that purpose, be born as the many”. Though He has all the objects that may be desired, (He willed so) for (His) sport. (Having so determined), He created from a fragment of a part of His, (namely, His body which is an attribute of His), the elements beginning with ether (*Akasa*). Again the same Supreme Deity denoted by the word *Sat* willed (as follows):— “Lo! † I will enter into these three deities with my body, *viz.*, the individual self and endow them with names and forms”. The *Śruti* explains, by the “individual self which is my body”, that the individual self has Brahman as its soul; it further shows that all non-sentient things (*achit*) become entities only owing to the entrance into them of the individual self which has Brahman as its soul and that only all things that are of this description (*achit*) acquire names and forms.

NOTE:—*These three deities*:— Ether, air and fire, the three elements are called *deities* here. Water and earth are also referred to by implication.

NOTE:—Even non-sentient things have, according to Visishtadvaita, an element of *chit* or consciousness, though it is extremely small.

NOTE:—*A fragment of a part of His*: Before creation, Brahman existed with sentient and non-sentient things (*chit* and *achit*) in their subtle state, when they could not be distinguished by names or forms. In creation, the substantive part or (*visishya*) *amsa* or *svarupa* of Brahman creates, by its will, from out of the

attributive part (*viseshana amsa*), namely, His body consisting of subtle *chit* and *achit*, the grosser forms of animate and inanimate things which we now see in the world. What changes or undergoes modifications is the body or the attributive part of Brahman and not its *svarupa* or substantive part which is unchanging (*nirvikara*).

What has been said (so far) means this :- The individual self (*Jivatma*), being the body of Brahman, is an attribute or mode (*prakara*) of His and has Brahman as its soul, as is (declared) in another *sruti* : "He whose body is the self (*Jivatma*);" things which have the configurations of gods, men and the like, being the bodies of the individual self, are its modes (or attributes) and for that reason, all these have Brahman as their soul. Therefore, all words in familiar use in the world as denoting (things) which are formed by the combination of the root (*prakriti*) and the termination-(all words) such as god, man, Yakshas, Rakshasa, cow, deer, bird, tree, creeper, wood, stone, grass, pot, cloth etc., denote, through the things which have the respective configurations implied as their signification, both the individual self presiding over it and the Supreme Self which is the soul (of the individual self).

NOTE :-According to Ramanuja, when we say *Devadatta*, we mean not only the bodily configuration of *Devadatta*, but also the self or soul of *Devadatta* and, likewise also, the Supreme Self who is the soul of *Devadatta*'s soul (which is its body).

Thus, the world which consists of all the sentient and non-sentient things has *Sat* as its material cause and *Sat* as its instrumental cause. Likewise, it has *Sat* as its support (*adhara*), and is governed by *Sat* and exists to subserve the purposes of *Sat*. All this and the like are explained at length in *Srutis* like "These * beings (*prajas*) arise, my dear, from *Sat* their origin, have their being in

* Chandogya Upanishad : 6-8-6.

Sat and are (ultimately) absorbed into *Sat*." Having established this, by such means as the relationship between cause and effect, the *Sruti*: "All this has this (Brahman) as its soul and that alone is real (*satyam*)" points out that Brahman, being the soul of the whole world, is alone true. Having declared that He alone is the soul of the whole world and that the whole world is His body, the *Sruti* concludes with the application of the general truth established before that all things have Brahman as their soul to the case of a particular individual self (namely, Svetaketu) by saying "That Thou art". Therefore, this mode or individual self signified by the word 'Thou' is also Brahman". What has been said means this :- When it is said "All this has this as its soul", by (the phrase) 'all this,' the world consisting of sentient and non-sentient things is referred to and it is declared (by the *Sruti*) that of this world, this (*viz.*, Brahman) is the soul. In relation to the world, Brahman is explained to be the soul". This is the meaning.

We should consider what (exactly) is meant by *Brahmatmakatvam* or having Brahman as its *atma* or soul. "Is it because of the relationship that exists between soul and body or is it identity of nature? If (it is said that it is due to) identity (of the world and Brahman) that the qualities of Brahman implied at the beginning, such as ever-realised purpose or will, in the text, "It willed that It would become the many and be born" would become * contradicted (or sublated). That the world has Brahman as its soul owing to the relationship (between the two) of body and soul is understood specifically from another *sruti*, *viz.*, "Having

NOTE:—* contradicted because neither non-sentient things nor sentient things in the world have such qualities.

entered within as the ruler, He is the soul of all persons". From this, it is specifically understood that Brahman is the soul or self of all, that He is the soul of all persons and that everything is His body. (Further), there is another *sruti* which says: "He * who stands in the soul (of the Jiva) and is within the soul, of whom the soul is not aware, to whom the soul is the body and who controls the soul, He is thy soul, the Inner Ruler, who is immortal."

Here (in the present context) also, by the phrase "by means of the individual self who is my body", the same is meant as has already been stated. Therefore, since all sentient and non-sentient things are the body of Brahman, Brahman who has everything for His body and everything as His attribute (*prakara*) is also signified by all words. "That (art) Thou"—by this co-ordination, only Brahman which has the individual self as its body and, likewise, the individual self as its attribute is signified. When it is stated in this manner, this is understood to be the purport:— He (i. e. the individual self) who is at first understood from the word "Thou" as the presiding spirit in the body is himself the body of the Supreme Self and the attribute of the Supreme Self; he is sustained by the Supreme Self and is unable to exist and act apart (from the Supreme Self). Hence, the word 'Thou' signifies the Inner Ruler who has 'thee' as His attribute. In the *Sruti* "I will enter through the individual self who is my body and endow (all things) with names and forms", the individual self, who has a body of his own, acquires his name only by being the body of Brahman.

In the co-ordination or grammatical apposition (*Samanadhikaranya*) between "That" and 'Thou'

* *Bṛhadaranyaka Upanishad. Antaryami Brahmanan.*

(in "That art Thou"), the two words refer only to Brahman. Of the two, the word 'That' signifies Brahman, the ultimate cause of the world, the treasure-house of all auspicious qualities, free from all imperfections and changeless. The word 'Thou' refers to the same Brahman who has the individual self, which is His body, as His attribute by being the Inner Ruler of the Individual self. Thus, the two words 'That' and 'Thou' refer to the same Brahman by the difference in their meanings. Brahman's being free from imperfection and from all change (or modification), His being the treasure-house of all auspicious qualities and His being the cause of the world are not contradicted (or affected in any way).

NOTE:—Co-ordination or *samanadhikaranyana*. Sankara holds that the co-ordination in 'That art Thou' means only identity or oneness of the Jiva and Brahman. Ramanuja contends that there is co-ordination or grammatical apposition only when two words having different meanings apply to the same thing and not when they signify their identity.

Those persons who have not studied Vedanta do not realise that all non-sentient things and all individual selves have Brahman as their soul. They think that the signification of all words is confined only to the respective objects which are (only) a portion of what is expressible by them. Those who have studied Vedanta are, on the other hand, aware, as a result of their study of Vedantic texts, that, since all things are created out of Brahman and have Brahman as their Inner Ruler, they have Brahman as their soul and that all words signify Brahman who has all things as His (modes or attributes) (*prakara*).

(It may be asked), "Well, if so, the significance of words like 'cow' as denoting the respective object (commonly understood in ordinary life) will be

affected adversely." It is not so. When it is stated, "I will endow them with names and forms", it means that all words are expressive of (signify) Brahman who has for His attributes *chit* and *achit*. Since the Supreme Being, who is the primary part of the signification of a word, is not capable of being understood by such means as perception (*pratyaksha*), laymen who use the word think that its signification becomes complete in what is only a part (and that a secondary part) of the signification. By the study of Vedanta, the knowledge of the signification becomes complete. Thus all words employed in the Veda point to their respective meanings ending with the Supreme Being. All words are only Vedic. After creating all things as before (as in previous creations), the Supreme Brahman took the words again and again from the Veda and employed them as names to denote those things, as also their ultimate (soul) *viz.*, the Supreme Being.

So says Manu :-

"He † (the Supreme Being) created the names of all things, their varied activities and also their specific forms (*samstha*) from the words in the Veda".

The word *samstha* (in the *sloka*) means 'forms' or configurations. Likewise Bhagavan Parasara says :- "He, § the Supreme Being, established, at the beginning, the names and forms of all beings such as gods and all activities only from the words in the Vedas."

So also the *Sruti* :- "The ‡ Supreme Being created the sun and the moon as before". The

† Manu Smriti : 1, 20. :

§ Vishnu Puranam : 1, 5, 63,

‡ Taittiriya 1 (Anuvaka).

meaning is "Having created the sun and the like as before, he gave them also names as before".

In this way is explained the statement that the world is none other than Brahman. From this, it is clearly understood how by knowing the One, all things become known. Since all things are the effects (or modifications) arising out of Brahman, they are real, only in so far as they have Brahman as their soul and in no other way. That is why it was said, "That is truth (Reality)" in the same way as in the illustrative example, all modifications arising out of mud are true only in so far as they are mud.

NOTE:—Among the passages in the Upanishads that refer to Brahman, some are called "causation texts" (*Karana Vakya*). One such is the passage which begins with 'Sat alone, my dear, existed at the beginning. It willed to become many'. Other passages explain the nature of Brahman, who is the cause of the world. These are called 'clarifying texts' (*sodhakavakya*). An instance of this is the text in the *Taittiriya Upanishad* which describes Brahman as Reality, Consciousness and Infiniteness.

Hitherto, Ramanuja has been discussing the real significance of the 'causation texts'. He now proceeds to examine, in the same way, the real import of the clarifying texts.

The clarifying texts also make the nature of the Supreme Brahman clear (by describing Him) as free from faults (or imperfections) and as the treasure-house of all good qualities.

Even if the words (truth, consciousness and infiniteness) are understood as signifying the opposite of all (those) qualities, since difference, attribute, or particularity cannot be avoided in deciding the oppositeness to the respective quality, a thing which has no difference or particularity (*bheda*) cannot be proved as existing.

Notes:—From now on, Ramanuja seeks to show that Brahman which is stated by Advaitins to be without any attribute, difference or particularity (*bheda*) cannot be proved to exist as such.

Notes:—The words Ramanuja has in mind and does not state are those in the clarifying passage, "Brahman is Truth (*satyam*) (Reality), consciousness (*jnana*) and infiniteness (*anantam*)" in the *Taittiriya Upanishad*. What do these words mean? Advaitins who deny difference, particularity or any positive attribute in Brahman explain the words thus. Brahman is said to be Truth or Reality. It means that Brahman is other than the untrue or unreal. Brahman is the non-existence of unreality. When Brahman is said to be *Jnana*, the meaning is that it is other than the unconscious. Infiniteness means the opposite of finiteness or non-existence of finiteness. These three words do not, according to them, mean three different qualities or even three different aspects of Brahman. They refer only to the non-existence of three things and therefore signify only the same unity. The absence of a pot, the absence of a cloth, the absence of a dish and so on, do not signify three or more positive entities but only a single unity. Ramanuja presumes that the reader knows the *Śruti* and the meaning given to the passage by Advaitins and proceeds to criticise their interpretation.

Advaitins say that these three words, "Truth, consciousness and infiniteness" should not be interpreted as three different qualities relating to Brahman. Their reason is that if there are three different adjectives or attributes to a substantive, they would mean three different objects possessing these respective qualities. They cite, as an example, the phrase "the cow with broken horns, without horns and with horns intact". These three attributes would imply three different cows and not a single cow. So also, if truth, consciousness and infiniteness are taken as three positive attributes of Brahman, the unity of Brahman would be impossible. Ramanuja's answer to this objection is as follows: It is only if the three attributes are opposed to one another, as in the example cited by the Advaitins, that the substantive will have to be three entities. But, if there is no mutual incompatibility among the attributes, the unity would not be affected. For example, if it is said "The young, dark-complexioned, redevyed Devadatta", the single Devadatta may have all the three attributes, as they do not contradict one another.

The Advaitins might raise the following objection:— Well, when it is declared that Brahman is

mere knowledge (or consciousness), the conclusion is inevitable that it has no attributes or particularities like knowledge. (It cannot therefore be stated that Brahman who *is* knowledge *possesses* knowledge as a quality. How can knowledge, which is Brahman, be said to possess knowledge as an attribute?).

(This objection does not hold good). Words denoting attributes and which distinguish an object signify also the object through the attributes (as is seen in words like 'cow'. So, the author of the *Sutras* says: "Since * it possesses that quality as its essence (*viz.* knowledge), it (the Atman) is called by that name as in the case of the *Prajna*." Since Brahman who is referred to as '*Prajna*.' (the wise one), Brahman, the wise, He who knows all and sees all, the one who knows all is alone called "Truth, knowledge and infiniteness", because He has knowledge as His essential quality. The Sutrakara says also, "This is † not improper as (the quality in question) lasts as long as the self exists", By the attribute 'knowledge', Brahman's nature is also indicated. It does not mean that Brahman is mere knowledge (without the attribute of knowing). If it is asked, "How is this learnt?", the answer is that it is learnt from hundreds of Vedic texts like the following:- "He who ¹ knows all and sees whatever is in all" and such others as indicate Brahman as the knower, "His ² might is declared to be supreme and varied and His knowledge, strength and action are natural to him." "By ³ what means can one know the knower?". Since knowledge is

* Brahma Sutras : 2-3-29.

† Brahma Sutras : 2-3-30.

¹ Mundaka Upanishad : 1-1-9.

² Svetasvatara Upanishad : 6-8.

³ Brihadaranyaka Upanishad : 4-4-14.

only an attribute, it cannot be proved to be also a thing. Therefore the words truth, knowledge and infiniteness denote only Brahman who is qualified by attributes like knowledge signified by these words.

Note:—*Prajna* (or Brahman) is called *ananda* or bliss because bliss is an essential attribute of His.

The meaning of Samanadhikaranyam or co-ordination as in Tat Tvam Asi (That Thou Art.)

Note:—(So far Ramanuja has been arguing that the *Śrutis* give plenty of evidence for a Brahman with attributes, a Brahman that knows and not a Brahman without any attributes, a Brahman that is mere consciousness which is conscious of nothing. He now points out that grammatical co-ordination or apposition (*samanadhikaranyam*) as understood by grammarians agrees only with his interpretation of *Tat Tvam Asi* "That Thou Art" as given on page 54 and that the Advaitic interpretation is unwarranted).

If it is said that, in "That Thou art", the two words, That and 'Thou' lose their primary meaning and declare only the pure object (without any adjuncts or attributes), there will also be the fault of ignoring the primary (or direct) meanings. The Advaitin might say, 'Since the aim of the sentences is only to show that the two are one, the indirect interpretation or (figurative interpretation) of the word (*lakshana*) is no fault. For example, in the statement "This is that Devadatta", the word "that" denotes Devadatta related to a particular place and a particular time and the word 'this' Devadatta related to a place close by and the present time; the unity or oneness of Devadatta is thereby indicated. Here, it is impossible that the same (person) should simultaneously appear to be related to places

and times opposed to one another. Therefore the two words establish only the mere object "Devadatta" and its oneness. But this argument of the Advaitin cannot be accepted. Even in the statement, "This is that Davadatta", there is no trace of indirect signification (*lakshana*), as there is no objection to the (primary and) direct meaning being taken. There is no inconsistency in the same object (or person) being related to two actions, one in the past and another in the present. In the declaration that the object which is related to a past action and to a present is only one, there is no absurdity (or objection), as the object's existence in another place was in the past and its existence in the immediate neighbourhood is in the present. The opposition between the past and the present is removed by the difference in the time. Even if indirect signification is admitted to exist, the opposition is removed by the indirect signification being taken of one only (of the two words). But, we maintain that there is no indirect signification at all (in it), since what was connected with one place in the past may, without any contradiction, be connected with a different place at present. In the same manner, here also, it has been pointed out that there is no contradiction (or inconsistency) in the Supreme Brahman, who is the cause of the world, being also the soul of the Jiva or the individual self as his inner ruler. By grammatical co-ordination is understood only the identity of two things with their respective attributes as they are, and not bare identity which is arrived at by ignoring them (*vis.* the attributes). Those who know the meaning of grammatical co-ordination declare that it exists, when words expressive of different meanings apply to the same object. It is this kind of identity that is proved by us.

Note:—When we say “the Emperor Asoka”, there is grammatical co-ordination or apposition between the words ‘Emperor’ and ‘Asoka’. The two words have different meanings, “the one who was an Emperor” and the one whose name was Asoka. These two attributes meet in the same individual, when there is grammatical co-ordination (*samanadhikaranya*).

Further, it is not proper to determine the purport of the sentence occurring at the end (of the context) in a manner different from (or opposed to) what is said at the beginning. For, at the beginning by (the text), “It willed to become many”, and other texts, Brahman’s will being ever realised and (His) being the sole cause of the world are declared. And opposed to this is (the doctrine) that Brahman is the seat of *Avidya* (or nescience or ignorance).

Note:—Advaitins hold the view that Brahman is pure consciousness without any difference or particularity or attribute and that it sees the manifold world appearing illusorily over itself owing to its contact with *avidya*.

Moreover, *śabda*, verbal testimony (*Sruti*), obtains its validity as the result of words signifying different meanings and of sentences signifying the relation between these meanings. Therefore *Śabda* or (*Sruti*) is incapable of signifying objects without differences (or particularities) and cannot be the authority for the existence of an object without particularities (*nirviśeṣa vastu*). Words like ‘without particularities’ signify an object understood as qualified by some (attribute) or particularity as being without particularities understood as existing in other objects. Otherwise, they can signify nothing. Words which are constituted of roots and terminations (*prakṛiti* and *pratyaya*) imply through them many particularities or attributes and much truer is this of sentences, as they signify the connection existing among more words than one.

Nôte:—Among the sources of valid knowledge (*pramana*), the following are important;—Sense perception (*pratyaksha*), inference (*anumana*), and *śabda* (verbal testimony) (i. e.) the words of one whose reliability is unquestioned. Advaitins who speak of Brahman as something without particularities or attributes rely on the authority of *śabda* or *Śruti* which they consider superior to sense perception in its validity. This explains the relevancy of Ramanuja's argument given above.

It might be (said by the Advaitins). “We do not say that *śabda*, verbal testimony or Scripture, is the authority for the existence of a self-luminous thing which has no particularities. A thing whose existence is self-established (*svatasiddha*) does not require any (proof or) authority. By all the texts (in the *Śrutis*), all attributes or particularities that appear illusorily on Brahman, such as being a knower, are denied. When all particularities disappear, the thing in itself (Brahman) unrelated (to any attribute) and self-luminous stands by itself”.

But this cannot be. By what word is this thing (Brahman) indicated when its (attributes) or particularities are denied?. If it is said ‘By the word *Jnapti* or knowledge’, it cannot stand (to reason). That (word), too, relates to a thing with particularities or attributes as particularities are denoted by the base and the termination (*prakṛiti* and *pratyaya*). (The root) *Jna* means “to know”. It implies an object (that is known) and a subject or agent (that knows) and denotes also a special kind of action (*kriya*) which has the particularity of distinguishing it (or marking it off) from other actions. By the termination, the gender, the number (singular, dual or plural) and the like are indicated. If these particularities given above are ignored, the self-luminous nature of Brahman cannot be proved, for it is by its power of illuminating other things that the self-luminosity of *Jnapti* (Brahman) is established.

Note:—We infer that a thing is self-luminous from the fact of its being the cause of illuminating other things by its relation to them. 'Illuminating' means making them fit to be talked about-

Furthermore, if the whole of Brahman shines for ever, and by itself, no false super-imposition of illusory attributes would be possible in it. While the nature of the rope shines (as such), no illusory attributes can be superimposed on it. That is just the reason why you postulate an *avidya* (ignorance or nescience) which conceals or obscures (Brahman); hence, that phase (*amsa*) of Brahman which has been obscured is the scope (or aim) of the corrective or rectifying knowledge found in the scripture. Otherwise, there would be no manifestation of corrective power in it. The (illusion) of 'serpentness' disappears when the 'ropeness' which is other than the rope (and is in the rope), shines. If a single attribute or particularity (*visesha*) viz., its being capable of being obscured or concealed is expressed in *sabda* or verbal testimony (Sruti), then it would become possible for Brahman to be qualified by all the attributes assigned to it in all the texts of the Veda. So, to those who feel bound by the authority of the *pramanas* (valid sources of knowledge), there is no proof of any kind for the existence of the thing without particularities or attributes.

Note:—*Adhyasa* or superimposition occurs when, on seeing a rope lying on the ground, the illusion that it is a serpent occurs owing to some resemblances between the rope and the serpent. The serpent or 'serpentness' is said to be falsely imposed on the rope.

Note:—Advaitins hold that Brahman is the only reality and that the world of sentient and not-sentient things is an illusion or (*adhyasa*) super-imposed on Brahman owing to the obscuration brought about by *avidya*. If this *avidya* or ignorance is removed or dispelled by the corrective knowledge afforded by the *Sastras*, *avidya* and its obscuration do not exist and Brahman shines alone. Ramanuja asks, "Is it your view that the whole of Brahman, which is self-luminous, is concealed by *avidya* or only

a part of it? If you say 'the whole of it' it would then mean that Brahman ceases to exist. If you hold that a part of it is obscured and the rest shines, then Brahman must be considered to have parts (or *avayava*) and this would mean Brahman with particularities like parts (*savishesha*). If Brahman shines always, then there would be no possibility of illusory appearances. When the rope is seen as such, no one would mistake it for a serpent.

Note:—Advaitins maintain that there are three orders or degrees of reality. When a rope is mistaken for a serpent, the mind or (*antahkaraṇa*) projects for the time being an external serpent which is later sublated. This they call *pratibhasika satya*. The world is itself a similar projection but it will last until the end of the cosmic process. This they call *vyavaharika satya*. In *mukti*, the world disappears and only Brahman shines alone and without a second; the reality of Brahman is *paramartha satya*.

Even in indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka pratyaksha*), the object (always) appears as possessed of attributes. Otherwise, in the determinate perception (*savikalpaka pratyaksha*) (that follows), an object would not appear to be that which was seen before (as when we say) "This is that." 'Cowness' (or the distinctive nature of the cow) has the character of a specific or special configuration of the object. Therefore, even at the time of indeterminate perception, the object possessing that configuration appears to us as "of this form." In the second and other later appearances of the object, the same configuration appears to exist also in many other objects. What is peculiar to the second and later perceptions is that the feature which is characterised by the configuration is seen to persist in more objects than one and so is an attribute of more objects than one. Therefore, the second and other perceptions are called determinate perceptions.

Note:—So far Ramanuja stated that verbal testimony or scripture does not support the existence of an object without attributes. He now states that the existence of such an object is not evidenced by perception (*pratyaksha*).

For the same reason (*viz*) that, even in indeterminate perception, the object is perceived only with its attributes, the *Bhedabheda* view (held by Bhaskara and Yadavaprakasa) that the same object has a two-fold nature, being both different and non-different (from others) stands refuted. The configuration (*samsthana*) is an attribute (*prakara*) of the object possessing the configuration (or outline) and is therefore a different entity from the *prakarin* or object which has the attribute. But, since it is an essential or inseparable attribute, it cannot stand apart from the object and is also incapable of being perceived separately. From these two causes, the object should not be considered as being two-fold in nature (*bhinnabhinna*).

NOTE:—All along the author has been criticising the doctrines of Advaitins. In this paragraph, he points out that his refutation of the doctrine of indeterminate perception held by Advaitins is enough also to disprove the main doctrine of the *Bhedabheda* thinkers.

NOTE:—Advaitins hold that, in the first or indeterminate perception, the attributes of an object are not perceived. The perception is only of the nature of an 'is' without any distinguishing feature or attribute. They maintain that the perception is only of *asti* or existence and that the particularity such as pot, cloth, etc., is illusory.

NOTE:—Bhaskara and Yadavaprakasa reason as follows:—Experience shows that all objects are perceived both as different and as non-different. The cow appears different from the horse, but in as much as both are beasts, they are also non-different. Therefore both cows and horses are different and not different. Again between the material cause and the effect (what is made out of it), there is both difference and non-difference. The pot appears different from the mud, but we also say that the pot is mud. The two are equated and this would be possible only if there were no difference.

NOTE:—They argue further —It is not possible to perceive the individual without, at the same time, perceiving the genus (*jati*) to which it belongs. The two are always seen together. So, there is

both difference and non-difference between an individual object (*vyakti*) and the genus (*jati*) to which it belongs. Further, the same word denotes both the individual (*vyakti*) and the genus (*jati*). When we say "the cow", it refers to the cow with horns, the cow without horns, and the cow with broken horns, while it denotes also the genus "cow". So, the individual and the genus are both different and non-different.

Ramanuja's answer is that because the same word expresses both the individual and the genus, it does not follow that there is no difference between them. It only shows that the genus or configuration (*samsthana*) is an attribute inseparable from the individual (*vyakti*) and not that the attribute is the same as the object possessing the attribute.

Resumption of the arguments against Advaita.

Again, he who maintains the existence of an object without attributes (Brahman) and says that all illusory appearances which conceal the self-luminous object (Brahman) are rejected (as false) by all the texts of the Veda, should state what these texts are that reject them. They might quote the *Sruti* * "Modification and name like 'pot' and 'dish' are only for the purpose of speech, the mud alone is real", and say that, since modification and name are only in speech, the mere substance that is seen there as the material cause—that alone is true (real) and the rest are untrue (unreal). If it is said that this is what the Vedic text says, it cannot be considered as convincing. When it is declared that when One is known, all become known," Svetaketu does not think it possible that, by knowing one thing, another thing could be known. (It is to explain to him how this is possible that the *guru* answers). If the same substance exists in varied but real (and true) states, owing to specific modifications and the like, when one thing is known, though

* Chand. Up, 6-1-4

it has acquired configurations different from it, it remains the same substance and may therefore be stated to be known as well. It is to explain this that the example (of the mud) is employed. In this passage, there is no word at all denying any attribute. **Vacharambhanam*:- *vacha* - by speech or for a purpose, *arabhyate* is *arambhanam*. Mud which exists in the form of a lump has a certain name and a certain usefulness. The same mud, when it exists in the state of pot, dish and the like, has different names and different uses. In spite of this, the substance, mud, is the same in all. By different configurations and different names, mud is touched for different purposes (or uses). Therefore, this alone is the true (meaning). By this illustration, the possibility of knowing one thing by knowing another is brought out. No attribute or (particularity) of any kind has been rejected or (denied) here. This has already been explained at length.

Besides, if, by passages like, "By hearing of which, what is unheard of becomes heard", it is declared that everything except Brahman is illusory, then the illustrative example like "just as, my dear, by one lump of mud" will be of no use, because the illusoriness of modifications, pot, dish and the like, is not, like the illusion of the serpent in the rope, previously known to Svetaketu, the disciple, either by reason or by any other valid source of knowledge. If it is said (by the Advaitins) that even the illusoriness of pot, dish and the like is sought to be proved thereby, the introduction (of them) as examples by the use of the word "just as" would be improper (for it would be proper only on the assumption that Svetaketu was already aware of it).

* Chand. Up. 6-1-4.

(kinds of) power is not inconceivable. So, the phrase "without a second" denies the existence of any other instrumental cause or agent. It is only because Brahman is omnipotent that some Vedic passages first declare Him to be the material cause and then state that He is also the instrumental cause or agent as this *Sruti* does. Other Vedic passages, having first admitted Brahman's being the instrumental cause, ask how he could (at the same time) be the material cause and the like. They answer (the question) by saying that, owing to his possession of all forms of power, Brahman can be the material cause and also other accessory aids (required for the production of the effect). (Consider) this text * "O Sages., with what trees did He build up the sky and the earth? Where was the forest from which the trees were brought? Does it not support the world and remain as its controller? Is it this question that you ask? Brahman is the forest. Brahman is the tree (timber) for the construction of the sky and the earth. I tell you, in reply, that He supports the world and controls it." Here having raised a possible objection from what is commonly seen, the objection is removed on the ground of Brahman's being different from all else. So also in the passage, "This, my dear, existed only as *sat*," many attributes or particular features (*Viseshas*) like 'at first' are indicated. There is not a single word expressive of denial of attributes, which Advaitins favour. On the other hand, to explain the causal relation between Brahman and the world, the *Srutis* indicate thousands of attributes (or particular features), unknown before, like the existense of a particular time, as in the

*Ashtaka II, Prasna VIII, Anuvaka VII, Pan.VIII.

words 'at first,' a specific kind of action as in the word "was", Brahman's being both the material cause and the instrumental cause and so also, by the answer to the objection that the instrumental cause is (usually) different from the material cause, Brahman's possession of omnipotence.

It is because this (passage) aims at explaining the truth or (reality) of the causal relationship existing between Brahman and the world, that the view that the effect arises without a cause (*asat karya vada*) is refuted in the passage beginning with "This, at first, was non-existent." The question follows, "How could this be ²so, my dear?" The meaning is "The origin of a thing from that which did not exist before is impossible, as there would be no basis or sub-strate." The same is explained again in "How could a thing that really exists arise from something that has no real existence?". What arises from a thing that does not really exist must also be unreal, in the same way as a thing that is made of mud has the qualities of mud. This is the meaning. The words, 'origin from *sat*', mean the association (of *sat*) with a special state or condition which renders it fit for certain specific purposes (*vyavahara*).

What has been said (so far) comes to this- The same substance which, at first, was the cause, and later became associated with a different state or condition-the same substance is said to be the effect. The truth that is sought to be explained (in the context of *sadvidya* is that, by knowing one (thing), all (things) become known. This would be impossible on the view that the effect did not exist before (in the cause) *asat karya vada* and for the following reason:-

¹ Chand-Up. 6—2—1.

² Chand-Up. 6—2—2.

The *asat karya vadins* (the *Vaiseshikas*) state that there are three kinds of causes: the instrumental cause (*Nimitta karana*), the material cause (*samavayi karana*) and (*asamavayi karana*) the action which produces the effect or result. From these three, they say that a new substance *dravya* with the name of a composite or a whole consisting of parts (*avayavam*) is produced as effect. It would follow (on this view) that the effect is different from the cause. If so, by a knowledge of the cause, a knowledge of the effect could not result. (The *Vaiseshikas*) might ask, "How can you deny that the effect which is a composite or whole consisting of parts is a new substance?". The answer is (as follows):- "That the effect is a new substance is denied on two grounds. What you call a new substance is the same substance which has acquired a new state or condition. The same substance, having acquired a new state or condition, is called by a new name and serves a different purpose. There is no need to postulate a new substance, as we do not see a new substance. Therefore, it has been stated that the cause itself is called an effect, when it has acquired a new state or condition."

NOTE:—The *Vaiseshikas* argue as follows:— When a pot has to be produced as an effect, three kinds of causes or antecedents are necessary:— (1) the potter, his wheel, stick, *etc.* These are called *nimitta karana* or instrumental cause, (2) mud, the material cause or (*samavayi karana*) and (3) the action (*asamavayi karana*) by which the potsherds unite to become the pot. They hold that the final result or *karya* is different as substance from the mud as well as the potsherds.

NOTE:—The relevancy of Ramanuja's argument in the paragraph given above may not be clear at first sight. He maintains that the Vedic text, "This, my dear, had, at first, no existence" states the view of the *Vaiseshikas* that the effect, namely, the world, had no previous existence and that, in the process of creation, Iswara created it anew. Ramanuja states that the refutation of

this view which follows in the *Sruti* shows that the whole context is a statement of the doctrine of *asatkarya vada* held by the *Vaiseshikas* and a refutation of it by the *Sruti* itself.

NOTE :—Sankara, on the other hand, is of opinion that the passage in question is a statement of the doctrine of the *Madhyamika* school of Buddhists. They maintain that whatever exists is only momentary (*kshanika*) and do not accept the view of the Advaitins that *sat* is the Reality which is eternal and that all momentary or other illusory appearances cannot occur unless there is a permanent and real substrate. Advaitins think that, without a real and permanent substrate like rope, no illusion such as of serpent can take place. So, Sankara and his followers consider that the *Sruti* is here refuting not the *Vaiseshikas*, (as Ramanuja thinks), but the *Madhyamikas*, who deny the existence of any permanent or eternal reality such as Brahman. All this knowledge is presumed as known for the discussion which follows in the text of *Vedarthasangraha*.

The Advaitin might here object and say:- The *Sruti* here refutes *asatkaryavada* or the doctrine that the effect did not exist before in the cause (or as the cause), in order to show that no illusion can take place without a substrate or basis. For, so it is. The single Reality (Brahman), which is consciousness, when shadowed by *avidya* (ignorance or nescience), is illusorily seen as the world. This *avidya* requires, for its association or shadowing, some thing that is real as the ultimate cause. This view must be accepted and (it would follow therefrom) that the passage in question refutes the view that there is no such ultimate and real cause as Brahman. This objection of the Advaitins is not valid. The proposition that, by the knowledge of one, all things become known and the illustrative example of mud show that the aim (of this context, *sadvidya*) is to prove *satkaryavada* (*i. e.*) that the effect existed before as the cause and does not arise as a new substance. Further, it is not possible, on the view of Advaitins, to refute the *Madhyamika* doctrine that no permanent

substrate or basis is necessary for the occurrence of an illusion. He who holds that the defect in a conscious being is real and that this defect is associated with something that is also real—for him, illusory appearances like the city of the Gandarvas, mirage *etc.*, are easy to explain. But, he who considers that the defect (in perception) is unreal and that the mind which has this defect is also unreal, may well admit that, even when the substrate or basis is unreal, illusions might take place. Therefore, in the Advaitic system, it is impossible to disprove the occurrence of illusions without a (real or permanent) substrate. In the clarificatory passages also, like "Brahman is the true, the conscious, the infinite" and *"Brahman is bliss (*ananda*)," it has already been pointed out that only a Brahman with all manner of attributes is referred to, since the purport of grammatical apposition (*samanadhikaranya*) is not opposed to the indication of a single object qualified by more attributes than one.

(The Advaitin) might say:- In the text "Then (comes) the instruction not so, not so. †(*neti neti*)," there is a repeated denial (of *the world*). (We ask): What is denied' here must be stated. The Advaitin might reply:- † "Brahman has two forms, tangible and intangible" "The world of two kinds—that with (a visible material form (like earth and water) and that with an (invisible) intangible form like air, ether, *etc.*) is all denied here as existing". (We answer), "Having explained what was previously not known as His form *viz.*, that the world is the form of Brahman, it would be improper (for the *Sruti*, immediately afterwards, to deny it (as existing). "Better not to touch mire

* Taittiriya Br. 6. † Br-Up 4-3-6. ‡ Br-Up 4-3-6.

at all than to wash it off after getting smeared with it" says the proverb. What, then, it might be asked, is the meaning of the negative sentence? The author of the *Brahma Sūtras* has himself stated the meaning (in 3—2—21). "The denial is only of the possibility of limiting Brahman's nature to the two forms stated before in the context. Therefore, the *Śruti*, after this denial of limitation in two forms, proceeds again to state (a number of Brahman's qualities). Immediately after the sentence *neti neti*, the *Śruti* says, "His name is the True of the True, the individual souls are true and He (Brahman) is the True, more true than they". Since, in this way a number of attributes are declared of Brahman, it is only the limiting of Brahman to what has been already stated that is objected to (and not attributes). This is the meaning of the *Sūtra*.

The Advaitin might say (*neha nanasti kinchana*). "There is no such thing as plurality (or the manifold) here. In this and other Vedic sentences, the denial of plurality alone is seen." If it is stated so, we answer:— "Here also, immediately afterwards, the *Śruti* says, "He has all under His power, He rules over all." This brings out Brahman's irresistible will and lordship over all. The passage in question therefore means, "Iswara has all things, sentient and non-sentient as his body and is seen in all modes (or *prakaras*). He is the Lord of all." What is denied here is the existence of anything other than those that have Brahman as their soul and not the plurality that Advaitins have in mind. This is the real meaning

¹ Br. Up. 4—3—6.

² Br. Up. 6—4—19.

³ Br. Up. 6—4—22.

of all such *Srutis*. Therefore, nowhere do we find any *Sruti* which denies Brahman's being qualified with attributes.

Here ends the argument that the doctrine of Brahman's association with ignorance is against the spirit of the *Srutis*.

**The argument
that Brahman's association with ignorance is also
against reason.**

Further, the contention of the Advaitins that Brahman is pure consciousness without any attributes (or particularising features) and that, its real nature being concealed by *avidya* (ignorance or nescience), Brahman sees plurality imposed on it (illusorily), this contention is untenable. Concealment means obstruction to luminosity. You do not admit that Brahman, which is consciousness (light or luminosity,) has any *attribute* called luminosity other than itself. If (you say) that there is obstruction or concealment of luminosity which is (Brahman), it would mean that Brahman itself ceases to exist. To say that consciousness (Brahman), which is a synonym for luminosity, is eternal and, at the same time, to say that this luminosity is concealed by *avidya* is childish, (because it would be making contradictory statements.). When it is said that luminosity is concealed by *avidya*, it should mean (one of two things)—obstruction to the origination (*utpatti*) of luminosity or (obscuration or) destruction of already existing luminosity. Since (it is held) that luminosity is not a thing which has been newly created, it would follow that luminosity already existing perishes. (How then could it be said to be

eternal?). If, on the other hand, it is maintained that luminosity is eternal and unchanging, nothing could be said to be concealed in Brahman by *avidya*, even though the latter exists. To say that, owing to *avidya*, Brahman suffers obscuration and sees plurality is inconsistent. This position of the Advaitin is indeed inexpressible, *anirvachaniya*, (not worth putting forward) in the presence of thinking men.

NOTE:—Advaitins say that *avidya* is neither an existent like Brahman nor a non-existent like the flower in the sky, but a thing that has an inexplicable or inexpressible (*anirvachaniya*) existence. Ramanuja uses the word here in a different sense, meaning that their position is indeed indefensible.

But, sir, the Advaitin might say, "You have also to postulate a self whose nature is knowledge or consciousness and state that this consciousness is self-luminous. When this self imagines that it is a god and the like, it will have to be admitted (by you also) that this self-luminosity undergoes obscuration, for if there is self-luminosity, it would be impossible to imagine the super-imposition on itself of any other form (like that of god, man and the like). Therefore, the untenability that you have pointed out in our doctrine is common to you also. Furthermore, the untenability pointed out by you against us is only in relation to a single self (viz., Brahman), whereas, since you postulate an infinity of souls (the *jivatmas* or individual souls), this untenability will, in your case, have to be disproved in all of them".

To this we reply, "There is nothing difficult for us to prove since we believe that the aim of Vedanta is a knowledge of God or Brahman, that Brahman is, by nature, free from all imperfections, that He is solely of the nature of knowledge and bliss, that He is the abode, by nature, of bound-

less, unsurpassed, and innumerable noble qualities; that Brahman has two regions of magnificence (*vibhuti*), that of these two, one (*nitya vibhuti*) is infinite and untouched by the modifications or changes due to time which is the accessory (*nimitta*) cause of all modifications like the origin, continuance and perishing of all material things, (*Prakrita*)-time which is subject to modifications like *nimesha, kashtha, kala, muhurtha* and other measures extending up to *parardha*, that the other region of magnificence (*lila vibhuti*) consists of infinite sentient beings, bound and free (*baddha* and *mukta*), who are parts of Himself and, likewise, of all non-sentient things which are subject to infinite, wonderful and varied changes and which form the objects of enjoyment for the sentient beings, that Brahman has all these as accessories for His sportful activity (*Lila*); and that by being the inner ruler or controller within them, He has all things as His body and as His modes or attributes. We believe also that the sources of our knowledge are the Vedas, Rik, Yajus, Saman, and Atharvan, which are true and consist of endless branches (*sakha*) and have come down to us in a continuous oral tradition without beginning and without end and that these Vedas find their elucidation and elaboration (*Upabrahmanam*) in the *Puranas* and *Dharmasastras*, which are themselves based on the Vedas with their three parts, injunctions (*vidhi*), explanations (*arthavada*) and hymns (*mantra*) and which were composed by many sages capable of realising Brahman—sages like Bhagavan Dvaipayana (Vyasa), Parasara, Valmiki, Manu, Yagna-*valkya*, Goutama, and Apastamba. For instance, it has been said by Bhagavan Dvaipayana in the *Mahabharata*, "He who knows that I have no birth, that I am always free from birth and that I am the Supreme Ruler of the world (he will be made pure of

all sins)". *Bhagavad Gita* Chapter 10, *sloka* 3. "In this world there are two kinds of *purushas* or *Jivas* - *kshara* and *akshara*. *Kshara* is the class of *Jivas* bound to *Samsara*. *Akshara* is the class of released souls (freed from bondage). "There is a third kind of *purusha*, who is different (from these two) and who is called *Paramatma* (the Supreme Self) (in the *Srutis*). He has entered into the three *lokas* and supports them as their eternal Ruler". *Bhagavad Gita* Chapter 15, *Slokas* 16, & 17.

NOTE :— *Lokas*— The word here does not mean 'worlds', but those that are known by the *pramanas* as existing (i. e.) matter (the non-sentient) and sentient beings who are either bound to *samsara* or released from it.

"Time (which changes all things here) is itself worn out there (in *nitya vibhuti*) (or the transcendental world of Brahman) and has no control at all there". *Mahabharata: Santiparva* 196-9.

"Compared to that (transcendental world of Brahman), these things (that we see) here are hells." *Santiparva* 198-6. "All this of the name of *kshara* from *avyakta* to *visesha*, which are subject to change is for the sport of Hari." *Santiparva* 206-58.

"Krishna is indeed the origin of the worlds and, likewise, of their dissolution. This universe with all moving and non-moving things exists for Krishna." The phrase "for Krishna" means that everything is for (the fulfilment of) His purposes.

And Bhagavan Parasara says:—

"The word 'Bhagavan' denotes, O Maitreya, the Supreme Brahman, who is ever pure, for whom exist the two (great) *vibhutis* and who is the (final) cause of all causes." *Vishnu Puranam* 6, 5, 72.

Jnana * (wisdom), *power*, *strength*, *lordship*, *prowess*, *splendour* — these are, without any exception, expressed by the word “Bhagavan” without any imperfections whatsoever.” Vishnupuranam 6-5-79

“O Maitreya, this great word “Bhagavan” refers only to Vasudeva, who is the Supreme Brahman”. Vishnupuranam 6-1-76.

“To Him, this word is applicable both in its etymological sense (*yoga*) and in its conventional acceptance (*roodi*) and not for mere courtesy. To others (it is applicable only) for courtesy’s sake”. *Vishnu Purana* - (6-5-77). “That supreme goal (*parama padam*) which goes by the name of Vishnu has these attributes (of released souls) and is ever the antithesis of all that is impure; it is eternal, all pervasive, imperishable and free from all imperfections”. *Vishnu Puranam*: 1, 22, 53.

“Time which has such modifications as *kala* and *muhurtham* is not the cause of any modification in His transcendental world *nitya vibhuti*”. *Vishnu Puranam* 4, 6, 84.

“Behold his activities which are like those of a child that plays” (ever spontaneous). *Vishnu Purana*: 1, 2, 18.

Manu also says:- “He (Brahman) controls all and is more subtle than the subtlest”. (12-122).

Note.—* The six qualities or *gunas* of Bhagavan:— (1) *jnana* (Knowledge). (2) *Aisvarya* (Lordship) unimpeded activity, activity based on independence (3) *Sakti* (ability)—potency to become the material cause of the world; also the power of bringing about what appears impossible of being brought about (4) *bala* (strength)—absence of fatigue, sustaining power (5) *Virya* (virility)—changelessness in spite of being the material cause of the world (6) *tejas* (splendour) might, the power to overcome others.

And Yagnavalkya says "The purification which results from a knowledge of God (Iswara) is considered the greatest of all purifications".

So also Apastamba: "All breathing things are the city (body) of Him who takes His repose in the cave". The breathing things are the bodily structure, constituted of the (five) elements, *which has the Jiva or the individual self as its soul.*

"Well", the Advaitin perhaps says, "Wherefore all this verbose declamation? The objection (pointed out by me) has not been shown to be false". Here is the answer (to him):— To us who hold this view and who maintain that the self (or *atman*) which is of the *nature* of knowledge or consciousness has by nature an *attribute* which is also knowledge (*dharmabhutajnana*) and which, as the result of (past) *karma* undergoes expansion (*vikasa*) or contraction (*samkocha*)—to us, this objection is easily disproved. According to you (the Advaitin), luminosity is the *nature* (of Brahman), and is not His *attribute* nor do you believe in its expansion or contraction. In our system, *karma* and the like which are the factors that cause obscuration prevent only the rise of the spread of luminosity. The *avidya* (ignorance or nescience) which you postulate is the cause of concealment or obscuration. If so, it has already been pointed out that the very being or nature (*svarupa*) of Brahman would perish; whereas, for us, by (*avidya*), which is really (past) *karma*, it is only the luminosity of the *attributive* knowledge of the eternal self that undergoes contraction (and not the very *being or nature of the self which is knowledge*). By this *avidya* or *karma*, arises the identification of the self with (the body of) god, man and the like. Here lies the difference between our two positions.

Consider the following passage in Vishnu-Puranam:— 6—7—61,62

“There is a third form of power called *avidya* or past *krama* by which the power or *sakti* called the individual self (or *kshetragna*) which is capable of pervading all bodies is overpowered. (Being thus overpowered by *karma*), the individual self, O king, becomes subject to all the continuous ills of *samsara* (births and deaths). The power of the individual self being thus obscured, the attributive knowledge (*dharmabhutagnan*) is seen, O king, in different degrees in different beings.” The *sloka* thus shows how the attributive knowledge of the individual self undergoes contraction and expansion as a consequence of *avidya* which is called *karma*.

Note:—Ramanuja brings forward, in his later work *Sri Bhashya*, seven objections to the theory of the Advaitins that Brahman is obscured by *avidya*. This argument that, in their view, Brahman, which is luminosity, would cease to exist if it were concealed or obscured is one of them. They do not believe that Brahman possesses any *attribute* which could be the object of obscuration, without in any way affecting the *substance or substrate* possessing the attribute. This is usually called ‘the untenability of concealment’ or (*tirodhana anupapatti*).

2. Untenability of any form of description concerning *avidya* (*svarupanupapatti*).

Again, on the explicit authority of the *Srutis* and by inference also from the teaching of unity (between *That* and *Thou*, for example), you (the Advaitin) postulate a concealing entity called *avidya* (*acchadika avidya*) as a defect or fault which causes the obscuration of the being of Brahman. Since, according to you, this *avidya* (or ignorance

or non-science) is itself illusory like the world, its appearance would also require an explanatory cause in the form of a defect or fault (in the same way as you postulate the fault called *avidya* to explain the illusion of the world). (This defect of *avidya*, by itself, cannot explain its own illusory appearance). So, you will have to postulate another defect to explain the illusory *avidya*. If this defect were real, there would be two entities, Brahman and the defect and the central doctrine of unity (*advaita*) would go to pieces. If, on the other hand, you say that this defect is unreal (*aparamartha*), it would require, for its own illusory appearance, another defect (*dosha*) and so on. Thus, there would be infinite regress in the argument (*anavastha dosha*). To avoid these two undesirable results, you may have to maintain that Brahman itself is the cause of the illusory appearance of the (original) *avidya*.

NOTE:—The argument here is as follows:—When Brahman sees the world or *prapancha* which is illusory, it must be due to some fault or *dosha* (for whenever we see an illusory appearance, it is due to some fault in us (defective vision, etc). So, the Advaitins postulate a *dosha* or factor causing the illusion of the world and call it *avidya*; but, since their doctrine declares that there is only one Real, namely, Brahman, this *avidya* too, has to be stated by them to be illusory. Ramanuja asks "What is the *dosha* or fault owing to which this *avidya* or illusion exists?". If you explain it by saying that there is some other *dosha*, it, too, must be illusory so that Brahman might be the only Real and that other *dosha* will have to be explained by stating its cause. Thus, there would be an endless series of *doshas*. This is the infinite regress referred to (*anavastha*.) To avoid this, one of the two explanations should be adopted by the Advaitins: that Brahman itself is the cause of the illusory appearance (and not *avidya*). This would, on the very face of it, be absurd. The alternative explanation would be :-The cause of the illusory appearance of the world is *avidya* which is also illusory: but, since *avidya* is beginningless or *anadi*, its cause should not be

asked for. In the *Visishtadvaitic* system, *harma* is said to be *anadi* and its cause is therefore not sought.—So also in regard to *advaitic avidya*.

Even though (you maintain that) *avidya* is beginningless and therefore requires no explanatory defect as cause, the very circumstance of its being illusory would imply that Brahman sees the illusion as beginningless. As you do not admit any real defect (*paramartha dosha*) for Brahman's seeing this illusory *avidya*, it would follow that Brahman would itself be the cause of the (illusion). As Brahman is eternal, the *avidya* would also be eternally there and there would, on this view, be no such thing as release from the bondage of *avidya*.

Refutation of the theory that there is only a Singla Jiva. (Eka jiva vada)

The same argument is enough to disprove another doctrine of the Advaitins, *namely*: "One only of all the bodies (that are seen) has a self within it; the other bodies have no souls like the bodies or beings that are seen in dreams. In dreams, only the body of the person that dreams has a self within it; the other bodies seen by him in his dream are just bodies created (by his imagination) and have no souls, being illusory bodies", (This doctrine is called the doctrine of a single individual self *eka jiva vada*). Since, according to Advaita, the individual self as apart from Brahman as well as all bodies are just false or imaginary creations of Brahman, it would follow that the existence of a self *Jiva* even in one body is illusory in the same way as all the bodies are illusory; there is no special reason to hold that one body alone is peculiar and has a self

in it (while all others have none.) According to our system, on the other hand, the person that dreams finds that his body and the existence of the self in it are not contradicted on waking, while the other bodies (seen in his dream) and the souls imagined in them during the dream are contradicted (as they do not persist). So, they are all illusory; his own body and the existence of the self in it are real (*paramartha*). This is the difference between the view of the Advaitins and ours.

3. Untenability of the cessation of *avidya* (*Nivritti Anupapatti*)

Further, how indeed is the cessation of *avidya* caused and what is the nature of this cessation? This has to be examined. The knowledge of unity (that all is Brahman) and (that the Jiva and Brahman are one (*Tat Tvam Asi*)) is said to cause the cessation. You might say that the cessation of *avidya* has the form opposed to that called inexpressible or indescribable (*anirvachaniya*), since *avidya* itself is neither *sat* (real, like Brahman) nor *asat* (unreal, like the flower in the sky) nor both *sat* and *asat* and is therefore inexpressible. If you say so, what is opposed to that which is inexpressible or indescribable must be expressible (or capable of description) *nirvachaniya*. If it is expressible, is it *sat* (real) or unreal (*asat*) or both real and unreal? There could not be any other alternative. If you hold that this cessation of *avidya* (*nivritti*) is something other than Brahman, there would be two entities that are real *viz.* Brahman and cessation of *avidya*. This would be, against the doctrine of unity and would be possible

only as caused by *avidya*, (which) therefore would not have ceased to exist. If, on the other hand, you hold that the cessation of *avidya* is itself Brahman, since Brahman already existed, the cessation of *avidya* must have occurred even before the knowledge acquired from Vedanta (that all is Brahman). Your doctrine that the knowledge of unity (that Brahman alone really exists) causes cessation (of *avidya*) and that *samsara* or bondage is due to the absence of that knowledge would then find its contradiction.

4. Untenability of the knowledge of unity obtained from Vedanta causing the cessation of *avidya* (nivartaka anupapatti).

Furthermore, since even the knowledge which causes the cessation of *avidya* is (illusory and) of the nature of *avidya*, the Advaitin has to explain by what means that knowledge, too, would cease to exist. He might state in reply, "This knowledge which causes the cessation of *avidya* removes all differences other than itself and then perishes of itself, since all knowledge is momentary. As illustrative examples, the Advaitins might cite the forest-fire and the poison which destroys the effects of poison". But this cannot be (a proper reply). Since this knowledge which causes cessation of *avidya* is other than Brahman, its being, origin and destruction are illusory (according to Advaitic doctrine). If its destruction is illusory, the *avidya* which causes the cessation of the previous *avidya* still stands and a remedy for this illusion of destruction which is the same as an existing *avidya* will have to be thought of. In the case of the

forest-fire and the like, their destruction must necessarily mean a succession of new states different from those that respectively precede them.

Note:—Advaitins hold that Brahman is itself knowledge (*satyam, jnanam, anantam*). But this knowledge, which is Brahman, could not be maintained as capable of removing *avidya*. For since Brahman always exists, the cessation of *avidya* would be eternal and there could be no *avidya* at all and consequently no appearance of the world. So they have to state that the knowledge obtained from the sources of knowledge like Vedanta could alone lead to the cessation of *avidya*. But since this knowledge is other than Brahman, it is illusory and caused by *avidya*. The knowledge which is Brahman, Advaitins say, is of a different kind from the knowledge obtained by perception, inference, verbal testimony and the like.

Note:—*The forest-fire and the poison which destroys poison:* Advaitins illustrate the point thus; The forest-fire consumes every inflammable thing in the forest and when there is nothing more to burn, perishes of itself. So also this knowledge of unity removes all illusory appearances and then perishes of itself. The poison administered by the physician to counteract the effects of poison in the body destroys the poison and then ceases of itself and does not affect the body.

5. Untenability of assigning to any knower this knowledge of unity which causes the cessation of *avidya*: Jnatranupapatti.

Besides this knowledge which denies the reality of all things other than Brahman, which is pure consciousness (*chinmatra*), it has to be stated by the Advaitin who the knower is. If it is said that the knower is the *Jiva* or individual self falsely super-imposed on Brahman, it would be illogical; for this illusory superimposition (*adhyasa*) (of the individual self) is the thing to be removed or denied and is therefore the object (*karma*) of the action to be effected by the knowledge of unity.

Since it is the object, it cannot, at the same time, be the subject who owns that knowledge (i. e.) it cannot be the knower. If, on the other hand, Brahman itself is stated to be the knower, what is the nature of this 'knowership' in Brahman? Is it real in Brahman's nature? Or is it an illusory super-imposition? If the latter, then this illusory superimposition and the *avidya* which causes it will stand unaffected by the knowledge of unity which removes the original *avidya*, because they are not within the scope of that knowledge. If you admit another knowledge which could dispel this (second), *avidya* there would be a further difficulty. This knowledge, too, would require the three essentials (*triputi*) of all knowledge, *viz.*, a knower, a thing to be known, and the action of knowing. The question would then arise "Who is its knower?" and thus you will be landed in infinite regress (*ananastha.*) Without these three essentials (knower, knowing and what is known), there could be no such thing as knowledge at all. For knowledge is that which illumines something to a knower. If you hold that this knowledge of unity which dispels *avidya* has none of these three essentials, it would be like the knowledge, which is Brahman (for that is mere consciousness without the *triputi* and like that knowledge, it would be incapable of dispelling *avidya*. If, on the other hand, you accept the former position, *viz.*, that Brahman itself is really the knower, then you will have come to accept our position, namely, that Brahman is not mere consciousness or knowledge, but is also the knower who has knowledge as an *attribute* of His.

If you should state that the knowership of the knowledge of unity which dispels *avidya* is also

among the targets to be dispelled, it would be funny. For when it is stated that everything except the ground was cut down by Devadatta, it would be ridiculous to include in the action of being cut down, the action of cutting, the person who cuts, and that which is cut down.

NOTE:—Advaitins hold that Brahman is mere *chit* or consciousness. They do not admit any attribute in Brahman such as knowledge or being a knower. Visishtadvaitins, on the other hand, hold that Brahman is of the nature of consciousness or *jnana* and is, at the same time, the *possessor of the attribute* of knowing (i. e.) He is also the knower (*jnata*).

NOTE:—Though Advaitins state that Brahman is knowledge or consciousness, they maintain that this knowledge which is Brahman (*svarupa*) cannot dispel *avidya*. *Avidya* can be dispelled, according to them, only by the kind of knowledge which is derived from any one of the sources of knowledge (*Pramana janya jnana*) sense,-perception, inference, or verbal testimony (*Sastra*).

6. Untenability due to the lack of efficient means for dispelling illusory appearance. (Samagri Anupapatti)

Moreover, by what means is produced this knowledge of unity which, you say, enables one to realise that Brahman alone is real and that all differences that we perceive in the world are illusory? This has to be carefully considered. If it is said "By the *Sruti* itself", it cannot be (a proper answer). (According to your system), everything except Brahman is the creation of *avidya*. Therefore, it would follow that the *Srutis*, which are different from Brahman, cannot dispel the illusory appearance of the world, being themselves the products of *avidya* (ignorance). For example, the illusion that the rope is a serpent which is caused by some defect or fault (in

perception, cannot be dispelled by the knowledge "This is a rope and not a serpent", when this knowledge comes from a defective or unsound source. When the fear due to the illusion of the serpent in the rope persists, if a person of unsound mind were to cry out aloud, "This is a rope and not a serpent", his words would not dispel the illusion, so long as his mental unsoundness is known and the fear arising from the illusion, too, will not vanish. The man who knows that everything except Brahman is illusory, even when he hears the words of the *Sruti* (that Brahman alone is real) knows that the *Sruti*, being different from Brahman, is the product of illusion. Therefore, the knowledge imparted by the *Sruti* that Brahman alone is real cannot dispel his *avidya* or ignorance.

If you say "The knowledge of unity which dispels *avidya*, *Sastra*, or Scripture which provides that knowledge, and, so also, the person who has that knowledge are all illusory and false, since they are different from Brahman", then, indeed, the illusory nature of the world and the disappearance of the world in *mukti* would become false. This would only come to mean that the world is real. Suppose a person dreams that some one in the dream tells him that his father is dead and he afterwards comes to know that it was all a dream, he would then realise that the knowledge imparted to him in the dream about his father's death is false and that his father is really alive. Texts in the *Sruti* like "That Thou art" cannot contradict the reality of the world, because these words are caused by illusion, just like the words contradicting the reality of the serpent in the rope when used by a man of unsound mind.

“But”, the Advaitin might say, “when some fear persists in a dream, if a knowledge arises, even during the dream, that it is a dream, the previous fear is seen disappearing. In the same way, here also (the knowledge imparted by the illusory *Sruti* may dispel the erroneous notion due to *avidya*)”. It is not so. During the dream itself, if it is known that this, too, is a dream, the fear is seen to recur again. So, there is no difference of any kind between the dream which contradicts and the dream which is contradicted. It has been already stated that even while we listen to the *Sruti*, we are aware (according to the Advaitin) that the *Sruti* is as illusory as dreams.

It is sometimes stated by Advaitins that though the scripture (*sastra*) is false or illusory, being the product of delusion (or error), it declares that Brahman exists and is without a second and without any attribute and that the existence of Brahman and its being without any attribute are true because they are not contradicted afterwards. This statement, too, cannot hold good. For the existence or reality of Brahman is contradicted by (a school of Buddhists), who declare that reality is non-existent (*soonya*). If the Advaitin says that this contention of the Buddhists is due to error or delusion, it may be replied, “You have yourself stated that the words in the *sruti*, “Brahman is real and without a second” are due to illusion (or *avidya*)”. The contention that there is nothing really existing (not even Brahman) has the superiority of having no later contradiction. Both the Buddhist who does not believe in the reality of anything and the Advaitin who contends that everything except Brahman is unreal are equally unfit, in the opinion

of the wise, to be controversialists, since neither of them accepts the truth of any authority (or *pramana*) which could prove their contention to be right. It has been said:— Disputation is at all possible only with those who accept the truth of the sources of knowledge (*pramana*). It is no use arguing with one who does not believe in the reality of anything.

Note:—*LATER CONTRADICTION*.—It is only if we know beforehand what is meant by the term "tree" that we can say afterwards "This is not a tree". So, the knowledge of an object precedes its denial. The denial which is experienced later supersedes the knowledge of the existence of the object. When one text in the *Srutis* says "The world exists", the Advaitin, on the authority of another *sruti*, says "It does not exist, only Brahman exists", and contends that the denial of the world, being later, supersedes the *sruti* which speaks of the world as existing and real. On the same line of reasoning, Ramanuja says, it would follow that the statement of the Advaitin that Brahman is real finds its supersession in the *sunyavadin's* statement that "there is nothing at all that is real". This proposition would have to be considered as true, because there could be no later contradiction of it at all.

Furthermore, on what authority (*pramana*) do you establish the unreality of the world given in sense perception (*pratyaksha*)? The Advaitin may say, "Perception arises from a defect or fault (*dosha*). So, what sense perception brings before us can be explained away otherwise (as due to faults or imperfections), whereas Scripture or *Sastra*, which is faultless and which could not be explained away otherwise, should be considered as superseding perception". If he says so, (we ask), "By what fault (*dosh*) does perception reveal to us (the world so full of) endless differences? If you say in reply, perception is tainted by the false notion of differences which has persisted from beginningless time", we reply, "The same fault is seen also in scripture (which, too,

recognises differences). How, then, do you establish the superiority of Scripture over perception (as a source of knowledge) and state that it is contradicted by the teaching of Scripture? As a matter of fact, perception and Scripture have different provinces and cannot therefore conflict with each other. Perception is concerned with apprehending elements like *akasa*' (ether) and air (*vayu*) and things having varied configurations like those of men endowed with senses such as those of hearing and touch.

Scripture or *sastra*, on the other hand, treats of what cannot be apprehended by perception, *viz.*, the nature of Brahman, His being the innermost soul of all, His being the Reality and His being endowed with countless attributes, the ways of worshipping and meditating on Brahman, and the various benefits accruing from His grace, such as attaining Him, and likewise also, the punishments that will be incurred by doing things displeasing to Him. (As they concern themselves with entirely different matters, there cannot be any conflict between sense perception and *Sastra*). You too, admit that Scripture which is a superior authority has no beginning and no end and has the merit of a continuous tradition (regarding the text). You should necessarily admit also the reality of what is given to us by sense perception (*pratyaksha*).

Enough of this refutation of flimsy fleece-like arguments brought forward by perverse minds which are thrown and swept away by the strong gale of hundreds of passages in the *Srutis*.

Refutation of Bhaskara's system of Bhedabheda.

Note:—The school of Bhaskara holds that there is no difference in reality (or by nature) (*svabhavena*) between the Supreme Self (Brahman) and the individual self (*Jivatma*), but that, owing to the limitations imposed by *Upadhis* (conditioning or limiting adjuncts) like the body and the senses, Brahman assumes the forms of *Jivas*. When the *Upadhi* vanishes, the *Jiva* becomes Brahman. So Brahman and *Jiva* are both different and non-different from each other. In their doctrine, the *Upadhi* is not unreal and this (among other things) distinguishes them from the Advaitins).

According to the second view (or school of thought), there is nothing other than Brahman and the *Upadhis*. Since the *Upadhis* are said, in this system, to be associated only with Brahman, all the imperfections due to the *Upadhis* such as the body and the senses) would affect Brahman also. The texts in the *Srutis* saying that Brahman is free from all faults and imperfections and the like would then be contradicted. The Bhaskarites might defend their position by saying "Ether (*akasa*) is all - pervasive, but the ether confined to a pot and the like is looked upon as different from the all - pervasive ether elsewhere and as possessing different attributes; neither the good qualities nor the bad qualities in the ether within the pot become associated with the extensive ether elsewhere. In the same way, the faults and imperfections of the individual self (*Jiva*) who is marked off from the rest (of Brahman) by the differences due to the *Upadhis* may not affect Brahman". If it is so stated, it cannot be considered convincing. Ether *akasa* is not a composite with parts (*avayavi*) and cannot, therefore, be cut off or marked off into two or more parts. So, the pots and other things are connected only with the all - pervasive ether.

Likewise, Brahman is incapable of being divided (into parts) and the *Upadhis* must be connected with Brahman itself. (and not any part of it.) The Bhaskarite might say, "The region of ether which is connected with the pot is different from the other region of it (not so connected)". We reply:- "Ether is a single (non-composite) thing and becomes connected with the pot and the like by means of a part or region in it. So, when the pot is moved (from one place to another), it is some other region (that becomes connected), and thus there is no fixity of region. Similarly, there is no fixity in the region of Brahman (which becomes connected with *Upadhis*. When the *Upadhi* moves, the part of Brahman (newly) connected with the *Upadhi* becomes differentiated from the part or region not (now) connected with it. So, you (the Bhaskarite) would be forced to admit that, at one moment, when connected with *Upadhis*, Brahman is bound in *samsara* and that, at another moment, when the *Upadhi* has moved away, it has attained release (or *moksha*). An admission of this kind would be ridiculous in the eyes of impartial thinkers.

The Bhaskarite might argue as follows:- "Although ether (*akasa*) is non-composite and therefore without parts, ether is considered as the sense (organ of hearing) and it is usual to distinguish between that region which is called the sense of hearing and the rest of ether which is not the organ of hearing. In the same manner, it may be possible to distinguish between Brahman with *Upadhi* and Brahman without *Upadhi*." But this argument is fallacious. It is only the region of the ether which is connected with the cavity of the ear modified by a special kind of air that is

called the sense of hearing. Though there is no distinguishing feature between this region of ether and the rest of ether, it may be proper to distinguish it as the sense of hearing. When the bodies (of beings) move, all regions of ether contact them without any fixed rule or restriction (*niyama*). So also *Upadhis* (while moving) contact all regions of Brahman without any restriction or reservation. We have explained the distinction between the region of ether called the sense of hearing and the rest, assuming (for the moment) that ether, as such, is the sense of hearing. As a matter of fact, however, ether does not form the sense of hearing at all. Vedic scholars hold that the eleven senses arise from the principle or 'real' (*tattva*) called *Vaikarika Ahankara*. For instance, Bhagavan Parasara says:—

"It is (sometimes) said that the senses arise from *Taijasa Ahankara*. But the ten senses (*devah*) with the mind as the eleventh are truly *vaikarikas*".

This is the meaning of the *sloka*:— *Ahankara* (one of the 25 reals) is of three kinds: *Vaikarika*, *Taijasa* and *Bhutadi* which are respectively called also *Sattvika*, *Rajasa* and *Tamasa*. The sage (Parasara) states that, from the *Tamasa Ahankara* or *Bhutadi*, the five elements like ether are produced. He then cites the opinion of others that the eleven senses are produced from *Taijasa Ahankara* and indicates his own opinion that the senses arise from *sattvika ahankara* and that the senses are therefore *vaikarikas*. The word *devah* in the *sloka* means the senses. Similarly, in the *Mahabharata*, it is stated that the senses are nourished (or strengthened) by the elements. Even if it is held that the senses are modifications of the five elements, the Bhaskarite

contention does not gain anything. The senses are distinguished from the elements as being their modifications, in the same way as the body is distinguished from the five elements out of which it is built up. This cannot be said to be true of the *Jiva*, who is not a modification or evolute of Brahman (*parinama*), because the *Sruti* says that Brahman is without any modification or change (*nirvikara*). Therefore, since Brahman is indivisible, without parts and without changes or modifications, it would (on the view of the school of Bhaskara) be impossible to disprove the presence of innumerable imperfections due to contact with the *upadhis*. Those who are well-versed in the *Sastras* have therefore scant regard for this *Bhedabheda* system, which could be accepted only by those who are guided by mere faith.

Further, you (Bhaskarites) hold that Brahman's essential nature (*svarupa*) evolves into non-sentient things (*achetana*). This is opposed to the *sruti* which declares that Brahman is without any changes or modifications (*nirvikara*.) If you maintain, (in order to avoid this difficulty) that it is not Brahman which evolves into non-sentient things but that His *sakti* or power undergoes the evolution, we ask, "What is this *sakti*? Is it a modification (or evolute) of Brahman?; or is it something not different from Brahman? In either case, it would follow, on your view, that Brahman itself undergoes change (which is against the *sruti*).

Notes—According to the *Sankhya* system, there are 25 reals or (*tattvas*) beginning with *prakriti* or matter in its un-evolved state and ending with *purusha* or the individual self. *Prakriti* evolves into *mahat*, the next to evolve is *ahankara*, which is one of the evolutes from primordial matter. It is this *ahankara* that is referred to above. The word *ahankara* also means *egoism* or

arrogance, but this has nothing to do with the *ahankara* referred to in the text above. The Vedantins adopt such of the conventions of the *Sankhyas* as are not in conflict with their system.

Note:— *The eleven senses:* five *Jnanendriyas* or senses affording knowledge, viz sight, hearing, touch, smell and taste; five *karmendriyas* or senses used in action, viz, speech, hand, foot, arms, the organ of reproduction; the eleventh sense is the mind.

Refutation of Yadavaprakasa's Bhedabheda.

Note:—In Yadavaprakasa's system as in Bhaskara's, the world is real, the Scripture is not illusory error. The Bhaskarites hold that the *Jiva* becomes Brahman in *moksha* (when freed from *Upadhi*) and that the difference between them (during *samsara*) is due to *upadhi*. By nature or in reality, they are not different from each other. The difference is merely due to *Upadhi*. In regard to *achit* or nonsentient things and Brahman, both difference and non-difference are natural *svabhavika*. Yadavaprakasa, on the other hand, holds that a portion (or *sakti*) of Brahman changes or evolves into the individual self and that, even in *moksha*, the individual self remains different from Brahman. So, both difference and non-difference between *chit* and Brahman are natural as between *achit* and Brahman.

In the third view (that of Yadavaprakasa) it is maintained that the individual self and Brahman are both really different and non-different. It is also held that Brahman becomes the individual self. If so, the individual self is different from Brahman only to the extent that Saubhari's many bodies taken by him at the same time were different from one another (i. e.) having only one soul among them), and in the same way as the several *avatars* of Iswara (Vishnu) were different from one another (all of them having, however, the quality of being Iswara). From this, it would follow that that the imperfections of the individual self would be only of Iswara. This is what it comes to saying:— The school of Yadavaprakasa maintains that Iswara, by His own substance

(*svarupa*), assumes different forms like those of gods, men, animals and plants and is their soul. If this position is taken up, just as all actions such as the holding of water which pertain to pots, dishes and the like made of a single lump of mud belong to mud itself, even so, all the pleasures and pains of all the *Jivas* would pertain to Iswara himself. (The followers of Yadavaprakasa) might argue:- "That part of the mud which has been left over after the making of pots, dishes and the like is not associated with any action (like the holding of water). In the same way, that part of Iswara which is not used up in the evolution of such individual souls as gods, beasts and men is the abode of omniscience, omnipotence and other such auspicious qualities". True, but this would imply that one part (*amsa*) of Iswara has an abundance of auspicious qualities, while another part is full of imperfections, since both have the quality of being Iswara. If they reply, "The two parts are distinguished or differentiated from each other", we ask, "What do you gain thereby?. It does not behove Iswara to be eternally subject to ills in one part, though, in another part, there is happiness. It is like Devadatta having one arm smeared with sandal paste and adorned with bracelet, armband and ring, while the other arm of the same (Devadatta) is beaten with a wooden mortar and put into the flames of an all-consuming fire. That would be the condition of Iswara. This variety of *Bhedabheda* is even more blasphemous than the Advaitic view that Brahman is associated with *ajnana* or ignorance, for, according to *Bhadabheda*, this unbounded suffering is real (and not illusory as in *advaita*) and insurmountable as individual souls are innumerable (and not single as in *advaita*) If the Yadavaprakasa school say, "Therefore we hold

that this part (*amsa*), namely, the individual self, is different in nature from Brahman", they will have come to our way (of thinking). The objection pointed out (so far) will arise only, if it is held that the substance (*svarupa*) of Iswara himself changes into the *Jiva* and is identical with the *Jiva*. If, like ourselves, they say that the relationship between Iswara and the individual soul is that between the soul and the body, there cannot be any such objection. Far from there being any objection, a number of great qualities like the control of all individual souls will have become explained in Iswara. The grammatical apposition or co-ordination *samanadhikaranya* in "That Thou Art" will be direct and not indirect or figurative (*lakshana*).

Further, it has already been stated that the same thing cannot be both different and non-different (from another) as they would be contradictory to each other. If the pot is different from the cloth, the pot cannot exist in the cloth. If the pot is not different from the cloth, the pot is in the cloth. The existence and the non-existence of the same object at the same time and in the same place are contradictory of each other, The *Bhedabheda* schools might say, "As genus (*Jati*), the cow with broken horns may exist in the cow without horns; cowness may exist but as an individual (*vyakti*) it may not exist in it". We reply:- "If the genus is stated to be not different from the individual, it would follow that in the cow with broken horns, the cow without horns would be present (for both are the genus 'cow'). This would be against reason. If the genus is held as both different and non-different (*bhinnabhinna*) from the individual, owing to non-difference, the genus *Jati* (cowness) should be present in the cow with broken

horns and owing to difference, it would not be present (in the cow with broken horns), in the same way as buffaleness is not present in the horse.

Note:—*JATI AND VYAKTI* :

In the *Bhedabheda* system, Brahman is different from the *Jiva* and, at the same time not different from the *Jiva*. If you ask, "How can a thing be both different and non-different from another?", the followers of that system reply: "There is nothing inconceivable in this. Take the following example:— A cow with horns, a cow without horns and a cow with broken horns. All of them belong to the genus or *Jati* "cow". That is, all the three of them have "cowness" in common, though, as individuals (*vyakti*), they are different from one another. There is no difference between the cow with horns and the cow without horns, if you consider them from the point of view of their *jati* or genus, for they have all "cowness". At the same time as individuals *vyakti*, they are different from each other. So, there is both difference and non-difference among them (*bheda* and *abheda*).

In refuting this argument, Ramanuja asks;— "(1) Do you mean to say that the genus, *Jati* and the individual, *vyakti* are not different from each other? If so, the cow with broken horns must be present in the cow with horns, for, they have both the genus or *Jati* "cowness"; (2) Or do you mean to say that *Jati* and *Vyakti* are both different and non-different from each other? If you hold this second view, certain absurdities will result. If they are different, the cow with broken horns cannot be in the cow with horns; if they are not different, the one must be present in the other. This is as absurd as saying that the buffalo is present in the horse. How can two contraries be the same?

The genus (or *Jati*) is really a mode (*prakara*) or attribute of the thing, being the common configuration of the object. The mode or attribute is different from the object possessing the mode or attribute. It has already been stated that the mode or attribute (*prakara*) is inseparable from the object possessing the (*prakara*) or mode and incapable of being apprehended apart from it and that the configuration (*samsthana*) is

present as a mode or attribute in more objects than one. The idea "This is the person seen before as that" arises from the mode being common to both as in the perception: "This man, *too*, has a stick". It is this mode, which is genus and the like, that is called *bheda* or differentiating feature. The association with this differentiating feature is the cause of the object being considered as different (from others). In the same way as knowing an object (*samvedana*) is the cause of the object being designated and talked about and is also the cause of the knowledge itself being designated and talked about, the genus is the cause of the object (*vyakti*) being talked about and also of itself (genus) being designated and talked about. By this same argument, the contention that sense perception apprehends mere existence (*sat*) and not differentiating features (*bheda*) stands refuted. For perception apprehends the object only as possessing the genus or configuration. It is this genus or configuration that reveals the object having the genus or configuration and is also the cause of differences being designated. The objection to the view that the substance (*svarupa*) of Brahman is modified into non-sentient beings (*achit*) has already been dealt with.

Here ends the refutation of rival systems of philosophy.

A detailed exposition of Visishtadvaita

“He who stands on the earth and is within the earth, whom the earth is not aware of, to whom the earth is the body and who controls the earth from within—He is your *atma* (soul), the inner Ruler, who is immortal”. *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad* (Kanva recension). “He who stands on the *atman* (soul) and who is within the *atman*, whom the *atman* is not aware of, to whom the *atman* (soul) is the body and who controls the *atman* from within—He is your *atma* (soul), the Inner Ruler, who is immortal”. *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad*: (Madhyandina recension).

“He who moves about within the earth, to whom the earth is the body and whom the earth is not aware of” and the like (*Subalopanishad*) “He who moves about within the *akshara* (*atman* or soul) to whom the *akshara* is the body and whom the *akshara* is not aware of.” (*Subalopanishad*). “He who moves about within Death, to whom Death is the body and whom Death is not aware of.” (*Subalopanishad*). “He is the inner soul of all beings and is untouched by (their) imperfections. He is the supreme Deity, Narayana, who is without a second”. (*Subalopanishad*)

“Two birds with similar qualities and mutually attached to each other rest on the same tree. One of them (the *Jiva*) eats the ripe fruit, while the other (the Supreme Self) shines without eating it”. (*Mundaka Upanishad*).

Note:—The ‘tree’ is the body; the fruit is the result of *karma*.

“He has entered within all persons and controls them (from within). He is the soul of all.

(*Aranyaka* 3-20-4.) "He created it; having created it, He entered into it (the *Jiva*); having entered into it, He became *Sat*, the individual self which remains ever the same without any change and also *tyat*, the non-sentient, which is subject to change. Though He became the *chit* and the *achit*, He never changed but was always *satyam*, the unchanging truth". (*Taittiriya Upanishad*.)

"I will enter with the *Jiva* as his *atma* or soul and will create the various forms and give them their names". (*Chandogya Upanishad* 6-3-2). "The *Jiva* or individual self realises that the Supreme Self directs him (in the wheel of *samsara*) and that he is the object of direction different from the Supreme Self that directs. By winning the grace of the Supreme Self thereby, he attains immortality." (*Svetasvatara Upanishad*-1-1-2). "Having realised the one who experiences (pleasures and pains), that which is the object of experience and Him who directs all, I have described to thee the three-fold nature of things". (*Svetasvatara Upanishad* -1-25). "The Eternal of Eternals, the Soul of all souls, He who fulfils the desires of many, being Himself single". (*Kata Upanishad* (2-5-13). "He is the Lord of matter and souls and the possessor of qualities". "He whose knowledge has no limits and he whose knowledge is limited, the Ruler and the Ruled". *Svetasvetara Upanishad* 6-33 & 1-17). From hundreds of such texts in the *srutis* and so also, by their elucidations and explanations such as (the following):-

"The whole world is Thy body; the stability of the earth is dependent on Thee". (*The Ramayana*)-6-(20-24)

"Whatever is created by whomsoever it may be, Hari is the cause of it all and every one (of these creations) is His body". (*Vishnu Puranam 1-22-35*).

"I am, O Arjuna, the soul of all beings and abide within their hearts. I am seated in the heart of every one. From me arise memory, perception and their loss as well." (*Bhagavad Gita-1020*); —from these and other such utterances of Valmiki, Parasara, and Vyasa who stand in the front rank of those who know the real meaning of the Vedas, we learn that the Supreme Brahman is the soul of all and that everything, sentient and non-sentient, (*chit and achit*), is His body. The body being the inseparable attribute of the soul which owns the body is therefore its *prakara* or mode. Therefore, the word denoting the body denotes also the soul whose *prakara* or mode the body is. *Though the body and the soul have different attributes, the two do not get mixed up with each other. Since Brahman has everything as its body, all grammatical appositions or co-ordinations (*samanadhikaranya*) (like "That Thou Art" and "All this is Brahman") which reveal the magnificence of Brahman, refer to Brahman who has all sentient and non-sentient things as his *prakara* (mode) directly without any *lakshana*.

*Note ;—*THOUGH THE BODY AND THE SOUL HAVE DIFFERENT ATTRIBUTES :—*

We see, in the world, things with different qualities getting mixed up. A log of wood exposed in a salt pan gets coated with salt in a short time. But no such mixing up takes place in the case of Brahman and the world of sentient and non-sentient things, because of the unique greatness or splendour of Brahman.

Grammatical co-ordination (*samanadhikaranya*) is said to be present, when two words refer to the same object in two different ways and this co-

ordination is direct (or without *lakshana*) and literal in our interpretation. Thus it is; in the co-ordination or apposition "That Thou Art", "That" refers to Brahman the (material) cause of the world, the abode of all auspicious qualities, (the one) who is free from all imperfections. The word "Thou" that enters into the co-ordination refers to the Inner Ruler within the *Jiva* who has the *Jiva* as His body, who is the soul of His body which is the *Jiva*, and who has that body as His mode or inseparable attribute. In the interpretations of other systems, there is no such (direct) apposition and Brahman becomes involved also in faults or imperfections.

This is what it comes to mean:- (*In the Srutis and the Smritis*) Brahman is declared to be of a particular nature. This particular nature of Brahman persists in all states or conditions. So, in all these states, this manifold and varied world consisting of sentient and non-sentient things exists either in the gross or in the subtle form. Only then can the text "I will become the many" have any real meaning. Therefore, it follows that all sentient and nonsentient things *chit* and *achit* exist as configurations or inseparable attributes of Brahman who is in the different configurations as cause and as effect.

Note:—GROSS AND SUBTLE: Before creation or *srishiti*, the world is in a subtle state. After *srishiti* it assumes a gross manifestation.

At this an objection might be raised that only the genus and the qualities (of a thing) and not a substance (*dravya*) are usually seen as attributes. These attributes are always connected with that thing as its configuration or mode and answer to the words "of this kind". A substance (*dravya*) which

can stand by itself (independent of others) cannot rightly be considered as an attribute or mode of Iswara answering to the words (of this kind) so that there may be grammatical co-ordination between them. Well, the reply is as follows:— Even substances like the stick and the ear-ring are often seen as attributes of another substance (say, a man) (as when we speak of a man with a stick or with an ear-ring).

Note:—The objection stated by thinkers of other schools is to this effect; The *Jiva* is a substance and Iswara is also a substance. How can one substance (*dravya*) be an attribute of another substance (*dravya*) so that the two may be put in grammatical co-ordination (*samanadhikaranya*) with each other in "That Thou Art"?

Note:—*GENUS - QUALITY*: 'cow' refers to an individual, 'cowness' is the genus (*jati*) which is in all cows. "White or Whiteness" is a quality in chalk, which is a substance having the quality. Here genus and quality are easily seen as attributes to substances; but how can a substance be an attribute of another substance? This is the objection raised.

But this answer might be said to be unsatisfactory and the objector might say, "When one substance, such as stick and ear-ring, which can have an independent existence, is an attribute of another substance, we (invariably) speak of that other substance possessing the substance and do not speak of them as being in apposition with each other. For example, we speak of Devadatta possessing a stick and not Devadatta as being a stick, "Devadatta has a stick". Therefore, it will not be proper to consider substances *dravya* like sentient and non-sentient beings as being similar to genus like 'cowness' and speak of them as modes or attributes of Iswara put in grammatical co-ordination with each other. The reply to this objection is as follows:— This kind of co-ordination is quite common in (ordinary intercourse) and in the Vedas. The words

'cow', 'horse', 'man', 'god' and the like denote the respective bodies which are substances built up of non-sentient matter. And yet it is often said, "Devadatta was born as a man owing to certain meritorious actions (in his past life)". "Yagnadatta was born as a cow owing to sinful actions". "Another sentient being was born as a god owing to meritorious deeds of a superior character". In all these instances, the bodies of these, man, god and the like are put in grammatical co-ordination (*samanadhikaranya*) with sentient beings as their modes or (*prakaras*) or attributes. Thus, substances (namely, the five elements which build up the body) are spoken of as *prakaras* or attributes of other substances in grammatical apposition (i.e.) Devadatta is a man', Yagnadatta is a cow, and the like. The truth is as follows:- It does not matter whether it is a genus (*Jati*) a quality (*guna*) or a substance (*dravya*). When any of them exists as an attribute of a particular substance, provided it is an inseparable attribute, it may be put in grammatical apposition with that substance. But if a substance which can stand independently by itself is considered at any time and in any place as an attribute or (*prakara*) of another substance, then they cannot be put in grammatical co-ordination and usage will require "being with" or 'possessing' as in "Devadatta is with a stick" and not "Devadatta is a stick". In the same way, all objects, either moving or non-moving, (*sthavara* or *jangama*) being the body of Iswara, can exist only as inseparable attributes of His. Therefore, Iswara who has them as His attributes is referred to also by the respective words denoting them and can be spoken of in grammatical co-ordination with them. All this has been explained at length in connection with the Vedic text on the creation of names and forms.

Notes:—'Tree' means not only the object usually signified by the word, but also Iswara who is within the tree and to whom the tree is a *prakara* mode or attribute. The word *Devadatta* means not only the body of Devadatta but the soul of Devadatta of which the body is an attribute. Further, the word refers also to Iswara who is within the soul of Devadatta and who has that soul as His *prakara* (or *svriva*). On this view, the *samanadhikaranya* in *That Thou Art* is direct and not indirect (*lakshana*) for "Thou" here is Svetaketu. The word also signifies Brahman who is within Svetaketa's soul as its inner Ruler (*antaryami*). 'That' is Brahman, the ultimate cause of the world. The meaning of the co-ordination is 'Brahman, the ultimate cause of the world is Brahman who is within the soul of Svetaketu as its inner Ruler'.

Therefore the self or soul, matter (*prakriti*), *mahat*, *ahankara* the five *tanmatras*, the five elements (earth, water, fire, air and ether) the eleven senses - these are the 25 *tattvas* or 'reals'. Out of these twenty-five reals are built up the fourteen worlds which constitute the universe (*Brahmanda*) Within this universe (or *Brahmanda*) are to be found gods, animals, men, and non-moving things like plants. All these are inseparable attributes of Iswara. These are all effects (*karya*) and are Brahman. Hence, when Brahman, their ultimate (material) cause is known, everything becomes known; "by the knowledge of one, all become known", says the *Sruti*. So it has been declared (by the *Sruti*) that Brahman is the soul of all sentient and non-sentient things which are His attributes, because He is the (material) cause (*karana*) and they are the effects (*karya*).

Notes:—CAUSE AND EFFECT :-

When it is said that the world is Brahman or 'All this is Brahman', it has to be understood only in this sense:—Brahman being the soul and the world being His body, the two may be looked upon as the same, but the substance of Brahman in itself (*svarupa*) is not the same as the substance of the world. Brahman being the material cause (*upadana karana*) may be spoken of as being the same as the effect (*karya*) viz., the world. The

effect is only a *prakara* or mode of the cause and is therefore an attribute. So when the relation of cause and effect is understood, we understand that the effect is an attribute of the cause.

Those who maintain that Brahman itself evolves into *prakriti* or matter and the *Jivas* or individual souls might here raise the following difficulty or objection:—“(You) rule out the possibility of the substance of Brahman (*svrupa*) evolving (in the form of the world) on the ground that it would be against the Vedic texts which declare that Brahman is not subject to any change and that it is free from imperfections. But *Brahmasutra* 1, 4, 23 states that Brahman should be considered as also the material cause (*upadana karana*), so that the proposition and the illustrative example (mud and pot) may not conflict (with each other). In this *sutra*, the Supreme Self is explained to be the material cause of the world (*prakriti* or *upadana karana*). The proposition sought to be proved is that by the knowledge of the one, all other things become known. The illustrative example is that of mud (the material cause) and its effects (*karya*) (like pots and dishes). (This illustrative example would be appropriate only if Brahman were the material cause (*upadana karana*). Whatever is the material cause must be subject to change. How is this inconsistency explained (by you)?”

The answer to this is as follows:— The (*Sruti*) says that Brahman is the (material) cause of the world including the *Jivas* or individual selves without any exception. (When this is so), if it should be maintained that Iswara evolves into the form of the *Jiva* it would be in conflict with the *Brahmasutra* (2, 3, 18) which says:—

“Nor *is the *Atma* (created) because (it is denied) by the *sruti*. From those *srutis*, the *atma* (is understood) to be eternal (*nitya*).

* *Brahma Sutra*: 2-3-16

Further, the Supreme Self is declared to be free from unfairness (*vaishamaya*) and cruelty (*nairghrnya*) (in its dealings with the different (*Jivas*) in *Brahmasutra* (2, 1, 34) in these words:—

“(There is) no unfairness nor hard-heartedness, for (creation is) in strict accordance (with past *karma*). It is by accepting the beginningless nature of the *Jivas* that *karma* is indicated as the reason (for the inequalities seen among different *Jivas* and the cruel suffering which some are subjected to.) The *Sutrakara* raises a possible objection to this and answers it in *sutra* (2, 1, 35.) thus:— “If it is objected to by saying that it cannot be *karma*, because before *srishti* or creation, there is no division (of Brahman into *Jivas*), the answer is “because the *Jiva* has no beginning (*i. e.*) (is eternal). This would be in accordance with reason and is also declared in the *Srutis*”. The reason implied is that if the *Jiva* or individual self is not eternal and has a beginning, he should have to be considered as enjoying the fruit of what was not done (by him) and being cut off from the enjoyment of the fruit of what was done (by him). (So the *Jiva* has to be accepted as eternal). In the same way (as the individual self is said to be without any beginning), matter (*prakriti*) also is declared by the *Srutis* to be without a beginning.

That matter (*prakriti*) and the individual self (*purusha*) were not created (and had no beginning) is also brought out in the following Vedic text:-

“A certain thing (matter) which has no beginning produces many things of the same nature

(namely, things constituted of the five elements) and is red, white and black (i. e. it has the colours, respectively, of the elements, fire, water and earth). Another thing which has no beginning (the individual self) imagines (in ignorance) that it is the same as the other (viz., matter) and follows its ways. Another being who is without beginning (the person who is wise) enjoys it (i. e.) matter or *prakriti* for a short time) and then abandons it (in disgust). (*Svetasvatara Upanishad* 4-5).

It is also shown that only *prakriti* (matter) is subject to change in its nature.- "The one who controls *Prakriti* (*Mayi*) creates the world out of *prakriti*; another (the *jiva*) is bound by *prakriti* (*maya*)". "It should be known that *prakriti* (with its three qualities, *sattvam*, *rajas* and *tamas*) is *maya* and that He who controls *prakriti* is Maheswara". (*Svetasvatara Upanishad* 4-10).

Note:—This passage explains what is meant by the word *Maya*. *Prakriti* is called *Maya* because it is the cause of the varied and wonderful creation (*srishhti*).

Smriti also states: "*Prakriti* (the cow), which has neither beginning nor end, produces (fire, water and earth) and creates also the world" *Mantrika Upanishad*. 1

Note:—First comes the evolution into the aggregate (*samashiti*) and then the individual objects (*vyashiti*).

The following *slokas* from the *Bhagavad Gita* also declare that only *prakriti* evolves into the world:-

1. "Know that *Prakriti* (matter) and *Purusha* (the individual self) (which are associated with each other) are both of them, without beginning. (18-19)

2. "Earth, water, fire, air, ether (*akasa*), the mind (*manas*), *buddhi* (*mahat*) and *ahankara* - these eight forms of *prakriti* are mine". (7-4).

"Know also that there is another *prakriti* (*splendour*) of mine different from the preceding. It is of the nature of the *Jiva* (the individual self) and is more important. By it (the *Jiva*), the world of matter (*prakriti*) is supported". (7-5).

3. "Having made my *prakriti* (matter) evolve (into eight forms), I create the world again and again". (9 - 8).

4. "Under my control, *prakriti* gives birth to the world consisting of moving and non-moving things". (9 - 10). These and others.

Thus, *prakriti* is the body of *Iswara* and therefore the word *prakriti* denotes (also) *Iswara*, who is its soul and who has it as His mode or inseparable attribute; so also the word *purusha* denotes *Iswara* who is its soul and who has *purusha* as His mode. Hence, *Iswara* is the soul of the world constituted of *purusha* and *prakriti*.

So, the *Vishnu Purana* says:— (1-2-28).

"Vishnu is both the causal reality (*avyaktam*) and the reality which is called the effect (*vyaktam*). He is *Purusha* (the individual self) and also Time (*kala*). He is the Prime Mover (*kshobhaka*) and, likewise, the thing that is moved (*kshobhya*) and is the Supreme Ruler."

Hence, it is only *prakriti* (or matter) that is the mode or attribute of the Supreme Self who has it as His attribute—it is only this part or aspect *prakara* that undergoes change. He who has *prakriti* as His

prakara or mode—the (*Prakarini*) does not undergo any change. In the same way, in the Supreme Self who has the individual self as His *prakara* or mode, it is only the *Jiva*, the attributive part, that is subject to the ills of *samsara* (*apurushartha*), the *Prakarini* (*amsa*) is the controller, spotless and full of all auspicious qualities and His will is omnipotent.

(If it is accepted that Iswara who has *prakriti* and *Jiva* as His modes is the cause of the world and that Iswara who has them as His attributes stands as the world), then it would follow that Iswara with *chit* and *achit* as His attributes is the cause and that He is, at the same time, the effect (namely the world) which has the former as the material cause. (The *Sutra* which declares) that the effect is none other than the cause could then become easily understood and all the Vedic texts would find reconciliation. Thus, Brahman in the causal state has *prakriti* and *purusha* as His body and they are then in such a subtle (*sukshma*) condition that they cannot be distinguished by names and forms. Brahman is also in the state of the effect (*karya*) with *chit* and *achit* in their gross (*sthula*) condition as His body, when they have become distinguished by names and forms (i. e. after creation or *srishti*). The attainment of this gross condition by Brahman is called the creation of the world. So Bhagavan Parasara says:—

* “Matter (*pradhana* or *prakriti*) and *purusha* (individual self) are both beginningless. They are the cause of the effect which consists of *pradhana* and *purusha*”. Therefore, since all existing things are modes or attributes of Iswara, the words which denote *prakriti* and *purusha* in whatever state they may be, denote, directly, the Supreme self who is endowed with these attributes

* Vishnu purana (1-6-87).

(*prakaras*), just like the words, god, man and the like which denote the individual self. Words like 'god' and 'man' denoting the bodies of individual selves which are specific modifications of matter denote, directly, the individual souls, since these bodies are only the modes or attributes (*prakara*) of the *Prakarin*. In the same way, all things, *chit* and *achit* (the sentient and the non-sentient) are the bodies of the Supreme Self and are therefore His modes or attributes and, for that reason, the words which denote *chit* and *achit* denote (also) the Supreme Self directly (without *lakshana*). This is just the relationship existing between the body and the soul. The one (the soul) is the support (*adhara*) and the other (the body) is that which is supported and which is incapable of existing independently of the other (*viz.*, the soul); the one (the soul) is the principle or substance which controls and directs and the other (the body) is directed and controlled; the one (the soul) has its purposes fulfilled by the other and is called (*seshi*) and the other (the body) exists solely for fulfilling the purposes of the other and is called (*sessa*). The word *atma* means etymologically "that which obtains". It is so called because it obtains the body and acts as its support and as its directing agent, for the fulfilment of its own purposes. The body is an *akara*, being an inseparable attribute or mode (of the soul), as it is supported and controlled by the other and exists for the satisfaction of its purposes. It is this kind of relationship that exists between the individual self and its body. Similarly, the Supreme Self has all things as His body and is therefore denoted by all words.

Notes—Sessa and Seshi. Both *chit* and *achit* exist not for their own sake, but for the fulfilment of the purposes of Iswara. So, Iswara is *Seshi* and *chit* and *achit* stand in the relation of *sessa* to Him.

Many Vedic texts declare this truth :—

“All the Vedas point to Brahman as that which is to be attained; all the Vedas are at one in Him”.
(*Kata Upanishad* 2 - 15)

The meaning is: Since, Brahman is the only thing which is expressed, they become one as expressive of the same thing”.

“The one celestial thing is in varied forms (like gods, men and the like), being their inmost self (*antaryami*)”. *Aranyaka*: 3, 11.

“The senses (*devah*) of these beings are not aware of Him though He exists with them”. The word *devah* in the *sruti* quoted above means the senses (*indriyah*). The *sruti* means that He exists within gods, men and the like as their inmost soul and is therefore (always) with them and (yet) the senses of these beings are not aware of Him.

There are passages in the Puranas which state the same thing :

“We bow to That wherein all words find their final and eternal resting place”. The resting place of a word is of course that which is expressed by it. “That which is the first cause of all effects is the primary and chief significance of all words”. *Jitanta Stotram*: (7-4).

“By all the Vedas, it is I that have to be known”
Bhagavad Gita: (15-15).

These and other passages refer to the Inner Self (*antaryami*) that has, as His attributes, individual souls with their bodies; for, does not the *sruti* declare: “So, I will enter into these three deities (*devatah*)—fire, water, earth, along with my body, namely

the individual self and create names and forms (such as gods, men, animals, plants and the like)?”

The words of Manu are also to this effect:—

“He who rules over all, who is the subtlest of all subtle things - know that He is the Supreme Person (*Purusha*) with the splendour of the sun and capable of being realised by intelligence similar to that in a dream”.

The meaning is as follows:- “He who rules over all” means “He who directs and controls all, having entered into them as their Inner Self”. Souls are said to be subtle because they pervade all non-sentient things. Iswara is said to be more subtle than the souls because He pervades even souls that are subtle. The word *rukma* in the *sloka* means “having the colour of the sun”. *Swapnadheegamya* means “capable of being realised only by constant meditation which has attained the clearness of sense perception”.

* “Some call Him Agni, others call Him Maruts, and others still call Him Prajapati, some others call Him Indra, while others call Him Prana. He is called also by others the Eternal Brahman”.
Manu: (12-123)

“Some” means some Vedas. On the line of reasoning stated before, since the Supreme Brahman has entered into all things as their Inner Self for controlling and directing them, words like Agni denote Him just like the words “Eternal Brahman”.

So also another *Smriti* says:—

“Those who perform *yajnas* to the spirits of their forefathers, to the gods and to Brahmins as well as

to Agni perform these *yajnas* only to Vishnu who is the Inner Self of all”.

Words like “the spirits of forefathers”, ‘gods’, ‘Brahmins,’ and ‘Agni’ denote only Vishnu who is their Inner Self”. This is what it comes to mean.

In regard to this matter, this is the essence of all the *Sastras*:— “The individual souls (*jivatmas*) have pure knowledge as their attribute; this knowledge is, in its (essential) nature, without any contraction or limits (that is, it can reach any place and function at any time). (But) owing to *avidya* which is of the nature of *karma*, it has undergone contraction in accordance with their respective *karma*. (As a consequence), they enter into the bodies of created beings from Brahma downwards to the (smallest) grass and obtain an extent of knowledge which is in accordance with their respective bodies. They identify themselves with their respective bodies and perform actions suited to them and, in virtue of these actions, are caught up in the stream of *samsara*, which consists in the experience of pleasures and pains adapted to their nature. Their release from *samsara* is impossible except by devout self-surrender (*prapatti*) to the Lord. For this purpose, the *Sastras* teach that all souls (*atmanah*) are of the nature merely of knowledge (*jnana*) and are therefore exactly alike, and that since their substance or essential nature (*svarupa*) exists solely to subserve the purposes of the Lord, they have the Lord as their soul. They teach, further, that the essential nature (*svarupa*) of the Lord is different from all else, being absolutely opposed to all that is imperfect and being of the nature of bliss, that He is the abode of boundless, wonderful and innumerable auspicious qualities and that He is the soul of all,

directing all things, sentient, and non-sentient, by His will. They teach (finally) that the means of attaining Him is devotion (*bhakti*) to Him with due supplementary rites (*anga*).

As stated in the following *sloka* :—

“The soul or self is of the nature of bliss (*ananda*); it is of the nature of knowledge (*jnana*); it is spotless (pure). Suffering (*dukkha*), ignorance and impurities are the qualities of *prakriti* (or matter) and not of the soul.

This means that since the qualities (like suffering, ignorance and impurities) are due to *karma*, which arises from the soul's association with *prakriti*, they do not pertain to the substance or essential nature (*svarupa*) of the soul. By association with *prakriti*, suffering and the like result; by dissociation from *prakriti*, they cease to exist. Hence, by this discernment, they may be seen to belong to *prakriti*.

The *Bhagavad Gita* says:-

* “In one endowed with learning and character, in one who is a Brahmin only in name, in a cow, in an elephant, so also in a dog and in the man who eats dog's flesh, the wise see the souls to be of the same nature (though in association with bodies that are diverse)”. Chap. 5, 18.

“The wise” are those who have the wisdom to differentiate, the soul (or *atma*) from matter

* The first two words in the *sloka* are interpreted by Sri Ramonuja in his *Gita Bhashya* as referring to two individuals. At first sight, it might appear that they mean “in a Brahmin endowed with learning and character”.

(*prakriti*) which has taken the shapes of gods, animals, men and plants. Those who have a knowledge of the true nature of the soul when it is dissociated from the specific form of matter see (all) souls to be of the same nature, though existing in widely different forms and are therefore "seers of sameness" (*samadarsanah*).

The *Gita* declares as follows:-

"Those whose mind is aware of the sameness (of souls when freed from matter) - by them has release from bondage (*moksha*) been secured even here ((i. e.) though they have not yet obtained *moksha*, they are, for all practical purposes, like released souls). The soul dissociated from matter is without faults (differences) and may be called Brahman; they are therefore in Brahman (Hence, they may be called released souls.)

'Without faults' (*nirdosham*) means "without the faults arising from association with specific forms of matter like the bodies of gods and the rest". The soul of every one, in its essential nature or substance (*svarupa*), (apart from matter or *prakriti*) has only the nature of bliss or knowledge and is therefore alike (in all). It has already been stated that the *srutis*, *smritis*, and *itihasas* teach that these words denoting the respective bodies and the grammatical coordination (*samanadhikaranya*) mean that the soul which has been described so far exists only to subserve the purposes of the Lord (*seshatva*), is controlled and directed by Him (*niyamyatva*) and is supported by Him (*adheyatva*).

The *Bhagavad Gita* says :-

"This *prakriti* or matter which is of the nature of *sattvam*, *rajas* and *tamas* was constituted by me, it is

hard to overcome; only those who have sought my protection can pass beyond *prakriti*". (7, 14).

This comes to saying that the release of the *Jiva* from *samsara*, which is characterised by association with *prakriti* possessed of varied qualities resulting from *karma*, is impossible without self-surrender to the Lord (*prapatti*).

The *Srutis* also state that there is no other way to attain Brahman.

The *Gita* further says :-

"This world is all pervaded by me without revealing my form; all beings rest in me (their inner self), (but) I do not depend on them; nor do they rest in me (by actual physical contact but by my will). Behold my unique sovereignty (9, 1, 5). Thus, the varied nature of His divine Lordship is stated to arise from the possession of all powers. The same idea is proclaimed again (in the following *sloka*):-

"I hold the whole world under my control with a fragment of my might".

It means:— "I enter into this wonderful and varied universe as its soul and hold it under my control by my will. Thus, I am the possessor of the boundless splendour of this universe. I am the abode of immeasurable noble qualities and stand as an object of unsurpassed wonder".

So has it been said:—

"The Lord is manifold while (remaining) one; while He is manifold, He remains single. His

form is beyond thought; who is there capable of understanding it?"

As ruler and controller, He remains one, enters into the varied forms of *chit* and *achit* as their inner self and thus appears in varied modes (*prakarah*), directs them to perform varied deeds, and thus assumes many forms. Having entered into the world consisting of varied and wonderful forms with an extremely small fragment of His might, as their inner controlling self, He is seen as manifold. At the same time, Narayana, who is the Supreme Brahman and Purushottama, remains One, the Lord of all Lords, possessed of boundless, wonderful and innumerable auspicious qualities. He is of unsurpassed splendour and has a complexion similar to that of a black cloud. His eyes are clear and long like the petals of a lotus; He has a form resembling a thousand suns (radiating countless beams). As the *Srutis* declare, "He is * in the cave in the Supreme Ether (*nitya vibhuti*), in the § heavenly world yonder" (and remains One). Nowhere else than in the Lord is it possible that a thing possessing a certain nature and certain powers capable of performing only one kind of action and having only a single form could have other forms, other characteristics and other powers. The Supreme Brahman described above is different from all other things and has the characteristics of all and possesses all kinds of power. Though He is single, He is of manifold forms, countless and varied. Since He has wonderful resources which are innumerable, He is also one that has neither an equal nor a superior. In Him manifoldness and singleness are not opposed to each other. On the ground that

* Taittiriya Aranyaka (1-1).

§ Taittiriya (6-1).

He is also an object (like others), it is not proper to say that there is opposition or incongruity between the two (namely, oneness and manifoldness).

Note:—This world with all its wonderful variety is called Bhagavan's *Lila vibhuti*, the splendid scene created for His play or *Lila*. Bhagavan also transcends this world and exists in the heavenly world, which is eternal and unchanging and which is called *nitya vibhuti*.

So has it been said :—

“The (unique) powers of all things (like fire, water and the rest) are such as cannot be explained by reason or thought. (What one substance possesses as its unique quality or power is not found in others). For the same reason (unique) powers such as that of creation and the like belong to Brahman (which is different from all else). O best of those that have performed austere penances, this is like the heat possessed by fire which is not to be found, for example, in water.” *Vishnupuranam* (1-3-2)

This is what it comes to mean:—It would be unreasonable to expect that a certain power found in any one of such substances as fire, water and the like will be seen in others different from that substance. Just as heat and other like qualities not found in water are found in fire which is different in kind (from water), even so, in Brahman which is different from all other things, it is unreasonable to infer likeness with other things (on the ground that Brahman is also a substance).

So says (Akrura to Sri Krishna):—

* “That great Being whose wonderful form this world is—with that wonderful being, namely, yourself, I have now come in contact”.

* *Vishnupurana* (5-19-7).

All these (truths) have been arrived at by a careful study of hosts of Vedic passages with diverse significance and of their commentaries as accepted by the wise. For instance, in regard to creation and dissolution, (*srishti* and *pralaya*), which are due to the infinite modifications of many 'reals' (*tattvas*) and in which there is no definite order of occurrence, the *Srutis* and no other source of knowledge can give us any knowledge and, likewise, in regard to Brahman. But the *Srutis* describe them in different ways. Some Vedic texts describe Brahman as being without any attributes (*nirguna*) and as being of the nature of knowledge:- "It is pure, free from stain; it is knowledge and bliss; it suffers no change; it has no parts; it never acts; it is peace; it has no attributes." Thus these *srutis* say that Brahman is knowledge without any attributes. Again, it is said in some *Srutis*:- "In Brahman there are no differentiating features (*nana*) of any kind. He who sees difference (or differentiating features) in Brahman - he goes from *samsara* to *samsara* (bondage to bondage)" *Kata Upanishad* 4-10. *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad* 6-4-14). "When one has realised that all is Brahman, how is it possible to say that one sees and that another is seen, that one knows and that another is known". *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad* 4-4-14). There are these and other Vedic texts of this kind which deny plurality (i. e.) that there are other things besides Brahman). There are other Vedic passages which say, "He who knows all and who knows the characteristics of all, - He whose actions (in creating the world) are of the nature merely of His will which is knowledge-(He is Brahman)" *Mundaka Upanishad* 1-1-10); "He who discriminates all forms (*rupa*) - He in his wisdom gives them their names and calls them by these

names". *Taittiriya Purusha Sukta*). "All moments (in time) arose from the Supreme Being (*Vidyut Purusha*)" (*Narayanopanishad*). "He is free from all sin; old age does not afflict him nor Death; He is free from sorrow; He has neither hunger nor thirst; all desirable objects are ever with Him and His will is ever accomplished" (*Chandogya Upanishad*) (8-1-5). These texts deny the presence of such qualities as are considered imperfections in the world and affirm the existence in Him of countless auspicious qualities, of omniscience and of all forms of power or might. They affirm also that He gave forms and names to all things and that He is the support (*adhara*) of everything. Other Vedic passages state as follows:- "Everything is, indeed, Brahman, for everything arises from Brahman, is absorbed in Him, and has its being in Him (*Chandogya Upanishad* 3-14-1). "All this has Brahman as its soul (*Chandogya Upanishad* 6-8-7). These texts declare that the world created by Brahman is manifold and that everything is Brahman". There are also a number of Vedic passages which say, "He who realises that the individual self is different from Iswara who directs him - he alone becomes worthy of His grace". (*Svetasvatara Upanishad* 11). "He who knows these three - the experiencing self, the object of experience and the ruler who directs" (*Svetasvatara Upanishad* 1). Prajapati desired as follows:- "I will create these beings". "The Lord of the world, the Great Ruler who is Supreme, the Supreme Deity of all deities" (*Svetasvatara Upanishad* 6), "He who has everything under His control and rules over everything" (*Brihadaranyaka Upanishad* 6. 4. 22). These and other *Srutis* declare that Brahman is different from everything else, that everything (else) is subject to His rule, that He is the ruler of all, that everything

(else) exists to subserve His purposes (*sesha*) and that Iswara is the Lord (of all). Other passages again say:— “The Ruler who has entered into all beings and who is the soul of all” (*Yajur Aranyaka* 8, 20). “This self is the Inner Ruler who is immortal” (*Brihadaranyaka Upanishad* (5-7); “He whose body is the earth, He of whom water is the body, He to whom fire is the body. He to whom primordial matter before it undergoes transformation (*avyaktam*) is the body, He to whom *akshara* (*chit*) is the body, He to whom Death is the body, He to whom the soul of the Jiva is the body” (*Brihadaranyaka Upanishad* 5-7). These *srutis* show that the relationship between every object other than Brahman and Brahman is that between the body and the soul.

This being the case, these passages which are diverse in their meaning should be interpreted in such a way that they do not conflict with one another and that the primary and direct meaning (*mukhyartha*) is not given up and they have been so interpreted (by us). The Vedic texts which deny change or modification in Brahman have their direct meaning, because we state that the essential nature of Brahman (*svarupa*) is not subject to modification (and that these modifications are only in His body consisting of *chit* and *achit*). The passages in the *sruti* which say that Brahman is *nirguna* (without attributes or qualities) are interpreted (by us) as meaning that Brahman is without those (objectionable qualities) or imperfections that are found in the world associated with matter. The texts which deny plurality (*nanatva*) are, in no way, disregarded, because we hold that all things other than Brahman, both *chit* and *achit*, are His bodies or modes (*prakara*) and that He is the inner self of

all, who has them as His modes. In this sense (we hold) that there is only one thing, *viz.*, Brahman. The passages which say that Brahman is different from all else, that He is the Lord and Ruler, that He is the abode of all auspicious qualities, that the objects of desire are ever with Him and that His will is supreme – these passages are accepted by us (just as they are) and stand unshaken. The texts which declare that Brahman is mere knowledge or bliss are interpreted by us as follows:– The Supreme Brahman, who is other than everything else, who is the abode of all auspicious qualities, who is the Ruler over all, for whose purposes everything else exists, who is the support of all things, who is the cause of the origin, continuance, and dissolution of everything else, who is free from all imperfections, who is not subject to any change or modification (*vikara*), who is the soul, of all — (this Supreme Brahman) possesses (in our doctrine) knowledge which is of the nature of bliss as His essential attribute (the attribute which defines His *svarupa*) and which is opposed to all impurity and that His essential nature (*svarupa*) is also knowledge, because He is self-evident or self-luminous. The declarations of unity (between the *Jiva* and Brahman found in the *srutis* like “That Thou Art”) bring out the relationship of the body and the soul that exists between them and that accounts for the grammatical co-ordination. In this sense we accept the authority of these passages also.

By this interpretation, it may be asked, which of the doctrines (*siddhanta*) is proved as true according to the Vedas, the doctrine of non-difference (*abheda*) (otherwise called *advaita*) or the doctrine of *bhedabheda*, difference as well as non-difference or the doctrine of plurality or *bheda*. The answer is

as follows: Since every one of them is taught in the Vedas, every one of them is accepted as true (in a sense). Since Brahman has everything else as His body and as His *prakara* or mode, He is the only existing thing. Thus, *abheda* or *advaita* is proved as true (*in this sense*). The one Brahman, we maintain, has sentient and non-sentient things, which are many and varied, as His *prakaras* or modes and stands manifold. Therefore, *bhedabheda* is proved also to be true (*in a sense*). We hold that *chit* and *achit* are different both in their essential nature (*svarupa*) and in their attributes (*svabhava*) from Iswara and should not be confounded with one another. Therefore, the *bheda* doctrine is also accepted as true.

The Advaitin might here object and say, "But the *sruti* states: "That Thou art" and "There is delay for him (who knows the unity of the *Jiva* and Iswara) only until he becomes free from the body." These passages imply that only the knowledge of unity between the *Jiva* and Iswara is the means of attaining release from bondage, which is the supreme goal or end of life."

We answer:- "It is not so. The passage in *Svetasvatara Upanishad* I says, "Only by knowing that the Inner Self within, directing the *Jiva*, is different from the *Jiva*—(only *thus* does the latter attain immortality (*amritatvam*), having been admitted into His favour by Him". "Thus" means "by reason of the knowledge of separateness". "By Him" means "by the Supreme Self". The words "becomes immortal, having been admitted into His favour" make it clear that the direct means of attaining immortality is the knowledge of the difference between the individual self and the Inner Ruler who

controls and directs. The Advaitin might say, "This text in *Svetasvatara Upanishad* should be considered as referring to the attainment of *Saguna* Brahman, (i. e.) Brahman with attributes, who is unreal. We ask:—"Why should not the reverse be true, namely, that the knowledge of difference is the means of attaining immortality, since the *Svetasvatara* text explicitly states it to be so, whereas the *Chandogya* passage has no such explicit statement (to the contrary)? That is, when there is (apparent) conflict between two (texts) of equal validity, their real import should be carefully studied without ignoring (either of them). "How could there be no conflict?" it may be asked. The meaning of the *Chandogya* text is, "Since the individual self is the body of the Supreme Self, who is within the former as his inner ruler and director, the word "thou" means "Brahman who has thee (the individual self) as His *prakara* or mode". It should be understood in this way". The meaning of the *Svetasvatara* text is that the difference between the *Jiva* who is the body or *prakara* and the Supreme Self who abides in him as his soul, who is free from all defects and imperfections, and who is the abode of wonderful and innumerable auspicious qualities should be borne in mind. This has been repeatedly explained.

(In the *Svetasvatara Upanishad I*) it is said, "The experiencing subject (the individual self), the object of experience (*achit*) and the Ruler who directs all etc." A thing which is the object of experience is of this nature:- it is non-sentient; it exists always for others; it is subject to changes or modifications and so on. The individual self, who is the experiencing subject, is of the following nature. It is essentially of the nature of infinite and pure knowledge and bliss; but owing to *avidya*,

which is of the nature of beginningless *karma*, its knowledge is subject to contraction and expansion and it becomes connected with non-sentient matter, which is the object of experience or enjoyment and it is capable of obtaining release from bondage by devout adoration of the Supreme Being and has such other qualities. Brahman exists in the individual self as its Inner Ruler and also in non-sentient things as their Inner Ruler. (Apart from these two) He exists also, in His essential nature, as the abode of countless attributes. Thus, the meaning of the *Svetasvatara* text is that Brahman exists in three forms.

(Moreover) the sentence, "That Thou Art," has been commented upon by wise *acharyas* of ancient times as teaching that the Brahman who is to be adored in *sad-vidya* is possessed of attributes (*saguna*) and that the fruit of this adoration is the attainment of *Saguna-Brahman* (Brahman with attributes). For instance, the *Vakyakara* says, "It is in accordance with reason that the goal is the attainment of *Saguna-Brahman* (since the adoration) according to *sadvidya* is of *Saguna Brahman*." This has been commented upon as follows by *Dramidacharya*, while pointing out the optional nature of the *vidyas* (i. e.) between *Dahara Vidya* and *Sad Vidya*:- "He who has 'sat' in his mind does not meditate on the multitudinous qualities as apart from the deity, (as in the *dahara vidya*). Nevertheless, he worships only the deity that has qualities. Therefore, even by the meditation according to *sad vidya*, the fruit that results is the attainment of *Saguna Brahman*. "He who has *sat* in his mind" means "he who meditates in accordance with *sad vidya*." The rest of the sentence means:- even though he does not

meditate on the multitudinous auspicious qualities like freedom from blemish or sin as apart from the deity, like the one who practises the *dahara vidya*, he worships only the deity who has these qualities; since all these multitudinous and auspicious qualities are always associated with the essential nature (*svarupa*) of the deity. Though the deity is meditated on as possessed only of its peculiar and unique qualities, such as being the cause of the world and the like, yet the worship of the deity is only as qualified by *all* the auspicious qualities which, as a matter of fact, are connected with its essential nature. Therefore, even in *sad-vidya* the goal is only the attainment of *Saguna Brahman*. Hence *sad-vidya* and *dahara vidya* are optional (i. e.) either of them may be chosen, the result being the same).

Note:—*Sad-vidya, dahara vidya:*— The Upanishads ordain some thirty-two forms of meditation or adoration of the Supreme Being. In *sad-vidya* the meditation is on the Supreme Self as being the cause of the world. In *dahara vidya* the meditation is on the qualities or attributes of the Supreme Being. These *vidyas* or forms of meditation are not all of them prescribed as necessary for everyone. Any one of them will do for attaining the desired goal. So they are alternatives and it is within the option of each man to choose the form of *vidya* suited to his own nature.

Here, another objection might be raised:— “It has been stated (by you) that the Supreme Self is the Inner Ruler who directs all creatures and that everything is subject to His direction and control. If so, there is no person qualified to follow (*adhikari*) the injunctions (*vidhi*) and prohibitions (*nishedha*) ordained in the scripture (such as “Do this” and “This should not be done”). He only is competent to follow injunctions and prohibitions such as “Do this” and “This should not be done” who is capable of action or refraining from action in accord-

ance with his own reason. There is no such person (since, according to you, every one is directed and controlled by the Supreme Self). In all actions, if the Supreme Being is considered (by you) as the inspirer and director, His power of control over all is admitted to be true. It is also said in the *sruti* as follows:— “He whom this Supreme Being desires to raise to a higher position—him the Supreme Being directs to do good deeds. He whom the Supreme Being desires to cast down—him the Supreme Being directs to do evil deeds”. (*Kaushitaki Upanishad* 3-9,). Further in making them do good and evil deeds, it would appear as if the Supreme Being is heartless (and partial).

The answer to this question or objection is as follows:—

The Lord endows all sentient beings, in common, with the power of intelligence, the power of initiating action (*pravritti*), and all other such things as are necessary for the performance of actions and for abstention from actions and becomes their support to enable them to carry out their purposes. He also enters into them and controls them by giving His assent. In all this, the Lord remains the *Seshi* for whom the *Jiva* exists. The *Jiva* or individual self, being thus endowed with these powers, acts or refrains from action in accordance with his own will (independently of the Lord). In these situations, the Supreme Being witnesses the *Jiva* doing these things and remains indifferent (or neutral). Therefore, everything is just. Directing some to do good deeds and some to do evil deeds is not without discrimination of any kind and not in common to all. If a person has already begun, of his own accord, to do things which are extremely pleasing to the Lord,

the Lord becomes pleased with his love and endows him further with wisdom and inspires him to further deeds of merit. If, on the other hand, a person has already begun to do extremely evil deeds, the Lord strengthens him in his evil nature and makes him do, of his own accord, only cruel deeds thereafter. The Bhagavan says :-

“To those who (in this way) worship me with loving devotion and who eagerly long for union with me at all times—I graciously vouchsafe unto them the mental power of realising me by which they become capable of attaining me.” *Gita* (10-10).

“To enable them to attain my grace, I reveal my attributes within their minds and with the shining lamp of wisdom concerning me, I destroy all *karma* resulting from ignorance.” *Gita*. (10-11).

“Those, who, owing to their cruel nature, show hatred to me—these wicked sinners I cast into the cycle of births and deaths and that too only in wicked forms of life (*asuri*) that are inimical to me.” (16-19).

The means of attainment of Brahman (upaya)

This Purushottama, who is the Supreme Brahman, can be attained only by means of devotion (*bhakti*) which is of the nature of meditation (*anudhyana*), which seeks no other reward, which is constant and continuous, which is characterised by boundless love (to the Lord) and which, by its vividness, has become the same as sense perception. (And by whom can this be attained?). By one whose multitudinous sins heaped up during all previous births have been

destroyed by supremely meritorious deeds, who has won the Lord's grace by seeking refuge at the lotus-like feet of the Supreme Person, whose knowledge of the truths and their real significance as obtained from the Scriptures has been rendered clear by the elucidation and explanation of good *Acharyas* and who, thereafter, comes to possess qualities of the spirit (*atmaguna*) in ever increasing measure from day to day—qualities such as control of the mind, control of the senses, the practice of austerities and penances, purity of body, patience, straight-forwardness or integrity, the distinctive knowledge of what is to be feared (namely, offence to the Lord and His devotees and the like) and fearlessness (due to the conviction that the Lord is his Saviour), compassion (towards those that are afflicted with suffering,) abstention from injury (to living beings) (*ahimsa*) and the like—(by one) who never ceases to perform the rites and duties prescribed to each *varna* (caste) and to each *asrama*, which have been prescribed as compulsory (*nitya*) and for special occasions (*naimittika*), as forms of worship of the Supreme Person and who desists from those actions that are forbidden—(by one) who has surrendered, at the lotus feet of the Supreme Being, both himself and whatever belongs to him, who, on account of his devotion, is ever engaged in the praise of the Lord, in remembrance of Him, in adoration of Him, in obeisance to Him, in efforts (to render service to Him), in reciting His holy names, in listening to His qualities, in explaining His qualities to others, in meditation of Him, in performing *pooja* and in prostration before Him—who by these acts has pleased the Lord and has won the favour of the Supreme Person possessed of infinite mercy and whose mental darkness has been dispelled by His grace.

So has it been said by Bhagavan Yamuna-charya, the great spiritual teacher, "He can be attained (only) by him whose mind has been purified by the two (viz., *karma yoga* and *jnana yoga*) and whose devotion is absolute and is exclusively directed towards the Lord.

Note:—*Karma Yoga and Jnana Yoga*: *Karma Yoga* consists in the performance of duties and rites prescribed for each caste and each *asrama* (stage of life), without caring for their fruits and with the idea that these acts are of the nature of the worship of the Lord. *Jnana Yoga* is realisation of one's self by the practice of *Karma Yoga* and of the disciplines prescribed in *Yoga*. These lead in their turn to *Bhakti Yoga*, which alone is directly capable of enabling a person to attain the Lord.

The *Sruti* also says:— "He who knows both *vidya* and *avidya* overcomes his sins by *avidya* and attains immortality by *vidya*." (*Isavasya Upanishad-II*). Here, the word *avidya* means that which is other than *vidya*, namely, *karma* or the performance of rites and duties ordained for each *varna* (caste) and each *asrama* (stage of life). The word *vidya* means meditation which has reached the form of devotion or *bhakti*.

(That the word *avidya* is used in the sense of *karmas* like sacrifices (*Yajna*) may be seen from the following *sloka*):—

"He, too, performed many sacrifices (*Yajna*) in order to cross (overcome) his sins by *avidya* (i. e.) *karma*, in order to possess the knowledge which comes of wise discrimination." (*Vishnupurana*: 6 - 6 - 2).

"He who meditates on Him in this manner attains immortality. There is no other way of salvation (*moksha*)". (*Purusha Sukta*). *Tam evam vidvan amrita iha bhavati.*

'Those who meditate on Him become immortal' (Taittiriya Upanishad). *ya enam viduh amritas to bhavanti.*

"The person who meditates on Brahman attains the Supreme". *Brahmavid apnoti param.*

"He who meditates on Brahman becomes Brahman (i. e.) (comes to resemble Brahman) (Taittiriya Aranyaka). *Brahma veda Brahmaiva bhavati.*

In all these sentences, the word *vedana* (*vid*=to know) really means 'meditation', because it should have the same meaning as *nididhyasitavyah* "should be meditated upon".

Note :—Advaitins hold that only *Jnana* or knowledge of unity between the *Jiva* and Brahman can bring about release from *samsara*. So they consider that the word *vedana* in the passages cited above means *knowledge* and not 'meditation'. The Visishtadvaitin holds that *karma* and *jnana* lead to *bhakti* and that *bhakti* alone leads directly to *moksha*.

The following *sruti* describes the nature of this meditation :—

"This (Supreme) Being cannot be attained by mere reflection (*manana*) nor by mere meditation (*medha*) nor by listening to the manifold (Scriptures). Only he whom the Supreme Being chooses—only by him can it be attained. To him alone the Supreme Being reveals His form (*svarupa*)"—*Mundaka-upanishad* 3 - 2 - 9. *

Not by mere *vedana* or meditation but by constant and continuous meditation which has come to attain the nature of devotion (or *bhakti*). Mere meditation cannot do it (*na medhaya*).

* Note :—This is the meaning of the first part of this *sruti* as interpreted by Sri Sudarsana Suri, the great commentator of *Vedartha Sangraha* and of *Sri Bhashya*. At first sight, one would be inclined to render the *sruti* thus :— "The Supreme Being cannot

be attained by the exposition of doctrine, nor by great mental power, nor by listening to the manifold Scriptures".

This is what all this comes to mean:- Only when the man desirous of release from bondage who is qualified by meditation (or *vedana*) and the like as ordained in Vedanta has come to perform this meditation in a spirit of boundless love (to the Lord) - (only then) does he become capable of attaining the Lord.

The Bhagavan has also stated the same:-

"The Supreme Person can be attained only by exclusive devotion (*bhakti*)" ("exclusive" in the sense that the devotion is only to Him and to no other deity.) *Bhagavad Gita* 8-22.

"Only by exclusive devotion, O Arjuna, can I, whose nature is such, be known, realised and enjoyed." *Ibid* - 11, 54.

"By devotion (*bhakti*) he comes to understand me - who I am and what my great attributes are. Having thus understood me, he then enjoys me." *Ibid* - 18, 55.

The meaning is this:- After that, he enjoys me owing to that devotion itself.

Bhakti or devotion is only a special form of knowledge which is characterised by unsurpassed love, in which there is no expectation of any reward other than itself and which generates a dislike for all other things. The *Sruti* (cited above) means that only he who has this kind of devotion is capable of being chosen by the Lord (for His Grace) and of attaining the Lord.

This kind of supreme devotion (*para bhakti*) which is a special form of knowledge arises only from *bhakti yoga* which, in its turn, results from *karma yoga*, the performance of rites and duties in absolute detachment in the spirit of service to the Lord, preceded by knowledge (*Jnana*) of the essential nature of the soul that increases day to day.

So says Bhagavan Parasara:—

“The Supreme Person is worshipped by the man who performs the duties and rites of his *varna* and his *asrama*. There is no other way of pleasing Him”. *Vishnupurana*: 3-8-6.

Purushottama, who is the Supreme Person that incarnated in this world for the redemption of the whole world, has stated this Himself:—

“Listen to me. I will tell you how the man who is earnestly engaged in the performance of his duties attains salvation (*siddhi*). Having worshipped me, who is the cause of all action and by whom all this (world) is pervaded, by the (proper) performance of his duties and rites, man attains salvation (*siddhi*).” *Bhagavad Gita* (18-46).

This means: He can be attained only by devotion which has gradually developed in strength, in accordance with what has been said before.

This is the path indicated in all the *srutis* whose meaning has been made clear by ancient commentaries on the *Veda* and the *Vedanta* and approved, without exception, by holy persons such as Bhagavan Bodhayana, Tanka, Dramida, Guhadeva, Kapardi and Bharuchi.

V. The validity of sources of knowledge (Pramana) and the arguments to prove that Narayana is the ultimate cause.

By this (exposition of right doctrine), Charvakas, Buddhists, the followers of Kanada and Goutama, Jains, and the followers of Kapila and Patanjali, who are all unbelievers in the Veda, have been refuted, along with those who hold heterodox views, while believing in the authority of the Veda. Even among those who believe in the authority of the Veda, those whose vision is blind to a knowledge of the true nature of things are considered by Manu as on the same footing as those who do not acknowledge the authority of the Veda.

“Those *smritis* which do not acknowledge the authority of the Veda and those again that are heterodox in their vision (*kudrishti*)-all these are of no avail after death; for they are associated with *tamas*”. Manu: *Smriti* 12-65).

This is the meaning:- Only those whose essential nature is true *sattvam* untainted by any trace of *rajas* and *tamas* - only they interpret the right spirit of the Veda and have an understanding of the real significance of the Veda.

So also has it been said in the *Matsya Purana*:-

“Some *kalpas* (cosmic periods equal to a day of Brahma) are mixed, some are *sattvika*, some again are *rajasa*, while others are *tamasa*.”

Having pointed out the differences among the *kalpas* by saying that some among Brahma's *kalpas* are mixed, some are *sattvic*, some are *rajasic*, while others are *tamasic*, the greatness of (deities

(*tattva*) characterised by *sattvam*, *rajas*, and *tamas* is extolled in the *puranas* belonging to the respective *kalpa* by Brahma whose nature is coloured by qualities like *sattvam*.

"Whatever *purana* was dictated long ago in a particular *kalpa* by Brahma — in that *kalpa* it is only the greatness of the deity having, in full, the quality (pertaining to that *kalpa*) that is described in accordance with the nature of that *kalpa*." *Matsyapuranam*.

Specifically, too, it has been said (as follows).—

"The greatness of Agni and Siva is extolled in *puranas* which are *tamasic*; the greatness of Brahma is highly described in *puranas* which are *rajasic* and in *puranas* which are *sattvic*, the greatness of Hari is seen prominently. Only those men who follow the *yoga* prescribed in these *sattvika puranas* reach the Supreme Goal. In *puranas* which are mixed (*samkirna*), the greatness of Saraswati and of the *Pitris* is described" and so on.

This is what it means:— Since Brahma is the first among created beings. in him too, on certain days (of his), *sattvam* is predominant, in others *rajas* and in others still, *tamas*.

So has it been said by Bhagavan:—

Neither among the beings on the earth, nor again among the gods in *svarga* is there any created being free from these three qualities of matter (viz., *sattvam*, *rajas* and *tamas*). (*Bhagavad Gita*: 18 - 40).

The *Sruti* says:—

"He who first created Brahma and He who conveyed the Vedas to him—(He is Bhagavan)". (*Svetasvatara Upanishad* 6 - 35).

From this, it may be inferred that Brahma is a created being and that he too is subject to the authority of the *Sastra*. So, he, too, is a *kshetrajna* (individual self). If there is a conflict (of statements) between the *puranas* dictated by him on the days which were *sattvic* and those which were dictated by him on other days, only that *purana* which was dictated on the *sattvic* days is authoritative; those which conflict with it are not. The superior validity of a particular *purana* has to be determined after considering whether or not it was dictated by Brahma on his *sattvic* days.

The effects (*karya*) of *sattvam* and the other qualities are stated as follows by Bhagavan Himself:-

“From the development of *sattvam* arises *jnana* or perceptual knowledge of the real nature of the soul; from the development of *rajas* arises desire (for the pleasures of this life and of *svarga*) and from *tamas* arises engagement in evil deeds due to negligence and false knowledge, which again lead to the deepening of *tamas* and consequently of ignorance or want of knowledge”. *Bhagavad Gita*: (14-1).

“That intelligence (*buddhi*) which discriminates between action (that leads to the pleasures of this world—*pravritti*) and abstention from such action (that leads to *moksha*)—(*nivritti*), between what ought to be done and what ought not to be done, between what is to be feared (violation of the teaching of the scripture) and what is not to be feared (following the path indicated in them) and between bondage (*samsara*) and release (*moksha*)—that intelligence, O Arjuna, is *sattvic*.

“That intelligence, O! Arjuna, is *rajasic* which does not understand properly what is meant by

dharma and *adharma*, and what ought to be done and what ought not to be done”.

“That intelligence which considers *adharma* to be *dharma* owing to its being clouded by *tamas* (ignorance) and which understands all things perversely is, O Arjuna, *tamasic*” : *Bhagavad Gita* (14 - 17 and 18 - 30, 31 & 32).

The authors of the *puranas* learnt what is said in the respective *puranas* only from Brahma and then composed the *puranas*. This may be seen (from the following *sloka*) :-

“I will tell you how, being asked by the great *rishis* like Daksha, Bhagavan Brahma born in the lotus, related to them long before (what is said in the *puranas*) : *Vishnu-puranam*: 1, 2 & 8.

If it be asked how the decision should be arrived at in cases where there is mutual conflict (of statement) among the passages in the Vedas which are not of human authorship, we have already said that the conflict may be resolved by a careful consideration of what goes before and what comes after and then determining the purport.

Here are some passages in the *srutis* which appear to be conflicting:-

(1) “Having withdrawn all the senses with the mind (from external objects) and fixed them on the Supreme Being, one should meditate on *Isana*.” *Atharva Sikha*.

(2) “Brahma, *Vishnu*, Rudra and Indra are all created beings. What is to be meditated on is the

(ultimate) cause. Only *Sambhu*, who is possessed of all supreme powers and who is the Lord of all, is fit to be meditated upon in the midst of the sky": *Atharva Sikha*.

(3) "He, to whom there is none superior nor inferior, He, than whom there is nothing smaller or greater, He who stands alone and unshaken like a tree in the heavens — by him is all this (universe) filled. *Svetasvatara Upanishad* (Chap III).

"What is above Him is formless and faultless, and those who meditate on it become immortal; others are afflicted with sorrow. That (Being) has its faces everywhere, its heads everywhere, its necks everywhere. It lives in the cave of the heart of all creatures. It pervades all things. It is Bhagavan who is called *Siva*." *Svetasvatara Upanishad* (Chap III).

(4) "When there was darkness (*tamas*) everywhere, there was no such (division) as day and as night; there was no *sat* (existence) and no *asat* (non-existence). Only '*Siva* existed'. That is the reality existing within the sphere of the sun which is worthy of adoration. It is from it that during creation, the *jnana* of beings attains expansion. *Svetasvatara Upanishad*.

It has been already pointed out that Narayana is the Supreme Brahman. How, then, could it be said that this does not conflict with the passages cited above, where Siva is stated to be the Supreme Being? (it may be asked). This is a small matter. The Vedas with their *angas* (supplementary treatises like *Siksha* and *Vyakarana*), as elucidated and elaborated by the principles of interpretation enunciated in the words of Vedic scholars

(Mimamsakas) declare that Hari is the cause of the world's origin and the like. The *(*Sutakara*) says:- "From whom (are) the origin and the like of this (world) - (that is Brahman)" - 1, 1, 2, "That from which all these beings are born, that by which those that are born continue to live, that into which all these are merged - that is Brahman" *Taittiriya Bhriguvali* : 1

Notes:—* Badarayana, the author of the *Brahma Sutras*.

From these it is evident that Brahman is the cause etc., of the world. This has to be understood only from the sections dealing with the creation of the world. "This * (world) existed, my dear, as *Sat* at the beginning, single and without a second." From this text, it is learnt that the material cause and the instrumental cause of the world and that which is the Inner Ruler—that these form the (one) final cause and that this final cause is what is denoted by the word *Sat*. In another *sakha* or (branch of the Veda), the same meaning is conveyed in: "This existed at the beginning as Brahman, alone." Here, the final cause is referred to by the word 'Brahman'. So it is seen that what is referred to by the word *Sat* is only Brahman. In another *sakha* the same meaning is conveyed in:- "This † existed in the beginning as *atma* alone", where (the final cause) is referred to by the word *atma*. In another *sakha* the same meaning is conveyed in:- "Only § Narayana existed (then), neither Brahma nor Isana (Siva), nor the sky nor the earth nor the stars". (The final cause) is here referred to by the word 'Narayana'. From this it may be determined that, by the words expressive

* *Briharanyaka Upanishad* : 3 - 4 - 10.

† *Aiteraya Up.* 2 - 4.

§ *Mahopanishad*.

of the final cause like *Sat*, Brahman and the like, only Narayana is referred to.

Note.—The principle of interpretation enunciated by the *Mīmāṃsā Śāstra* here referred to is this :— When, in a certain context, a number of words of which the earlier are generic and the latter specific are employed to denote a thing, the generic words refer only to the thing denoted by the words which are more specific. Here *Sat* (existent) is an extremely comprehensive word referring to all that exists, both small and great, sentient and non-sentient. Next comes *Brahman* which excludes small things and applies only to the great (*brihat*). More specific is the word *ātma* (soul) which excludes non-sentient things and applies only to the conscious self. The word "Narayana" is the most specific of all beings, more specific than *ātma* (the conscious self which includes the individual self as well). Therefore, *Sat*, Brahman and *ātma* refer only to Narayana.

In *Narayanopaniṣad*, (6-2) the passage beginning with *"Him whom seers describe as being in the ocean" and ending with "No one has taken hold of Him (i. e.) known Him either above or across or in the middle. No one rules over Him. He, indeed, is greatly famous (as the creator and protector of the world). His form is incapable of being seen, and no one can see Him with his eye. He can be realised only by the mind endowed with devotion and resoluteness. Those who meditate on Him become immortal"—this passage brings out His being beyond all else, denies the existence of anything superior to Him and then states that this passage should be taken as being one with the † eight hymns (*riks*) beginning with "Hiranyagarbha arose from the waters." That these *riks* treat of the Supreme Person and are in praise of Narayana is indicated by the sentence, "Hrih (i. e.) *Bhumi*) and Lakshmi are His consorts."

* 'Lying on the ocean' and 'being the Spouse of Lakshmi' are marks from which it may be inferred that the deity referred to is Narayana.

† See Appendix for the meaning of these eight hymns.

The same idea is explicitly stated in the *Narayana Anuvaka*:- "He is the God with a thousand heads; He sees all things; He looks after the welfare of the Universe; The Universe is Narayana (because He is its soul). The *Purusha* is the Universe because it depends on Him for its existence. Narayana is the Supreme Brahman, Narayana is the Supreme Reality or Truth, Narayana is the Supreme Light, Narayana is the Supreme Self. He is the infinite, changeless Seer who has his residence in the ocean. He confers benefits on the world; Beginning with these sentences and ending with "He is Brahma, He is Siva, He is Indra, He is the freed soul (*akshara*); He is the Supreme Ruler with absolute sway (*svarat*)", (*the Anuvaka*) employs words which, in all the branches of the Vedas, denote the Supreme Reality (*Tattva*)-words like 'the freed soul', 'Siva', 'Sambhu', "The Supreme Brahman", "The Supreme Light", "The Supreme Truth or Reality", "The Supreme Goal", and the 'Supreme Being' to denote only Narayana as endowed with the respective qualities. (*The Anuvaka*) further points out that all other things are dependent on Him, are pervaded by Him, are supported by Him, are controlled by Him, exist for Him to serve His purposes and have Him as their soul. It shows how Brahma and Siva are of the same category as Indra and others and are therefore among His glories (*vibhuti*). This passage in the *Anuvaka* is solely intended to determine the nature of the Supreme Reality (or *tattva*). Apart from this, nothing else is prescribed here. The adoration of Brahman, who is declared in this passage as being above all else, is ordained in other passages (elsewhere), such as "He who meditates on Brahman attains the Supreme". The passage marked (1) (Page 141) above means "One

should meditate on the Supreme Being who is the cause of everything by withdrawing the senses and the vital breaths and fixing them on Him". It prescribes therefore only the meditation on Narayana, who is the Supreme Brahman. The word 'Isana' applies to him (and not to Siva) because the *Srutis* say He is the Lord of the Universe and 'There is no ruler over Him'.

Note;—The word 'Isana' has, for its conventional meaning (*roodi*), Siva. But here, it has its etymological meaning (*yoga*) viz., one who rules.

The passage marked (2) (Page 141) also prescribes the meditation on Narayana who is the ultimate cause and who can be called 'Sambhu'. "On whom should one meditate?". The passage beginning with this (question) and ending with "The cause should be meditated on" lays down first that the effect or what has been produced should not be meditated on and that only the cause is fit to be meditated on. Narayana's being the ultimate cause and, likewise, His being denoted by the word 'Sambhu' are declared in the *Narayana Anuvaka*, which deals solely with the question of determining what the ultimate cause is. Therefore to give any other interpretation is against reason in regard to this passage which ordains that the cause should be meditated upon.

In passage (3) (Page 142) it has been stated that the words "What is above Him" refer to the Supreme Reality being other than the *Purusha*. This, too, has been refuted by what has been said. For the meaning of the passage is as follows:— "There is nothing else superior to Him and nothing can therefore be above Him" or, in

other words, it means, "Nothing that is other than the *Purusha* can, in any way, be superior". The word *aniyastvam* (smallness) means subtleness. '*jayastvam*' (greatness) means "Lordship over all". So, the meaning is "Since He pervades all and is the Lord of all, no one other than He can have the (same) subtleness or the (same) greatness of lordship; "than whom there is nothing more subtle nor greater" denies the superiority of any one other than the *Purusha*. So the supremacy of any other deity is against reason.

Note:—*Aniyastvam* (smallness, which means here, 'subtleness'. That which is subtle can pass through things that are gross. Light, for instance, can pervade or pass through glass, being more subtle than glass. Xrays are more subtle than ordinary light, since they can pass through or pervade even things like, wood, flesh, etc., through which ordinary light cannot pass. Brahman is the subtlest of all, for it can pervade all other substances without exception,

If it is asked what this passage means, the answer is as follows:— At the beginning of this section (*Upakrama*), it is said, "Only by meditating on Him does a person attain immortality. There exists no other way". This shows that the meditation on the Person is the cause of immortality and that the meditation of any one other than He is no way at all. Then follows the sentence, "There is nothing else that is superior to Him". This declares that the Person is above every one else. Since the Real called *Purusha* (*Purusha tattvam*) alone is superior to all else, it is formless and faultless. "Those who meditate on it become immortal. Others have only sorrow?" By these sentences the meditation on the *Purusha* being the cause of immortality and that of others not being the proper way, which were stated before as propo-

sitions, are now concluded with reasons. (If it is interpreted) otherwise, the conclusion would be in conflict with the two statements or propositions (*pratijna*) stated at the beginning. Since this Real called *Purusha* is free from all taint of impurity, He has the quality of purity and is fit to be called Siva and is known also from the words "the eternal, the pure" (*Sasvatam, Sivam, Achyutam*). It is only the *Purusha* that is referred to by the word (Siva), as may be seen from what follows:— "He is the great *Purusha*, the Lord (of all) (who can give us the object of all our efforts, *viz., moksha*, the one who inspires (*us*) with goodness *sattvam*)".

By the same argument (as is followed above) in the passage marked (4) (Page 142) "There was no *sat* nor *asat*. Only Siva existed", everything should be interpreted (as before) (i. e.) Siva refers to Narayana.

Further, in the *Anuvaka* (section) which begins with (*Ambhasyapare*) "In the boundless water (i. e.) (the ocean) the *Purusha* is described as One who is without an equal or a superior in "No one rules over Him". The same *Purusha* is described in the *Anuvaka* or section beginning with "He is subtler than the atom" and is called "Maheswara" who is signified by the syllable *a* (अ) which is the origin (*prakriti*) of *pranava* (the syllable *aum* (ॐ)), which, in turn, is the origin of the Veda, being both the beginning and the end thereof. The *Anuvaka* then prescribes the meditation of the *Purusha* as existing within the ether (*akasa*) of the lotus-like heart. This is the meaning:— Of all the Vedas, the syllable *aum* (*pranava*) is called the origin. Of *pranava*, too, the origin is the syllable *a* (अ). The Veda which is an evolute

from *pranava* has obtained the form of its origin (namely, *pranava*). He who is expressed by the syllable *a* (अ) which is the origin of *pranava* is Maheswara. He who is denoted by the syllable *a* which is the origin of all words that are expressive and who is also the origin of all things denoted by words—He is Narayana.

The Bhagavan has said the same (in the following):—

“I am the origin of all the world and, likewise, of its dissolution. Dhauanjaya, there is nothing else that is above me”. *Bhagavad Gita* 7—6 & 7).

“Of all syllables, I am the syllable *a*”, *Ibid* (10—33).

Narayana is that which is denoted by the syllable *a*, for the *Sruti* says “*A* is Brahman”. All words have the syllable *a* as their origin, for it is said “All speech is the syllable *a*”. That all things expressed or denoted by words have Brahman as their origin is evident. So since the syllable *a* denotes Narayana, it follows that Narayana is the *Maheswara* (referred to in this *Anuvaka* and not Siva). And this has been explicitly declared in the *Narayana Anuvaka* whose purpose is solely to determine the Supreme Reality.

The same Supreme Reality (*Paratattva*) which is determined in this *Anuvaka* that has no other purpose is denoted by other words in all passages which treat of other subjects (like the cause of the world). And this truth is brought out by the *Sutrakara* in *Brahmasutra* (I—1—31) which says: “This instruction (is based) on insight into the *Sastras*, as by Vamadeva”. On

the ground that the Supreme Brahman is signified by the words Brahma, Siva and the like, it would not follow that Brahma and Siva are Supreme Realities, for, in this *Anuvaka* which has no other purpose than treating of the Supreme Being, Brahma and Siva are placed among the glories (*vibhūti*s) of the Supreme Being, on the same footing as Indra and others. From the fact that words like *Prana* are (sometimes) employed in the *Srutis* to denote the Supreme Brahman, it would not be right to say that *Prana* (the vital breath) and *akasa* (ether) and the like are the Supreme Reality.

Note:—*Sūtra I - 1 - 31*. In what is called *Pratardana Vidya* in *Keushitaki Upanishad*, Indra says, 'Worship me, Indra, the slayer of Vritra'. The *Sūtrakara* discusses the meaning of this passage and comes to the conclusion that the object of meditation or worship is not Indra but the Inner Self of Indra (namely) Brahman. So, Indra's teaching is that the Inner Self within himself should be meditated on. In this he had in mind the *Sāstra* which says that Brahman is the Inner Self of all. Vamadeva, the seer, taught in the same way. So here too, Brahma and Siva mean the Inner Self of Brahma and Siva, namely, Narayana.

Now for another objection:—In *Chandogya Upanishad* (I - 8) occurs the following passage:—"In this city of Brahman (*viz.*, the body of the worshipper) there is a small abode like the lotus (*viz.*, the heart); inside (that abode) there is an infinitely small *akasa* (ether). What is within that *akasa* or ether should be sought. That is to be known". "The word *akasa* here denotes (Brahman), the material cause of the world, and what we are asked to do is to seek (and know) something that is within that *akasa* (for purposes of meditation). This *akasa* is said to be the dispenser of names and forms. As in the *Purusha Sukta*, the *Purusha*

is called the dispenser of names and forms, the object of search and meditation is (not the *Akasa* or *Purusha*) but something else that is within the *Akasa* which is synonymous with *Purusha*.

Note:—This view is that of *Vyomatita Vadis* (i. e.) those who hold that beyond *vyoman* or *Akasa viz.*, *Narayana*, there is a higher principle, a higher Real or *tattva* which is prescribed as the object of meditation or worship.

This objection can be raised only by those who have not studied the Veda (properly) and who have not seen the writings of those that have studied the scriptures. For the *Sruti* itself gives the answer to this objection. So also the *Vakyakara*. The *Sruti* raises the question, "What is there within that small *akasa* that should be sought and that should be known?" and answers thus "This *akasa*, which is within the heart, is as immense as the physical or material *akasa*, thereby indicating that Brahman, the Supreme Person, who is denoted by the word *akasa*, is of boundless splendour and is the cause and the support of the world. Then the *Sruti* proceeds to state: "In this, all auspicious qualities (*kamas* which are objects of desire) are established eternally. This self (*atma*) is untainted by evil, has no old age, nor death, no sorrow, no hunger, nor thirst: it has all objects of desire and its will is irresistible. Thus, the eight qualities beginning with freedom from evil and ending with irresistible will are placed in it (namely, the *akasa* or Brahman). So, by saying that, in the same way as the Supreme Person is meditated on, the eight qualities of the Supreme Person, too, are to be separately known (and meditated on), the *sruti* itself has refuted this objection.

This is what it comes to:- "What is there within it that is to be sought? To this question the answer is: "In Him (*viz.*, the *akasa*) are qualities like being the creator and supporter of the world, the quality of being its controller, the quality of being one for whom the world exists, freedom from evil and the like. This is the refutation of the view held by the *Vyomatitavadins*. The *Vakyakara*, too, says:- By "What is within it" the *kamas* are referred to. *Kamas* are those which are desired (i. e.) attributes like freedom from evil. The real purport is the following:- That Brahman, which is referred to by the word *Dahara Akasa* (the small ether) and which, as a form of play, creates, maintains and dissolves the whole world and so also, the supremely wonderful eight qualities like freedom from evil which are within it, both these are to be sought and known. The *Sruti* says again, "Those who depart (from this world) after knowing this *atman* (Brahman) and also its qualities—to them there is freedom to go about as they please in all the worlds."

But it may be asked:- "How is it that, in a sentence which lays down (the injunction) that only the (Ultimate) Cause is to be meditated upon, Vishnu, who is described as the Supreme Reality in passages which are devoted to no other purpose than the determination (of the Supreme Reality) is placed among created beings?" (The answer to this question is as follows:-) "We have to understand that Vishnu who is placed here alongside Brahma and Rudra wanted to complete the number of the Reals (*tattvas*) who were His own creations and, by way of sport and by His own will, incarnated as Vishnu (to make the number three). This is just like

the Supreme Being incarnating as Upendra, by way of sport, to complete the number of the gods (*devas*), and also like the Supreme Brahman incarnating, by His own will, as the son of Dasaratha to complete the number of kings born of the solar race, and like Bhagavan incarnating in the house of Vasudeva by His own will to relieve the burden on the goddess of the earth, while completing the number of the kings of the lunar race.

It has already been said that, in all contexts dealing with creation (*srishti*) and dissolution (*pralaya*), Narayana alone is stated to be the ultimate cause.

Notes—An *avatara* is not a creation by somebody else. It is a form taken by the Supreme Being, by His own will, for a definite purpose. So an *avatara* is not a *harya* (*effect*) and may be the *karana* or cause,

It may be objected again that, in the *Atharva Siras*, Siva describes himself as possessed of supreme lordship. The *Sruti* itself replies to this objection by saying: "He has entered into all and into all the quarters." (The word 'He' in this sentence refers to the Supreme Being and not to Siva). Therefore, it was said so by Siva on the ground that the Supreme Being had entered into Him. The *Sutrakara* himself has explained the meaning of this and other such passages by saying, "This instruction (is based) on insight into the *Sastras*, as by Vamadeva" (I—1—31). So also has it been stated by Prahlada:-

"Since Ananta (Narayana) pervades everywhere, I am He; from me (arises) all; I am all; everything is in me who am eternal." *Vishnu puranam*: 1 - 19 - 85.

“Since Ananta pervades everywhere” gives the reason (for the statement made by Prahlada). The Supreme Being pervades all, because He is the soul of everything, sentient and non-sentient, which forms His body. Therefore, it has been said that all words (like Siva and the rest) denote only the Supreme Being. Hence the word ‘I’ (*aham*) in Prahlada’s speech refers only to the Supreme Being who has for His modes (*prakara*) the soul of himself. The Vakyakara, therefore says, “It is said in such statements as Brahman should be meditated on as the soul (of all), since it is the cause of all.” It is only the Supreme Self that stands as the effect (*karya*) and as the cause and has for His body, sentient and non-sentient things, both in their gross and in their subtle state. So, the Vakyakara says ‘It is the cause of all.’ The *Sutarakara* also says:—“Brahman should be meditated on) as the soul; (it is) in this way that (previous worshippers) have meditated, (The *Sastras*) too give the same instruction (IV - 1 - 3).

In the *Mahabharata* also, in the dialogue between Brahma and Rudra, Brahma says to Rudra:-

“* (He) is the inner self of you, of myself, and of all who are called embodied beings” (i. e.) Narayana, who is the Supreme Ruler (Parameswara) is the Inner Self of Rudra, Brahma, and other embodied beings, (*dehi*).

In the same (treatise) occurs (the following):—

“† Vishnu is the soul of Bhagavan Siva (*Bhava*) who is possessed of immeasurable splendour”).

* Mahabharata: mc: 179—4

† Do Do: 196—16

In the same (again occurs) the following:—

“* These two (Brahma and Rudra), greatest of gods who are stated to have been produced from the graciousness (*prasada*) and wrath (respectively) of Vishnu, act as the agents of creation and destruction following the path pointed out by Him (Narayana)”.

The meaning is:— Brahma and Rudra carry out the work of creation and destruction, having been shown the way by Narayana who resides within them as their Inner Self.

Here ends the section proving that Narayana is the ultimate cause.

**The argument to prove
that Brahman is the Instrumental Cause (*nimitta karana*)
as well as the Material Cause (*upadana karana*).**

Those who maintain that the Instrumental Cause (*nimitta karana*) of the world should be different from the material cause (*upadana karana*) should be looked upon as outside the pale of the Vedas (for their view is against that of the Vedas). This view is also against that of the *Sutras* composed by that (great) authority on the Vedas, (Badarayana), such as, “(That) from which arise the origin *etc.*, of this (world) (is Brahman)” (I. 1-2) and “Brahman is also the material cause (*prakriti*) since this is not in conflict with the proposition and the illustrations”. (1—4—23).

It is also against a large number of *srutis* (e. g.)
(1) “This, my dear, existed at the beginning as *sat* and without a second” (2) “It resolved

*Mahabharata: ka. Par: 35—50

that it should become the manifold", (3) "Brahman is the forest and Brahman is the tree from which they made the world", (3) "Brahman presided supporting the worlds", (4) "All the moments (of time) took their origin from the *Purusha*, whose splendour is like that of lightning", (5) "No one rules over Him. Great fame is His", (6) There is nothing here of plurality (*nana*), (7) "He has everything under His control and is the ruler over all", (8) The *Purusha* alone is all this, both the past and the present and He is the ruler of all, (9) "There is no other way of attaining Him". Likewise in the *Ithihasas* and *Puranas*, while describing creation and dissolution, this (alone), Brahman or Narayana, is indicated to be the highest reality (*paratattva*):-

In the *Mahabharata* occur the following (*slokas*):-

"By whom was all this created, O Brahma (literally grand - father,) both the moving and the non-moving? Whom do they go to at the time of dissolution (*pralaya*)? Tell me this;

"Narayana has the (whole) world as His body; He is the inner self (*atma*) of all; He is eternal".

"The *rishis*, the *pitris*, the gods, the great elements, the tissues of the body (*dhatu*) - this world consisting of moving and non-moving things— all had their origin from Narayana".

Note:—(1) shows that Brahman is both the material and the instrumental cause, (2) shows His being the instrumental cause, (3) shows His being the material cause, (4) shows His being the instrumental cause, (5) shows His being the material cause, (6) shows His being the instrumental cause. (7) shows both.

The *Vishnu Purana* which is accepted unanimously by all learned men (*sishtas*) in the east,

north, south, and west as being adequate, by itself, to determine the nature of all *dharma* (duty) and of all reality (*tattva*) raises the question, "The cause of the origin and the like of the world is understood to be Brahman; What is that cause?" and answers it by saying "(All this) arose from Vishnu". From such passages as this, it is agreed on all hands that this *purana* exists solely for the purpose of pointing out the specific form of Brahman (*viz.*, Vishnu).

So also in the concluding section of this treatise it is said:—

"(The nature of) *Prakriti*, both in its manifested state (*vyakta*) in creation and in its unmanifested state (*avyakta*) during *pralaya*, has been explained by me and so also, (the nature of) *Puruha* (the individual self). Both of them merge in the Supreme Self". (This means that the Supreme Self is the ultimate cause of the world).

"The Supreme Self is the support of all and is the Supreme Ruler (*Parameswara*). In the Vedas and the Vedantas (the Upanishad), it is celebrated in song by the name of Vishnu".

The meaning is "He alone is celebrated in song in all the Vedas and Vedanta by all words as the ultimate cause. Just as the *Narayana Anuvaka*" among all the *srutis*, interests itself solely in determining the specific form of the Supreme Brahman, so also this *Vishnu Purana* says:—

"From you, O, knower of *dharma*, I desire to learn whence this world arose, how it arose, whence it will arise again and how it will arise; illustrious sir, tell me by whom it is pervaded

and in whom this world of moving and non-moving things lay merged before and in which it will become absorbed again". Having begun, in this way, to ask, "What is this Supreme Brahman?", it proceeds to describe the specific nature of this Supreme Brahman:—

"From Vishnu possessed of the will (to create), this world took its origin; in Him alone it stands; He maintains it and controls the world; He is the world.

"He is greater than the great; He pervades everywhere; He is self-supported; He is without the specifications of genus, quality and the like. He is not subject to decay and death, to modification, to growth and to birth. He is capable of being spoken of only as existing always.

"He is everywhere and everything has its abode (*vasati*) in Him. Therefore, the learned speak of Him as Vasudeva.

"He is the Supreme Brahman—eternal, because He is unborn, unchanging, and without end. He is always of the same nature; He is pure, because there is no blemish or imperfection in Him, as He is free from *karma*."

"All this universe which is of the nature of the manifest and the unmanifest, and which also stands in the form of *purusha* (the individual self) and of *kala* (time) is only He."

"He is beyond *prakriti* (matter) which is the cause of all the elements (*bhuta*), beyond its evolutes or modifications (like *mahat* and *ahankara*)

and beyond blemishes like the *gunas* (of *prakriti* viz., *sattvam*, *rajas* and *tamas*.) He is beyond all obscuration (*avarana*). He is the soul of all, O Sage, because all parts of the world are pervaded by Him."

"The essential nature of His divine self has the quality of all auspiciousness. He supports all sorts and kinds of beings with but) a small fraction of His might. At His own will and pleasure, He assumes wonderful forms pleasing to Him; and (this He does) to promote the well-being of the whole world."

"He is the unique abode of qualities like splendour, strength, wisdom, valour and might. He is the greatest of the great; in Him there are no such things as pain, because He is the ruler of the great and the small.

"He is Iswara; He is of the nature of *Jivas* in their individual state (*vyashti*) and in their collective, causal state (*samashiti*); so also He is of the nature of the manifested and the unmanifested state (of matter). He rules over all; He knows the nature of everything and of every mode of everything".

"That knowledge by which this (Brahman) that is free from the taint (*dosha*) (peculiar to *prakriti*), that is pure (without the *karma* which binds the *Jiva*), that is incapable of being ever tainted (by *karma* like the released souls), that is supreme and always the same—that knowledge alone is knowledge; the rest is called *ajnana* (ignorance)".

In this way the *Vishnu Purana* is interested only in determining the specific form of the Supreme

Brahman. Therefore, other *puranas* are to be so interpreted as not to conflict with it. That they are interested in other subjects (than Brahman) may be seen even in * the manner in which they begin. That in them which is entirely opposed (to what is in the *Vishnu Purana*) should be disregarded as due to *tamas*.

Note:—in the manner in which they begin : The *Laingapurānam* begins by asking for a description of the greatness of the *Linga* in special, whereas *Vishnupurānam* seeks to know the Supreme Being and its characteristics and declares that *Vishnu* is that Supreme Being ; so the praise of Vishnu in it is impartial.

But it might be said, even in this (*purana*), the equality of the trinity (Brahma, Vishnu and Siva) is apparent as in the following :-

“Bhagavan Janardana alone takes the names of Brahma, Vishnu and Siva, while engaged in the (respective) work of creating, maintaining and destroying”. *Vishnu Purana: 1-2-66*.

We answer : “It is not so. “Janardana alone” means that Janardana is stated in this context to be identical with Brahma, Vishnu, Siva and the rest of the world. What was stated succinctly before in “He is the world” is here elaborated.

“He is the creator and He also creates Himself; Vishnu is the object of protection and is, at the same time, the protector: He is destroyed at the end (in *pralaya*) and He is himself the destroyer, being the Lord (of all).” *Vishnu Purana: 1-2-6*.

Here by indicating Brahma in his capacity as creator and the object of creation, and likewise the destroyer and the destroyed at the same time, the *purana* teaches the identity between Vishnu

and everything else. In so far as the creator and the destroyer are among the glories (*vibhūti*) of Janardana just like the created and the destroyed, there is nothing peculiar to the former. Since the words, Janardana and Vishnu, are synonymous, the *purana* states that, for His own *Lila* (or play) and at His own pleasure, the possessor of these glories becomes himself one of the glories. This idea is set forth immediately afterwards:-

“Earth, water, and likewise, fire, air and ether, all the senses, the mind and the *purusha* (*viz.*, the *Jiva*) — these that constitute the world are only He. Though He is unchanging (*avyaya*) yet, He is the soul of all beings and has the universe as His body. Therefore, creation and the like which are found in all beings is only to serve His purposes. *Vishnu Purana: 1-2-68.*

“He alone is the created and He alone is the creator; He protects and destroys and is, at the same time, the protected; Vishnu who has everything without exception as His form owing to states of existence such as Brahma—Vishnu grants us the objects that we desire; He is the object of worship; He is the highest of all.” *ibid: 1-2-68.*

Here, the *purana* raises the question whether it is proper to affirm the identity between the world with blemishes and imperfections mingled (with good qualities) and Brahman who possesses all auspicious qualities and who is not subject to any blemish or change — identity, such as is implied in the grammatical co-ordination or apposition (*samanadhikaranya*) such as “The world is He” and then itself answers it in the words: “Though unchanging, He alone is the soul of all beings and

has the universe as His body". This Vishnu alone, who is the Ruler of all rulers and who is the Supreme Brahman, is stated to be the whole world and the reason is given in: "Though unchanging, He is the soul of all beings and has the universe as His body." Again, it is said, "All that is the body (*tanuh*) of Vishnu" To explain:— Though He is unchanging, since Vishnu, the Supreme Brahman, has the universe as His body, this identification of Him with the world is not against reason. The nature of the soul and the nature of the body are, of course, different. This Vishnu, who is the Ruler over all, it has already been stated, incarnates, at His own pleasure, as Vishnu, one among the gods, among animals and among men that are in the ranks of those under His control in the world, in order that they may seek refuge under Him. In the sixth chapter of the *Vishnu Purana*, while speaking of *Subhasraya* (a sacred object for meditation), it is clearly stated that Brahma and others are under the sway of *karma* and that Bhagavan Vasudeva, who is the Supreme Brahman, takes an incarnation of His own accord and in His essential nature, for the good of the whole world. In the *Mahabharata* it is explained that even in these incarnations as gods and the rest, His body is not constituted of matter (*aprakrita*). "The body of this Supreme Being is not built up of the five elements (earth, water, etc., which are evolutes of matter (*prakriti*))." The *Sruti* also says "Though unborn, He is born in many forms". The foremost among the wise are aware of His birth". To Brahma and others who are subject to the sway of *karma*, birth, which is of the nature of entrance into the bodies of gods, (men) and the like that are special configurations (*samsthana*) of the elements (earth, water, fire, air and *akasa*) that are themselves

evolutes or modifications of matter is inescapable, though they may not desire it and these bodies are adapted to the respective *karma*. On the other hand, this Bhagavan, who is the Ruler of all and whose will is omnipotent (*satyasankalpa*), though He never performs any *karma* which is other than pure, is born manifold, of His own accord and in His own wonderfully auspicious form among gods and the like for the well-being of the world. The word 'His' (*tasya*) (in the *Sruti* text) * means 'Of Him who does not perform any *karma* that is other than pure; *bahudha yonim* (manifold birth) means many kinds of birth in accordance with His innumerable auspicious qualities, *dhirah* (the wise) means 'the foremost among the wise.' *Jananti* means 'know'.

* *ajayamano bahudha vijayate; tasya dhirah parijananti yonim.*

Note:—The question asked was: Does not the placing of Vishnu alongside Brahma and Siva in the *shloka* quoted from *Vishnu Purana* show that He is not above them and that there is another *tattva* above Him? Sri Ramanuja's answer is "No. Brahma and Siva are created beings and therefore *Jivas*, whereas Vishnu, though placed alongside with them in that context, is not a created being but an incarnation of Janardana or Vasudeva or the Supreme Brahman. An incarnation is not the same thing as a created being.

The *Sutrakara* (Badarayana) himself has refuted the idea of there being a higher principle (*tattva*) than this Supreme Person who has been explained as the material and instrumental cause of the world in the following *sutras*:- "From which the origin and the like (of this world) proceed - (That is Brahman)" I, 1, 2 and "(Brahman is) also the material cause as it is not opposed to the proposition (sought to be proved) and the illustrations" I-4, 28

and other such (*sutras*). For in III 2, 30 he raises the *purvapaksha* or *prima facie* view. ("There must be) another (reality) higher than this (Supreme Person) on account of such indications as 'bridge', 'measurability', 'connexion' and difference". Then, he refutes the *purvapaksha* in the following *Sutras*:-

Br. Sutra III. 2, 31. "but on account of resemblance."

Note:—The *Sruti* text which is the subject of discussion here means:— This *Atma* (the Supreme Self) is the *setu* which protects the worlds against getting mixed up with one another (*Chandogya Upanishad* VIII - 4, 1). The *Purva Pakshin* says that the word *setu* in the text should mean 'bridge' and that, as a bridge always leads to something beyond itself, the *atma* or Brahman described so far must lead to a higher *tattva* beyond itself. The *Sutryakara's* answer is as follows:— On account of resemblance to a *setu*, Brahman is called here a *setu*. *Setu* here means not a bridge, but a dam which prevents what is on one side of it from getting mixed up with what is on the other side. But for Brahman, the properties and limits of things like earth, water, fire and air would get mixed up. So, Brahman is not a bridge leading to something else beyond it, but a dam or controlling authority which keeps all things in the proper places assigned to them.

Br. Sutra III. 2 - 32. "(It is) for the purpose of contemplation as in the statement about the feet."

Note:—The *Sruti* texts which are the subject of discussion are such passages as "Brahman has four feet" *Chandogya Upanishad* (V. 18-2) Brahman has sixteen *kalah* or parts *Prasna Upanishad* (VI. 1). "His foot is all the beings" *Purusha Sukta*. These passages would imply measurability or limitedness. It might follow from them that the Brahman described so far was finite and that there was a higher *tattva* that was infinite. This contention of the *Purva Pakshin* is refuted in III - 2-32 as follows:— Brahman is certainly infinite, but for purposes of meditation, we are taught to think of Him as having feet, parts and the like.

Br. Sutra III. 2-33. (Though infinite, it may be meditated on as finite) owing to particular places as in light and the like.

Note:—Light and ether, (*akasa*), though pervading everywhere, are spoken of as finite and limited, owing to their connection respectively with such places as windows as in 'the light in the window' and with such objects as pots. So too, though Brahman is infinite and all - pervasive, it may be meditated on as finite owing to its connection with particular places.

Br. Sut. III. 2 - 34. As there is no impossibility (in the same thing being both the end and the means).

Note:—The text discussed here is "He is the *setu* leading to immortality". The *Purvapakshin* contends that, as there is a connecting intermediary between the goal and the means of reaching the goal, the goal should be different from the means of reaching it. The *Sutrahara's* answer is this: Brahman may well be both. There is nothing that is improper in this, for the *Śruti* says "He whom this *Atma* (the Supreme Self) chooses—by him alone can He be attained; to him alone He reveals his form". *Katopanishad*.

Br. Sutra: III. 2 - 35. "So also owing to (the existence of) others being denied, (there is nothing higher than Brahman).

Note:—The texts discussed in this *Sutra* are such passages as "That which is higher than it:" *Svetasvatara Upanishad* (3-10) explained before (on page 146), "He reaches the Person beyond the highest (*Mundaka Upanishad* III 2-8.) "He is beyond the highest which is higher than the *Akshara*".

On the strength of these passages, the *Purvapakshin* says: "There should be a higher *tattva* than Brahman. The *Sutrahara* replies "No. There is nothing higher, for the *Śruti* itself says (in *Svetasvatara Upanishad* 3-9) that there is nothing else higher than Brahman."

Br. Sutr.: III. 2 - 36. (We learn) that everything is pervaded by this (Brahman), from words signifying extent and others."

Note:—The *Sutrahara* here says that there are Vedic texts like "By Him is all this (world) filled". *Svetasvatara Upanishad* (3-9), "Whatever is seen or heard of in the world, all that Narayana pervades, both within and without" *Purusha Sukam*. "The wise see (Brahman) who is eternal, omnipresent, pervading everything, owing to His

subtleness and who is the cause of all living beings". *Afundaśa Upaniṣad* I 1-6. (In these *Sūtras*, the author refutes the view that there is anything higher than Brahman such as Brahma.)

In Manu's *Dharma Sastra* also, we find (1) "Then appeared He who controls *tamas*", (2) "Desirous of creating all kinds of beings", (3) "First He created water and placed His energy in it", (4) "From the egg of Brahma (*Brahmāṇḍa*) arose Brahma". In these passages, since we hear of Brahma's birth, it is evident that Brahma is a *Jiva* (*Kṣhetrajña*).

Note:—The 'He' in (1) refers to Aniruddha, an incarnation of Vasudeva, the Supreme Being, who is said to preside over *tamas* before the creation of the world and of Brahma, (2) 'Desirous' is here said of Brahman not Brahma (3) the 'He' refers to Brahman,

The names are given also of the Supreme Person who is the creator and of Brahma who was created by Him in the following:-

"The waters were His abode of old. Therefore, He is called Narayana. The person created by Him is celebrated in the world as Brahma."

Note:—Narayana etymologically means "He of whom the waters (*narah*) are the abode (*ayana*).

That Brahman and others are *Jivas* may be determined also from the *Vishnu Purana*, where it is explained that they cannot be sacred objects of meditation (*Subhasraya*) owing to their association with the three kinds of mental effort (*bhavana*).

Note:—(1) The mental effort for performing *karma* capable of securing objects of pleasure is called *karma bhavana*. (2) The mental effort to perform the adoration of the Supreme is called *Brahma bhavana* and (3) the mental effort to perform both the above is called *ubhaya bhavana*.

Brahma has *bhavana* of the third kind. In creation he has *karma bhavana*. At other times, he has *Brahma bhavana*. Some have only *karma bhavana*, like most of us mortals. Great seers like Sanaka and Sanandana have only *Brahma bhavana*.

Here ends the section proving that Narayana is both the instrumental and the material cause of the world.

Refutation of the view of the Mimamsakas of the Prabhakara School that we understand the meanings of words only when finding them employed in denoting some action or other:

Note :— (The Mimamsakas, who have laid down valuable principles of interpretation in regard to the Vedas, attach great importance to the earlier parts of the Veda, the Karma kanda, which prescribes rituals and sacrifices (yajnas) for the attainment of certain worldly objects and of svarga after death. To them, the Upanishads which form the jnana kanda are of little or no importance, as they do not prescribe the performance of rituals and sacrifices and describe only the nature of Brahman, of the individual self, of matter and of their relations to one another. The rituals and sacrifices described in the Karma kanda, if properly performed, would, of themselves according to them, lead to the attainment of the good things of this world or of svarga as the case may be. It might appear from the Vedic texts that these rituals and sacrifices are intended to please this god or that. But such words have no validity in regard to the knowledge that they impart. It is doubtful, they say, whether gods really exist; even supposing they exist, they are not necessary at all for man's attaining his desires. The performance of karma by itself will give him, either in this life itself or after death, whatever he desires. It may be objected that as karma, the performance of a rite or a sacrifice, lasts only for a short time and as no trace of it persists after the performance is over, it cannot yield such benefits as svarga which can only come after death, since there is no connecting link between the karma which has perished and the end that is desired. To meet this objection, the Mimamsakas postulate an entity called apurva which arises in the atma as a result of the performance of the respective karma and immediately after its performance is duly completed. This apurva or karya (as it is also called), they maintain, persists through life and even after death and secures the attainment of the desired object either in this world or in svarga. There is no need, according to them, to assume that the gods mentioned in the Vedic texts confer these benefits.

The Vedas consist of three parts, vidhi, mantra, and arthavada. Vidhi is those texts which lay down certain actions, rites or yajnas as fit to be performed and certain prohibitions as to what we should not do. It is only these texts that, according to Mimamsakas, are valid sources of knowledge. Mantras consist of hymns in verse in praise of the gods describing their attributes and asking for their favour. They

may be in praise also of the karma prescribed in the vidhivakyas or texts prescribing rites or karma. The Mimamsakas do not regard these mantras as giving any valid knowledge. What may be inferred from them about gods or their attributes is absolutely of no value as true knowledge. Arthavadas are invariably in prose and extol the karma laid down in the vidhivakya or the god or gods whose praise is sung in the mantras. These, too, have, according to Mimamsa doctrine, no value as sources of true knowledge.

There are two schools of thought among Mimamsakas, namely, the school of Prabhakara or Prabhakaras (the followers of Prabhakara) and the school of Kumarila Bhatta or Bhattas, as they are called.

How do we learn at first the meaning (vyutpatti) of words? To this question different philosophers have given different answers. The Prabhakaras affirm that the meanings of words are understood only when they are employed in connection with some action to be performed (karyarthavada). When A says 'Bring the cow' and B brings it after hearing the words of A, C who has listened to A's words and observed B's action in bringing the cow, infers that the word 'cow' used by A must mean the animal brought by B. The Prabhakaras are not content with stating that this is one of the ways in which the meanings of words are learnt, but assert that this is the only way in which the meanings of words could be learnt. According to them, sentences or words which do not denote any action to be performed cannot convey any valid knowledge. Now in the Upanishads, there are many sentences which speak, for instance, of Brahman as being eternal, as being consciousness and as being infinite (satyam, jnanam, anantam.) Do these texts convey any meaning that may be considered as a contribution to valid knowledge in our minds? The Mimamsakas say 'No, they do not'. These passages do not prescribe any action for performance and are of the nature of arthavadas. Hence, no valid meaning can be derived from them. This contention is called vyutpatti abhava vada. If this view were accepted, it would follow that the study of the Upanishads is absolutely of no use.

In this section, Sri Ramanuja refutes the contention of the Prabhakaras that the meanings of words come to be learned at first only from sentences prescribing action. He shows also that the Upanishads, too, contain vidhivakyas prescribing what ought to be done and that, on this account also, what is said in them has validity. Then, he takes the warfare into the enemy's camp and proves by various arguments that there is no justification for the Mimamsaka's assumption of the existence of

an *apurva* or *karya* which confers the benefits, though the *karma* or ritual has perished. Though the *karma* is over, it has served its purpose, Sri Ramanuja says, in pleasing *Iswara* who, at the appropriate time, rewards the man with the objects of his desire).

There are some (thinkers) (Prabhakaras) who hold that words (in the Vedas) which consist of *vidhi*, *arthavada*, and *mantra* can be said to convey a meaning only when they denote a thing to be done (*karya*), because we do not find words conveying any meaning when they are used in connection with anything other than an action (to be performed). All speech, action or (*vyavahara*) is based on the idea of the action to be performed. Therefore, the significance of the Vedas is, in their opinion, concerned only with things to be done and they are not valid sources of knowledge in regard to permanent or established entities (*parinishpanna vastu*) (like Brahman).

Against this view (of the Prabhakaras), it may be said as follows:-

Is it a king's command that the determination of the power of words to signify what they mean is arrived at *only* by speech stimulating activity (of some form or other)? (There is none such). It is easy to make one understand the signifying power of a word even in regard to established entities. For example, one (A) is sent by another (B) with instructions given by gestures and the like to say to Devadatta, "The stick is in the room." A, proceeding to execute the orders goes to Devadatta and uses the words, "The stick is in the room." A fourth person O who stood by and understood the gesture employed by B like a dumb man may not at first know the meaning of the words employed. Notwith-

standing this, he observes these words employed by A to signify to Devadatta that the stick is in the room and learns that these words convey this meaning. Where is the impossibility here? (In "the stick is in the room", there is no activity enjoined). So also, deliberately, it may be learnt by the teaching of others. For example, the child is told again and again by parents and others with words accompanied by fingers pointing to the respective objects, "This is father", "This is mother", "This is uncle", "This is a man," "This is a beast", "This is the moon", "This is a serpent". Being taught in this way, the child finds a knowledge of their meanings arising within himself from those very words. He concludes gradually that the use of these words accompanied with the gesture of the finger is the cause of this knowledge of their signification, since there is no other association (*sambandha*) and since there is no knowledge of any person who has established any convention (regarding the words and their meanings). Later the child is told by elders, "This word means such and such a thing" and learns the meanings of all words and himself also employs collections of words (sentences). In the same way, he learns the signification of all words and, in specific groups of words, the signification of the true connection existing among the different words. Therefore, the insistence that the knowledge of the meaning of words arises only in connection with things to be done is without reason. Hence, since it is clear that the signification of words can be known also in the case of established entities (both in ordinary speech and in the Vedas), it follows that all the Vedic passages do give (us) a knowledge of Brahman who is the cause of all the world, who is the abode of all auspicious qualities and who has (other) such attributes. Further, (let

us admit for the moment) that the knowledge of the meaning of words arises only in regard to a thing that is to be done (*karya*); even then, the texts in Vedanta also may (be shown to) give knowledge in as much as they too prescribe a thing to be done. They prescribe meditation (*upasana*) (of Brahman). In connection with that action to be done, they may very well give (us) knowledge of the person (who meditates) and of the fruit of the action which is an attribute of his, in the same way as the Mimamsakas admit that *arthavadas* give valid knowledge of certain things even when the *vidhivakya* does not mention them. For instance, (1) the *vidhivakya* says, "The person desirous of *svarga* should perform the *Jyotishtoma* sacrifice". It does not tell us what *svarga* is like or the attributes of *svarga*. An *arthavada* says - "Where there is no heat, no cold, no grief". It is admitted by the Mimamsakas that this attribute of *svarga* is valid knowledge (though it does not occur in the *vidhivakya*). Again (2) there is a *vidhivakya* which enjoins: "The *night satras* (sacrifices due to be performed at night) should be done". It is not stated in the *vidhivakya* what the reward (or *phala*) would be. But an *arthavada* following it says, "Those who perform these night sacrifices become well-established in life". The Mimamsakas admit that this passage, though only an *arthavada*, gives us valid knowledge about the fruit resulting from the performance. Furthermore, (3) there is a prohibitory injunction (*nishedha*) to the following effect: "Therefore one shall not threaten a Brahmin with assault". It does not state any penalty. Only an *arthavada* says: "He who threatens shall be fined a hundred gold coins". This *arthavada* is admitted by Mimamsakas as affording true knowledge. As in these (three) cases, *viz.*, the attributes of *svarga* that

it is a place where there is no trace of grief, the information about the fruit resulting from night sacrifices and the punishment for threatening, *arthavada* passages in Vedanta do give true knowledge of Brahman, the attainment of which is the fruit of the meditation enjoined in the *vidhivakya* ("Brahman should be meditated upon") of the attributes of Brahman, of the person who meditates and other such things and all this is being related to the *vidhivakya*.

Note:—The original is too condensed and presumes too deep a knowledge of Mimamsa on the part of the reader to be easily understood. So the translation had to be made explanatory.

For instance, the text, "The man who knows (meditates upon) Brahman attains the Supreme" really enjoins that the man who wants to attain the Supreme should meditate on Brahman. So the attainment of Brahman which is an attribute (*viseshana*) of the person who is concerned with the meditation of Brahman is here declared to be the fruit of the meditation. In this, the essential nature of Brahman (*svarupa*) which appears as the object of attainment and all its attributes are established only as being related to the thing to be done. And comprised within it, such things as Brahman's creatorship of the world, Brahman's being the cause of its destruction and Brahman's being the support and the inner soul of the world—all these (both what has been said and what has not been said) are established. There is nothing in this that is against reason.

Since this is so, whatever is said in all the *mantras* and *arthavadas* becomes established as being related to the thing to be done (namely, the meditation), provided it is not opposed (*aviruddha*)

to other sources of valid knowledge (*pramana*) and provided it cannot be established (by other sources of valid knowledge) (*aprapiti*). So has it been said in the *Dramida Bhashya*:—

“Beginning with the *Sruti* text *(on *avadana*), the *Bhashya* proceeds to say, “Though this text is in praise of *avadana*, the praise cannot be true, if it tells us of what does not exist”. To explain:—“It is well-known that all *arthavada* passages inspire (one) with a knowledge of the excellence of the enjoined *karma* by praising, in a thousand ways, the qualities of the sacrifice and the like, which are of the nature of the worship of (certain) deities with their supplementary rites (*anga*) and, likewise, of the unseen qualities of the deities worshipped. If these qualities do not exist in reality, there will be no knowledge of the excellence of the *karma* (sacrifice). Therefore to produce this knowledge of its excellence, the *arthavada* passages must afford a knowledge of only such qualities as really exist. On the same line of reasoning, it would follow that what is said in the *mantras*, too, should be considered as true.

Note:—(*Avadana* is from the root *do* (दो) to cut (with the preposition *ava.*) The *Sruti* referred to in the *Dramida Bhashya* means, “A man is born with three debts (*Rina*), that to his ancestors, that to the gods and that to the Rishis. If a sacrificer *cuts* a slice from the heart of the animal slain for the sacrifice and makes of it an offering in the fire, all his three debts will be *cut off* (i. e.) discharged; that is why *avadanas* are called by that name (i. e.) those that cut.

Note:—Sri Ramanuja first refuted the theory that the meanings of words are first understood only when they are employed to denote an action or a thing to be done. Later, he said that, even on the assumption that this theory is true, the Vedantic texts must be considered as affording valid knowledge in as much as, in Vedanta, actions or things to be done are prescribed.

Now, he proceeds to show that what the Mimamsakas mean by the thing to be done (*karya*) namely, *apurva* (a potential created in the soul by the activity connected with rites and sacrifices, which, later on, results in certain fruits) cannot be properly defined and has no foundation in fact, being only an unnecessary and dogmatic assumption. Sri Ramanuja points out that the definitions which might be given by Mimamsakas of *apurva* or *karya* would apply either to the rite or the fruit of the rite and not merely to this *karya* or *apurva*.

Further, those who hold this theory regarding the meanings of words as being related only to a thing to be done, - they should define what they mean by *karya* or 'the thing to be done' (when they say it is identical with *apurva*.)

If they say *karya* or *apurva* is what is produced by the volition (*kriti* or mental effort) and is, at the same time, aimed at by the volition, we ask, what is meant by "*that which is aimed at by the volition!*". (1) If the reply is "that with which the volition concerns itself is that which is aimed at by the volition", volition which is an activity of a person cannot have any concerns (*adhikara*) or aims (for only persons have aims and concern themselves with activities like sacrifices). How can volition have 'concerns' (*adhikara*)? (2) If the definition is altered or amended in this way: "That desirous of securing which a person produces the mental effort (or volition) is *what is aimed at by the volition*", it would become too wide as a definition (*ativayapti*) for, then, that which is desired would become *that which is aimed at by the volition*. (It would apply to *svarga* or any worldly enjoyment that the sacrificer desires as well as to the *apurva*). The Mimamsaka might reply, "There are two aspects of desire, one is existence as the object of the desire and the other is the power of stimulating the person

to act. It is this stimulating or inspiring aspect that forms the definition of "*that which is aimed at by the volition.*" This effort (to amend the definition) which is due to an obstinate insistence on one's theory is all in vain. The power of stimulating or inspiring is nothing but the absolute dependence of what appears to be the object of desire on one's own effort for its realization (i. e.) that the object desired cannot be attained except by one's own effort; for only then (i. e.) after realising that it cannot be secured without one's effort, does one proceed to enter on the activity. When the desire for a thing (*svarga* and the like) has arisen, and when the person realises that the desired object cannot be secured without beginning his effort, the desire to act arises and then the person acts. This is the order of sequence as understood by those who know the truth of these things. Therefore, there is no such thing as *that which is aimed at by the volition (apurva)* apart from the desired object being dependent for its attainment on one's volition. The Mimamsaka might now say, "The reason for a thing being desired is its being agreeable (*anukula*) to a person. (3) So, that which is agreeable to a person is *that which is aimed at by volition*". But this cannot be. That which is agreeable (*anukula*) to a person (is synonymous with pleasure and) means nothing other than pleasure, in the same way as that which is disagreeable to a person is synonymous with pain (*dukkha*). There is nothing other than pleasure which can be said to be agreeable to a person (and *apurva* is certainly not pleasure). The Mimamsaka might reply, "The relief from pain which is other than pleasure (*sukha*) is seen to be agreeable to a person". We refute this statement as follows:—

“Whatever is agreeable to one’s self is pleasure (*sukha*) and whatever is disagreeable to one’s self is pain (*dukkha*). This is the differentiation between pleasure and pain. Between them, pleasure which is agreeable to one’s self becomes an object of desire and pain which is disagreeable to one’s self becomes undesirable. Since contact with pain is unbearable, relief from it, too, becomes an object of desire. Since it becomes an object of desire in the same way as pleasure, relief from pain is confounded with pleasure (though it is not the same as pleasure). To a man who is still in the stream of births and deaths (*samsara*) owing to contact with *prakriti*, there are three possible states:- contact with what is agreeable, contact with what is disagreeable and being in his own essential nature with neither pleasure nor pain. Absence of contact with pleasure and absence of contact with pain are both the same (because that is the third state described above with neither pleasure nor pain). Therefore when the contact with what is disagreeable exists, relief from it, which is this third state of being in a neutral condition, becomes desirable. Since, there is a similarity between pleasure and this relief from pain in both of them being desirable, relief from pain is illusorily mistaken (*bhrama*) for pleasure.

Therefore, those who judge matters by valid evidence laugh at the man who says that *Niyoga* (commandment as also that which is acquired by the commandment or *vidhi* namely, *apurva*, is agreeable because whatever is agreeable is of the nature of pleasure (*sukha*). It is because *Niyoga* (*apurva*) can bring about the accomplishment of the desired object that it is assumed to be the object of a commandment, an enduring thing

(lasting for a long time) and also as a new and super-sensuous entity (resulting from the activity connected with sacrifices and the like). In the words "*Svarga kamo yajeta*" (He who is desirous of *svarga* shall perform the sacrifice), the contention of the Mimamsakas that the thing to be done signified by the word *yajeta* is something other than the activity connected with the performance of the sacrifice, namely, *apurva*—this contention would be possible only because of its being read in association with the words, "He who is desirous of *svarga*" and consequently of its being considered as the means of attaining *svarga*. The *Mimamsakas cannot say that the use of the word *yajeta* first suggests *niyoga* or *apurva* independently of the other words in the sentence and that its being read in association with the words "He who is desirous of *svarga*", later brings into prominence the person (commanded to perform the sacrifice) who is necessary for the production of this *apurva*. They cannot say so, for the verb *yajeta* suggests only "what can be accomplished by man's effort". It is only by its being read in association with "He who is desirous of *svarga*", that the Mimamsakas could infer what is not conveyed by the verb *yajeta* and what is other than that denoted by the verb, namely "the thing to be done", its enduring quality, and its being a new super-sensuous entity (*apurva*). Its being different from the activity which alone is suggested by the verb is inferred from its appearing as the means of bringing *svarga* into effect. The terminations of the potential (*ling*) and imperative moods affixed to verbs only indicate that the activity is the means of attaining *svarga*,

Note:—*The Sanskrit verb *yajeta* means "should perform a sacrifice". But the Mimamsahas say that it means "create or acquire *apurva* (by performing the sacrifice)"

which is consistent with the meaning of other words read in connection with the verb, namely, "He who is desirous of *svarga*", This is the usual designation accepted in ordinary intercourse and the Mimamsakas have to ignore it in their assumption of *apurva*. What has been said means this:- When a number of words are employed in a sentence, the meaning of a particular word can be taken to be only that which would be coherent or congruous with the meanings of other words uttered along with it and this meaning of the word in question can be determined only after hearing the full sentence consisting of a number of words which express a meaning in connection with one another (and not independently) and before reading and hearing the whole sentence, as the Mimamsakas claim of the *apurva* in the word *yajeta*. That meaning in the sentence in question is only 'the means of attaining *svarga*'. Therefore, in the same way as the activity in performing the sacrifice is given up by the Mimamsakas as being incongruous with the meanings of the other words, the meaning of the word *yajeta* as being none other than *apurva* will have to be given up (even though they say it is suggested by the word at first and independently), because it is also incongruous with the meanings of the other words. ("He who is desirous of *svarga* should attain *apurva*" does not make any sense). For example, in sentences like "On the Ganga is the village of the herdsmen," the word 'Ganga' is construed as referring to a place capable of being dwelt in, with reference to the village of the herdsmen. At first, it is true 'Ganga' suggests the flood of the river; on that account (that only the meaning which the word, at first and independently of others, suggests should be

accepted), it does not become coherent and congruous with the meanings of the other words in the sentence. Therefore, we give up the meaning "the flood of the Ganga" as there cannot be a village on the water and take the word to mean "on the bank of the Ganga." Similarly here also, granting, as you say, that the word *yajeta* suggests, at first, only the *karya viz., apurva* and nothing else, its denoting nothing else cannot be maintained when the sequence of the words in the sentences is thought of for the sake of the meaning. (So, this meaning of the word *yajeta* insisted on by the Mimamsakas will have to be given up). But, this assumption that the word *yajeta*, at first and independently of other words, suggests 'the thing to be done' (i-e.) *karya* or *apurva* at the time when it is heard, is itself not true. When A says 'Bring the cow' and B brings it, C who understands the meaning of the words 'bring the cow', while observing B bringing it, knows that the activity of B in bringing the cow is painful in itself and is looked upon as the thing to be done (*karya*) only as it is a means of attaining some specific pleasure (afterwards) and not as itself being a pleasure. Therefore, to say that *niyoga* or *apurva* (or the commandment to produce it) is agreeable to a person is opposed to all ordinary experience. It is also against the experience of the person who maintains that *niyoga* is of the nature of pleasure, because it is agreeable to men.

In cases like "He who is desirous of rain shall sacrifice with bamboo shoots (*kariri*)," as soon as the sacrifice is over, the *niyoga* or *apurva* should have been generated, but it is not experienced as agreeable in itself as apart from the rain, though

it is the cause of the rain. The Mimamsaka might reply, "It is not experienced as agreeable in this life, for the effect, namely, rain may occur either in this life or in a later life." From the uncertainty regarding the time when it will rain (as the result of the sacrifice), the Mimamsakas have necessarily to assume that the *niyoga* or *apurva* has already been generated in this life. But, this *niyoga* is not now experienced as being agreeable or, in other words, as a pleasure. Thus from these arguments, it must have become evident that there is no such thing as "that which is aimed at by the volition or mental effort" other than the desired object (*viz.*, rain or *svarga* as the case may be) which can be attained by the effort.

The Mimamsaka might now attempt another definition of "that which is aimed at by the mental effort or volition" and say, (4) "that which is aimed at by volition is *seshin* to the volition. (*seshin* is one for whose purposes the *sesha* exists). We ask, "What is the definition of a *seshin* and what of a *sesha*?" When two terms are associated with each other, they are said to be *mutually associated* (*pratisambandhi* to each other); (for instance, 'father' and 'son' are mutually associated terms; they are *pratisambandhi* to each other). Hence, the Mimamsaka might reply: "That which is mutually associated with *karya* or *apurva* as its *pratisambandhi* is *sesha* to it and that which is *pratisambandhi* to the *sesha* is the *seshin*. Here, *karya* is certainly not defined, for the *karya* is now called *seshin* without the word *seshin* being defined clearly and all along we have been asking for a definition of *karya*. If now the Mimamsaka should amend the definition and say, (5) "The *sesha* is one

which exists invariably along with the volition which has started with something else for its aim", we ask, "What is this something else for its aim?". It is just this aim which was required to be defined. The definition of a word should not contain the word itself to be defined. It may be said "*aiming at* is the accomplishment of a desire". We ask again, "What is this thing that is desired?". The Minamsaka might reply, "The benefit to be derived from the volition is the benefit which stimulates a man at the beginning to make the mental effort or volition and this is the object desired (namely *svarga*) which can be attained only by the volition. This we have already stated. Everywhere the relationship between the *sesha* and the *seshin* is as follows:- That whose whole existence, by its very nature, serves to promote the interests of another is *sesha* and the other is the *seshin*. Sacrifices and the like and the effort to perform them subserve solely the desire to attain the fruit. Owing to the desire to complete the sacrifices and the like properly, the rest is subservient (*sesha*). Those who are born slaves to others exist solely (and primarily) for promoting the highest interests of the others and are hence *sesha*. Similarly, the essential nature (*svarupa*) of all things, sentient and non-sentient, eternal and non-eternal, is to subserve the highest purposes of Iswara: so, they are *sesha* and He is the *seshin*. The *Srutis* therefore say, "He has all things under His sway", "He rules over all", "the Lord of the Universe" and so on.

Therefore, it is only the attainment of *svarga* that can be called *seshin* and not *apurva* or *karya*, for it is only the former that is the ultimate and supreme benefit derived from the volition. The

Mimamsaka's definition "that the primary and important entity which is brought into accomplishment by the volition is *karya* or *apurva* will convince only those who have implicit and unquestioning faith in Mimamsa doctrine.

Note ;—*Seshin* is defined by the Mimamsaka as that which is related to the *sesha* and when the question is asked what is meant by *sesha*, it is defined as that which is related to the *seshin*. Here no real contribution is made to a knowledge of what either of the two means. If one of the words, say *sesha*, is defined without bringing in the other word, then, the second word *seshin* may be defined as having a certain relation to *sesha*; then, one could understand what the two words mean.

Further, in instances like "the man desirous of *svarga* shall perform the sacrifice", the termination of the tense form *yajeta* suggests an agent or (*karta*) in general and "The man desirous of *svarga*" makes it refer to a special kind of agent or *karta* and this is the explanation of grammarians. The Mimamsaka contention that the words "The man desirous of *svarga*" suggest not a special kind of agent or doer but a special kind of *niyojya* (or person who should understand in his mind that he should acquire *apurva*) is opposed to the view of the grammarians and we ask "Whence is it inferred?". The Mimamsaka might reply, "How can a man who is qualified by the desire for the attainment of *svarga* be the agent or doer when he does not know that the activity, namely, the performance of the sacrifice is a means to attain *svarga*?" We ask the Mimamsaka in return, "How can one qualified by the desire for the attainment of *svarga* understand in his mind that he is a *niyojya* (i. e.) one who should acquire *apurva*?" It is because of this difficulty that the Mimamsaka says he arrives at the conclusion that the *niyoga* or (*apurva*) is the means of attaining *svarga*. We

may also reply in the same way, "We arrive at the conclusion that the activity in the performance of a sacrifice is the means of attaining *svarga* (without any such *niyoga* or *apurva*). Our view has at least the merit of having the sanction of the science of grammar, (whereas the Mimamsaka view has not). When a statement is made such as "He who desires to eat should go to the house of Devadatta," since we hear of the activity of going to Devadatta's house on the part of one desiring to eat, we conclude or infer, though it was unknown before, that going to Devadatta's house is a means of attaining the desired end (eating food). So also in the instance "He who is desirous of *svarga* shall perform the sacrifice *Jyotishtoma*." It is not proper on the part of the Mimamsaka to attribute, to a person described as a doer of one action, the doership of an entirely different action. The word *yajeta* (should perform the sacrifice) describes the person as the (prospective) doer of the sacrifice. In Mimamsa interpretation, he is called the doer of another action *viz.*, of the action of understanding in his mind that he is a *nijojya* enjoined to acquire *apurva* or *niyoga*. For the *nijojya* has been defined by Mimamsakas as one who understands in his mind that the *karya* or *apurva* should be his." If they should state (at this stage) that this understanding is favourable to the activity in performing the sacrifice, the objection is not thereby removed. For when it is said "Devadatta should cook (food)" he is stated to be the (prospective) doer of the cooking, and it is not proper to say that he is stated in the sentence to be the doer of the act of going (to the kitchen, for example), because this going is favourable to the act of cooking.

Note:—All this long discussion is for the purpose of proving that the assumption of an entity called *apurva* by the Mimamsakas is uncalled for, since this *apurva* or *avya* cannot be defined as anything other than the desire for the fruit of the sacrifice and the like or the activity connected with the sacrifice. This assumption (of a *niyoga* or *apurva*) is opposed to the ordinary interpretation of words in life and also that of grammarians.

Note:—The Mimamsakas maintain that, when we hear the *vidhiavahya*, "He who is desirous of *svarga* shall perform a certain kind of sacrifice", first arises a desire (*Ichha*) for *svarga*, then the volition, will, or mental effort (*kriti*) to attain that end, then the understanding that the *apurva* should be acquired, then follows the activity connected with the sacrifice (*kriya* or *karma*) and, as a result of the *kriya*, *karya* or *apurva* in the soul which, later, either after this life or after some future life, secures the object desired namely, *svarga*. Sri Ramanuja would describe the chain as follows:— First the desire for *svarga*, then the will or volition, then the activity of the sacrifice, then the consequence of this activity which consists in having pleased Iswara by the sacrifice and this pleasure in the mind of Iswara or His grace finally brings *svarga*. The Mimamsaka assumed the generation of an *apurva* on the ground that the activity of the sacrifice which perishes when it is over, no longer persists and cannot therefore secure the desired object. Sri Ramanuja explains that this assumption of an *apurva* is unnecessary, since Iswara's pleasure or grace which has been secured by the activity of the sacrifice persists and can bring about the accomplishment of the desire.

Further, we ask, "Why do you assume or postulate the existence of an enduring entity (that lasts long) called *apurva*?" If the reply is, "Otherwise the utterance of the words 'He who is desirous of *svarga* in conjunction with 'shall perform the sacrifice,' would be incongruous and against reason, we ask, "Where is the incongruity or unreasonableness? "He who is desirous of *svarga*" means "He to whom *svarga* is the accomplishment of a desire". If it is said by the Mimamsaka that, for the *svarga* which is to be attained at some future time, activity such as the performance of the sacrifice, which perishes immediately after it is over, cannot be the means, we reply that this charge of un-

reasonableness or incongruity can be made only by those who do not at all understand the true teaching of the Vedas. Those who understand the Vedas declare that Bhagavan Narayana, the Supreme Ruler, who has been propitiated by all sorts of *karma* or activities, vouchsafes the desired fruit (of such activities). For example, Sri Dramidacharya, who is in the forefront of those that have understood the Vedas, says "It is certainly by the desire to attain the fruit, that men seek to propitiate the Supreme Self (*atma*). The teaching of the *Sastras* is that when He is pleased by the actions, He is capable of granting the desired end". The meaning of this is as follows:— "In order to attain the desired object or end, (men) want to propitiate Bhagavan Vasudeva, the Supreme Self, who is expressed by words like Indra and others and who is within Indra and others as their inner self, by *karmas* or activities such as sacrifices, charitable gifts, offerings made in the fire and the like to deities like Indra. The *Sruti* also says:— (The Supreme Being) who is the hub (*nabhi*) of the Universe receives all actions such as sacrifices and good deeds like digging tanks, both those that were done in the past and those that are being done in whatever way they may be performed. 'Sacrifices' and 'good deeds' refer to all kinds of *karma* prescribed in the *srutis* and the *smritis*. "Receives all" means "Whatever actions are performed as for all deities such as *Indra*, *Agni*, and *Varuna* - they are all accepted as His own by the Supreme Person who is their inner self. "The hub of the Universe" means "He who supports the world filled with all *varnas* or castes such as the Brahmin and the Kshatriya. He is called the hub because He supports the world by granting their respective desires to those who have won His grace by their *karmas* or activities. That He is the person referred

to by such words as Agni and Vayu on account of His being their Inner Self is declared in "That is Agni, That is Vayu, That is Surya, That is Chandra (the moon)". Bhagavan, too, says :-

"Whatever be the body (*tanu*) that the devotee wishes to propitiate with earnestness and sincerity, I endow him with unshaken sincerity in that form of worship." *Gita* (VII - 21).

"Endowed with that sincere faith, he performs the worship (of that form or body (of mine). Thence does he obtain his desires, whatever they may be, and these are really granted by me". *Gita* (VII -22.)

"Whatever be the body" this means that "Particular deities such as Indra and others are, in fact, the bodies of Bhagavan who is within them as their Inner Self. And again in IX - 24, Bhagavan says :-

"I am the deity propitiated in all the sacrifices and, likewise, it is I that grant all the desires".

So also in the *Vishnu Purana*, we find the following :-

"O Achyuta, that art of the form of all the gods, Thou art worshipped always in (all) sacrifices".

"O Lord, those by whom Thou art worshipped in the performance of their respective duties (*dharma*) —they transcend all this *Maya* in order to obtain release from bondage".

Thus, in all the *Itihasas* and *Puranas* as well as in all the *Vedas*, it is said here and there that all rites (*karma*) are of the nature of worship of the Lord of all and that Purushothama, being

worshipped by these rites, grants the respective objects desired. So also in texts like the following, all the Srutis declare that Bhagavan, who is worshipped by means of sacrifices, charitable gifts and offerings made in the fire, receives them, being the Inner Self of Indra and the other gods and is also the giver of all objects desired.

“Sacrifices become related to the gods through Him”. “Through Him” means “Through the Supreme Being who is within the gods as their inner self”. “Sacrifices become related to the gods” means “Sacrifices become associated with the gods”. It really means “Sacrifices become associated with gods like Indra, because they stand in the relation of bodies to the Supreme Being, who is their inner Ruler.

In the *Bhagavad Gita* (V - 29) we are told that He is the recipient of all sacrifices and austerities and that He is the Supreme Ruler of all the worlds”. It follows therefore that all rites (*karma*) are of the nature of the worship of the Supreme Person, who is the Inner self of Indra and the other gods, and that He alone is the giver of those objects that are desired. Where, then, is the advantage of postulating an *apurva* which is far from being the ordinary interpretation (of words) as being expressed by them or as being required to be postulated? If it is asked, “If so, what is the meaning accepted for the potential mood (*ling*) and others”, we answer as follows:- “The root *yaj* means “to worship a deity” and refers to sacrifices and the like which are of the nature of worship of a deity; the potential mood and such things as the terminations express what ordinary interpretation requires, namely, that this worship is capable of

being carried out by the activities of the doer". What is there unreasonable in this? According to the science of grammar, the terminations denoting the agent or doer bring out the manner of relationship between the meaning of the root and the activity of the agent. Other tenses and moods than the *ling* indicate the past, the present and the like; such tenses and moods as the *ling* indicate that the thing denoted by the root is capable of being accomplished by the activity of the agent or doer.

Further, the *vidhivakyas* themselves, after prescribing the respective *karma* or rite to the man who desires a particular object, state that the *karma* is a form of worship of a deity and will bring out the desired end through that deity. For example, the text laying down the *vidhi* or command says, "The man who desires to have prosperity will offer, as a sacrifice, a white goat (*pasu*) to Vayu." Then occurs the following sentence which is an *arthavada*. "Vayu is a deity who grants the desired end soonest. So, he who approaches Vayu with a suitable offering will be rewarded by Vayu with worldly prosperity." Here, since there is nothing unreasonable in the statement that the desired end is attained (through a god), it does not stand to reason to maintain that the means of accomplishing the desired end is inferred by the *pramana* called *Upadana*.

Note :—*Upadana* is a *pramana* like inference (*anumana*). It is almost the same as *arthapatti*. When it is stated that 'Devadatta is fat and yet does not eat in the daytime' we infer that he must be eating at night time. The inference here is by *arthapatti* and *upadana* is similar to *arthapatti*. From the purport underlying the *vidhi* (*vidhyakshepa*), we apprehend the *apurva*, according to the *Mimamsakas*.

Even though the agency by which the desired end is brought about *viz.*, Vayu is not stated

in the *vidhivakya*, yet, this is understood from the sentences which follow it, especially as it is necessary for the *vidhivakya*. This is the meaning. In the rule of prohibition: "Therefore, one shall not threaten a Brahman with assault," though the *vidhivakya* does not state what would happen to one who so threatens, still we understand that the action of doing the prohibited thing will bring into effect a fine of a hundred gold coins, from the sentence which follows the text enjoining the prohibition. We take it that the prohibited action will lead to the fine, as it is necessary for the passage which enjoins the prohibition. While this is so, why, in this case (namely the sacrifice to Vayu), should we disregard or ignore what is plainly understood from the sentences closely following the (*vidhivakya*) that the sacrifice will bring prosperity through the agency of Vayu and resort to the help of an inference or apprehension (*upadana*) for stating that the sacrifice will yield the desired end? There is a saying to this effect; "Who will bury a treasure of gold in a room in his own house and go to beg of a miser in his desire for wealth?" This saying holds good in your case (Mimamsaka's). Besides, the fine of a hundred gold coins is the result not of any (intermediary) *apurva* or *adrishta*. To the man who obeys the commands laid down (in the *Sastras*), to the man who does not follow them, and to the man who does what is censured as objectionable—to all of them, all the pleasure (*sukha*), or the pain (*dukkha*) results from the favour or the frown of the Supreme Person.

To prove this, there are various *Srutis*, such as these that follow:— "It is indeed He who confers bliss." *Taittiriya Upanishad*; "(When a man

is in constant and uninterrupted meditation of the Supreme Being), he has no fears. (When there is interruption in the meditation), then does he become subject to fear." "For fear of Him does the wind blow; for fear of Him does the sun rise, for fear of Him, do Agni and Indra (perform their respective duties) and the god of death who is the fifth among them runs (on His errands) for fear of Him. (*Taittiriya Upanishad*). "It is by the orders of this imperishable (Supreme Being), O Gargi,* that the sun and the moon stand supported. It is by the orders of the Supreme Being that men, who have received gifts praise the giver, being obliged to him, that the gods praise those that perform sacrifices and the *pitris* those who perform (the *sraddhas*)."

* *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad*: 3-8-9

So the *Dramidabhashya* says:-

"By His orders, the wind sweeps along and the rivers flow; within the bounds prescribed by Him, the oceans leap about like rams that have become excited".

"These worlds remain without dropping down or breaking to pieces, being subject to His will. He knows those who perform His bidding and rewards them in His compassion, because He knows everything and is proficient in all the rites." This means, "To the man who understands the real truth concerning the nature of the Supreme Person and then performs the rites and duties prescribed for him, as also His meditation accompanied by *jnana*, all pleasures extending even to the attainment of Him result by His grace and so also freedom from fear, each according to His endeavour. To the man who does not meditate

on Him with true knowledge of His nature and who does not perform the duties prescribed for Him and performs those that have been condemned as evil, immeasurable sufferings including the non-attainment of Him result from His frown and so also fear."

Bhagavan himself says:-

"Perform the duties prescribed for you; for, the performance of *karma* is superior to *jnana* (without *karma*)" *Gita* III - 8. Having here laid down that all *karma* should be performed with knowledge, He says again:-

"Surrender all *karma* unto me." (*Gita* III-30) by which He declares that all *karma* is of the nature of His worship and that all souls are subject to His control.

He then proceeds to say:-

"Those who perform this bidding of mine without failure, those who have faith in the teaching of the *Sastras* and those who do not speak with contempt of them—all these obtain release from *karma*."

"Those who do not do my bidding out of contempt, those who have no faith in it—these will become deluded in regard to all knowledge. Know that they are devoid of all sense". *Gita* III-92-93.

(In these two *slokas*) Bhagavan praises those who perform His commands and censures those who act contrary to His bidding and states again that those who do not act according to His command are of the nature of *Asuras* and that they will have a disreputable lot or destiny:—

"Those wicked and cruel men who hate me—I throw them into the bondage of *samsara* and that in *asuric* births.

"Having obtained *asuric* births, these fools are born again and again and without ever attaining me; they finally reach the most disreputable of all conditions". *Gita* (xv-19-20).

"He who performs all *karma* with the thought that it is really I that make him perform it—he will, by my grace, attain the eternal state from which there is no change." *Gita* XVIII-56.

Thus, He points out the condition of eternal bliss assigned to those who do His bidding. Some exaggerated statements are made in *Karma Mimamsa* in the chapter on the gods, in order that those who have not studied Vedanta may not lose their faith in *karma* and in order that they may continue to have faith in all *karma*. Those who are well-versed in the Vedas know that the two parts *Karma Mimamsa* and *Brahma Mimamsa* form a single *Sastra*. In order to emphasise the importance of *karma*, it is stated in the chapter on the gods that the fruit of the *karma* comes of itself and not from any gods. The real intention is not to deny the agency of the gods.

The Arguments to prove the existence of The Region of Eternal Glory (*Nityavibhuti*).

In the same way as this Supreme Being, Narayana, has infinite knowledge, bliss, and purity (which are attributes that define His nature), in the same way as He has countless, wonderful and unsurpassed, auspicious qualities such as wisdom,

power, strength, lordship, might and splendour, in the same way as He controls, by his will, all other things, sentient and non-sentient, so also He has a celestial and unchanging form, which, besides being to his liking, conforms to His nature; He has likewise countless ornaments of wonderful and varied beauty in keeping with His form; He has also innumerable and wonderful weapons suited to His might; He [has, besides, a Spouse of unsurpassed glory with a form pleasing to Him and conforming to His greatness and with beauty, greatness, sovereignty and goodness suited to His nature; He has, moreover, a retinue of countless followers and attendants who possess boundless auspicious qualities like wisdom and the capacity for rendering service suited to Him; He has, further, countless objects and accompaniments of enjoyment suited to His nature, and to his greatness. So also He has a celestial abode which far transcends the power of speech and of mind to describe. There are thousands of passages in the *Śrutis* which state that all these are eternal and immaculate.

(Here are some of them):-

"I know this Supreme Person whose complexion is radiant like the sun." *Purusha Sukta.*

"This person is within the sun, all golden in appearance; His eyes are like the red lotus blossoming in the rays of the sun." *Chandogya Upanishad 1-6-6*

"Within the ether inside the heart, this Person dwells; He can be grasped only by the pure mind. He is immortal, all golden." *Mundaka Upanishad: 2-2-7*

The word *manomaya* in the (above) *Sruti* means "that can be grasped only by the mind that is pure."

"All the moments had their origin from this Person who is like lightning."

"From the Person like lightning" means from the Person whose colour is like that of lightning".

"He shines like a black cloud in the middle of the flame of fire which shines like a streak of lightning". *Narayanopanishad: 13-2*

This means:- This flame of fire which is in the ether of the small lotus (of the heart) has, in the middle of it, the form of the Supreme Being shining like a black cloud and resembles, therefore, lightning which has within it a black cloud;

"He can be grasped only by the mind that is pure; He has all beings in the world for His body. He has a radiant form. His will is irresistible; His form is as subtle as ether (*akasa*); He is the sole doer of all that takes place; He has all objects of pure enjoyment; He has all (transcendental) fragrances and flavours. He has all these auspicious qualities, since He is perfect in Himself, He is indifferent to everything and does not speak of anything".

"He is dressed in a raiment coloured with saffron" and so forth.

"The Spouse of Vishnu is the queen of the world". "The goddess of the earth and the goddess Lakshmi are His wives". "The *Suris* are always gazing at the supreme abode of Vishnu". "He lives beyond this universe of matter (*rajas*); His celestial form is endless; It is incomprehensible (*avyakta*), ancient, omnipresent and beyond the region of *tamas*".

“He who meditates on this Brahman set within the cave of the heart— He attains the Supreme abode of Brahman”. “It alone is the past and it is the future and it is in the Supreme Ether that never changes”. It is from these and hundreds of such *srutis* that all this is ascertained.

In “That supreme abode of Vishnu etc.,” it is stated that the *Suris* are always gazing at it. From the words “*always gazing*”, it is learnt that there are certain beings with perfect knowledge or wisdom whose vision is eternal. The words may be interpreted to mean either “Those who are *suris* gaze always” or “Those who always gaze are *suris*”. In both cases, it cannot be said that the sentence cannot be considered as declaring more things than one. Since these things cannot be proved by any other *pramana* than the *sruti*, in this passage, three things are declared as existing; the *suris* who are eternal; their vision, and the Supreme Abode which has them both or, in other words, the Supreme Abode qualified by the *suris* and their gaze is here declared to exist, as it has not been established elsewhere (*aprapta*) or by other *pramanas*.

(The sage Jaimini) says in his *Purva Mimamsa*: “If they are not taught elsewhere, the ancillary aspects of a rite mentioned along with the performance of the rite itself should be considered as also prescribed, because they are inseparable from the rite itself.” For example, in *vidhis* enjoining the rite like “The offering made to Agni shall be in eight potsherds,” both the rite itself and the ancillary features of the rite (like the potsherds) and the god Agni, which have not been established elsewhere should be considered as prescribed; (i.e.) what is ordained is the rite

qualified by all ancillary features. So also here there is nothing inappropriate in saying that the Supreme Abode of Brahman is declared to exist with Suris gazing at it always," because they have not been established elsewhere or otherwise. Vedic scholars maintain that the *mantras* uttered while offering (*homa*) in the fire and the *mantras* repeated while it is being offered, the *mantras* used in *japas*, the *mantras* which are chanted (*stotra*) and also those that are uttered (without chanting) (*sastra*), those which are found in the respective contexts and those which are found elsewhere out of these contexts — that all these are of significance and convey their meaning just as they stand in the same way as the *Brahmanas*, provided what they state has not been already established and provided also that what they express is not opposed to the *pramanas*. A *Stotra* tells of the attributes of a god and is intended to be chanted or sung. A *Sastra*, on the other hand, speaks of the attributes of a god and is to be uttered (without being sung). In the case of *mantras* which describe the materials to be employed in the rite, those statements which are made in them about the attributes of particular deities, provided they have not been established otherwise and are not opposed (to the *pramanas*) are appropriate to the application of the rite.

This passage in the *sruti*, viz., "The *Suris* always gaze at this supreme abode of Vishnu" is not concerned with souls that have obtained release, for the word "always" (which means eternally) would then be out of place. Nor can it be said that the *Suris* refer to the beginningless stream of released souls in which case "always" might be justified. "Gaze" always signifies that each of them

is the doer of the action of gazing. So, other interpretations would be against the spirit of the *sruti*. Even in regard to passages which refer to an action, it has already been shown that *mantras* and *arthavadas* convey valid ideas. Much more then, should there be a real idea in passages concerning an established entity (*siddhavastu*) which is understood from the interpretation of the words. Therefore the reasoning followed here to prove the existence of the Supreme Abode of Brahman and of the eternal *Suris* is just.

The (following) objection may be made here:—
 “The word *Paramapada* in the *sruti* which has been rendered into ‘the Supreme Abode of Brahman’ really means the essential nature (*svarupa*) of the Supreme Being. In passages like “*Paramapada*, which has the name Vishnu, is absolutely free from all that is objectionable or faulty”, *Paramapada* and Vishnu are spoken of as being identical. (So how could the *sruti* in question prove the existence of the Supreme Abode of Vishnu?).

We answer: “It is not so. The Supreme Abode is itself declared to exist in passages like the following:-

“He dwells beyond this world of *rajas* or matter.” *Rajas* here stands for *sattvam* and *tamas* as well, all the three of them being qualities of matter.

“He lives in the Supreme Ether (*vyoman*) which is imperishable.”

“He who presides over all dwells in the Supreme Ether.”

“He who knows Him that dwells in the Supreme Ether within the cave.....” Further that the *Paramapada* is the abode and is different from Vishnu is clear also from the genitive or sixth case in “of Vishnu.” Moreover when it is stated, “The *Paramapada* which has the name Vishnu,” there is an implication that there are other *paramapadas*. It is only that *paramapada* which is other than the *Paramapada* of the name Vishnu that is said to exist and to be gazed at always by the *Suris*.

To explain: In some places the word *paramapada* is employed to denote the Supreme Abode; it is sometimes employed to denote also the individual self freed from matter or *prakriti* and it is also used sometimes to denote Bhagavan. In the passage: “In that *Paramapada* of Vishnu, the *suris* are always gazing at it”, it refers to the abode. In the passage “The great *Paramapada*, which has no qualities, becomes associated with qualities (*sattvam, rajas, and tamas*) during creation, continuance and dissolution and is seen to be of three kinds”, the word *paramapada* means the soul freed from matter. In the passage “The *paramapada* named Vishnu is without anything objectionable or faulty”, the word means Vishnu. All these three meanings are conveyed by the word *paramapada*, as each of them is the supreme object of attainment. If it is asked how all these three could be objects of attainment, we answer as follows:- Bhagavan is the supreme end or goal to be attained. The other two are also objects of attainment, as they are attained along with Bhagavan. The attainment of that condition of the soul which is free from all the bondage of matter takes place along with the attainment of Bhagavan as is stated in the following *sruti*- “Those

auspicious qualities that are desired in *moksha* are obscured by *anrita*." The word *anrita* means *karma* which obscures from us the true qualities of Bhagavan. If it is asked, "How are we to know that the *anrita* which obscures is the *karma* of the self in bondage, we cite the following *shlokas* in support of the contention:

"*Avidya* which has the name *karma* is a third power (*sakti*) other (than these two). By it, O king, the power (*sakti*) called the soul in bondage (*kshetrajna*) which is found in all bodies is covered or obscured. Owing to the obscuration, the soul experiences all sorts of suffering due to *samsara*".
Vishnu Purana.

(*Avidya* and *anrita* are known to be synonymous terms).

That the attainment of the abode of the Supreme Being takes place along with the attainment of Bhagavan is obvious (and needs no explanation).

In the *sruti*: "He who dwells beyond this world of *rajas*", *rajas* signifies *prakriti* or matter which is endowed with three qualities *sattvam*, *rajas* and *tamas*, because mere *rajas* cannot stand by itself. So the passage means, "He dwells in a region which lies beyond matter possessed of the three qualities". From this, we infer that Vishnu's abode lies beyond *prakriti* or matter which is the object of enjoyment for the self in bondage and which is constituted of *sattvam*, *rajas* and *tamas*. So also in the *sruti*: "I know this Supreme Person having the radiance of the sun and dwelling beyond *tamas*," the word *tamas* signifies *prakriti*, as mere *tamas* cannot exist by itself. This passage means the same as that which speaks of Vishnu living beyond *rajas*. It means "I know

the Supreme Person radiant like the sun and dwelling beyond *tamas* or *prakriti*." Further, it is said *"The person that knows Brahman, who is truth, knowledge and infiniteness and who dwells in the Supreme Ether (*vyoman*) within the cave" and likewise, "In the imperishable Supreme Ether". From these two *sruti* texts, it is learnt that this abode is changeless and is called by the name "the Supreme *vyoman* or Ether". Since the quality of imperishability is attributed to the Supreme Ether in the *sruti* quoted above, the solar system (*adityamandala*) and the like which are perishable are not to be called by the words "Supreme Ether".

* *Taittiriya Aranyaka: (1-1)*

From passages like †"Where there is a class of *devas* or gods called *sadhya*" and "Where there are ancient *rishis* or seers from the earliest times", we learn that these are the *suris* referred to elsewhere. The same idea is conveyed by the *sruti*. *"Vishnu's supreme abode (*paramapada*), where there are beings with divine wisdom (*viprasah*) singing (the praise of the Lord), (*vipanyava*) ever vigilant in their vision (or knowledge), (*jagruvamsah*). *viprasah* means "beings possessed of wisdom"; *vipanyava* means "ever singing praises". *Jagruvamsah* means 'whose intelligence never fails them'. So it means:- "These wise seers whose wisdom never fails shine radiantly always singing the praise of Vishnu's *paramapada*".

* *Tad viprasah vipanyava jagruvamsah samiadhate
Vishnoh yat paramam padam.*

Since the *sruti* says, "This, my dear, existed at the beginning only as *Sat*, alone and without a second", it has to be understood that these followers, the abode and the like are included in the essential

† *Taittiriya Aranyaka: 1-2.*

nature of the Supreme Being, just like the multitude of auspicious qualities like knowledge, strength and lordship. The words "only as *Sat*", "alone" and "without a second" show that they have to be included as being within Brahman, because they form part of His transcendental, non-material (*aprakṛita*) attributes. The word 'this' in "This, my dear, existed at the beginning as *Sat*" refers to this universe constituted of experiencing subjects (*Jivas*) bound by *karma* and the objects experienced or enjoyed by them. "The *Suris* always gaze at it" shows that they are not subject to *karma*, because their vision is eternal. The *sruti* which begins with "He is free from sin" and ends with "He has no thirst" declares that Brahman is without any of those objectionable features that are seen in *prakṛiti* (matter) with its three qualities, in the modifications of *prakṛiti*, and in the *Jivas* who are associated with them, which three form the materials of His play (*Lila*). Then the same sentence proceeds to declare by the word *satyakama* that the objects of His enjoyment and the implements of His enjoyment are true (i.e.) eternal. Whatever is desired is *kama*. He whose objects of desire are true (i.e.) eternal, is *satyakama*. Therefore, whatever objects and implements of enjoyment are desired by the Supreme Brahman as suitable are true (i.e.) eternal. The materials of His play (*Lila*), which are other than the objects and instruments of His enjoyment, are also eternal, in as much as they are capable of being grasped by the *pramanas*. They are however subject to modification, though eternal, and are hence unstable and changing. On the other hand, the objects and implements of His enjoyment in *paramapada* are, besides being eternal, unchanging and stable and true. Brahman is also declared in that *sruti* to be *satyasankalpa*. It means that although

He has countless, eternal and wonderful objects and implements of enjoyment, He could, by His mere will, create innumerable objects unseen before.

The word *satyasankalpa* (omnipotent) declares that the nature, existence, activity and differences of all things, namely - the materials of His play (*Lila*), the objects and implements of His enjoyment, the sentient and the non-sentient, those that are not subject to change as well as those that are subject to change—all these depend upon His will.

The same truth is conveyed by *Itihasas* and *Puranas* which elaborate and elucidate the Vedas:—*Srimad Ramayana* was composed solely to elucidate the Vedas, as may be seen from the following *sloka*:—
 “*The great sage, Valmiki, found that these two boys, Kusa and Lava, were intelligent and well-versed in the Vedas and taught them the *Ramayana* to illustrate and explain the Vedas.’ In the *Ramayana*, we find the following (in Mandodari’s lament): †“This Rama is surely the great Yogin, the eternal Supreme Self; He has no beginning, no middle, and no end; He is greater than the great; He dwells in the transcendental, non-material (*aprakrita*) world beyond *tamas*. He is the protector of the world armed with *sankha*, *chakra* and *gada* (club). He has the mole *Sri Vatsa* on His chest; He has, as His inseparable Spouse, the goddess Lakshmi. He is invincible, eternal, immutable”. And elsewhere we find in The *Ramayana* the following:—

“All his arrows of various kinds and his long bow took human forms and followed Rama”.

* *The Ramayana: Balakanda: 4-6*

† *Ibid: Yuddhakanda: 144-14*

“He entered into the splendour that is Vishnu with his body and with all his followers”.

In the *Vishnu Purana* we find the following:-

“Hari’s form is, O king, one in which all these great powers are found established. It is different from all else and is beyond all measure”.

“Hari is Brahman with a form; all *Jivas* are subservient to Him. The eternal mother of the world, Lakshmi, is inseparable from Him”.

“Just as Vishnu pervades everywhere, Lakshmi, too, O best of Brahmins, pervades all. If Vishnu assumes the form of a god, she, too, assumes a like form. If He assumes the form of a human being, she, too, assumes a human form; She makes her form always be in conformity with that of Vishnu”.

“In His Supreme Abode, there are *Yogis* ever in contemplation of Brahman, exclusive of all other things, and the *Suris* are always gazing at it”.

“Divisions of time like *kala* (a few seconds) and *muhoortha* (one and a half hours) do not produce any change in that region of glory”.

In the *Mahabharata* also it is said:-

“The Supreme Abode (*Vaikuntah*) is a celestial region, imperishable and incomprehensibly magnificent; it cannot be seen by our senses or intelligence; it can be understood only from the *Agamas*; it exists from the beginning. Go there, O Lord, and in every *kalpa* protect us that have sought refuge in Thee by incarnating in Thy divine form”.

“Time is itself subject to change there. It has no sway in that region”.

The *Sutrahara* too says (in 1-1-21):-

“He who is seen within the sun and within the eye is Brahman, because (in this Upanishad) attributes peculiar to Him are taught”.

This *Sutra* indicates that the Supreme Brahman has a form. Its purport is as follows:- He who is seen within the sphere or *mandala* of the sun is the Supreme Being, the Supreme Brahman, Narayana. He shines like a mountain of molten gold; He has countless beams like the beams of a crore of suns; He has long and clear eyes like the petals of a lotus opened by the rays of the sun, and standing on firm stalks in deep water; He has beautiful eyebrows, a beautiful forehead and a beautiful nose; His lips are like coral and lit up with a smile. His cheeks are tender and lovely; His neck is like the conch; His well-formed ears are over his lofty shoulders; His arms are robust, round and long. The palms of His hands are charming and rosy with beautiful fingers; He has a slender waist and a broad chest. The members of His body are well-proportioned; the divine build of His body defies all description; His complexion is attractive; His two feet are as lovely as newly blossomed lotuses; He is dressed in yellow raiment adapted to His greatness; He wears countless and wonderful ornaments of a celestial nature, such as a brilliant crown, ear-rings, necklaces, the gem Kaustubha, armlets, bracelets, anklets and waistband; He is adorned with the conch, the discus (*chakra*); the club (*gada*), the bow (*sarnga*), the mole, Srivatsa, and the garland of wild flowers (*vanamala*). By His unsurpassed beauty, He allures all minds and eyes; He fills all things moving and non-moving, with the nectar of His loveliness; His youthfulness is eternal and is wonderful and inconceivable; His smile is as charming as a flower; by His holy fragrance, He fills all the quarters;

by his grandeur. He overwhelms the three worlds; He blesses those that seek His protection with His sweet glance full of compassion and love.

He has, for play, the creation, maintenance, and dissolution of all the world; He is free from all blemish; He is the treasurehouse of all auspicious qualities and is absolutely different from all other things.

The words, "Because attributes peculiar to Him are taught", in the *Sutra* referred to above, find their explanation in the following *srutis*:- "He rules over all the worlds and fulfils all desires and He rises above all evil (*karma*). His attributes and qualities are brought out in the following *srutis*:- "He has all things under His sway"; "He is the Lord of everything"; "He is free from the taint of sin. He is not subject to old age (and the like)" The *sruti* ends with *satyasankalpah* (i. e.,) omnipotence. Similarly, the *srutis* say, "He is superior to all (sentient beings) in the Universe and is eternal. He is the soul of all. He is Narayana and is called also Hari". "He is the Lord of the Universe and is subject to no one above Him".

The *Vakyakara* has also conveyed all this meaning as follows:- "The passage in the *sruti* says, "A person radiant like gold is seen in the sphere of the sun. The person referred to in it is the Wise One (*Prajnah*), the Inner Self of all, for the *sruti* teaches that He is the Lord of the world and the Dispenser of all that is desired. So also He is described as being free from the taint of all sin". The *Vakyakara* also declares that this form of the Lord should not be considered as not being eternal:— "It may be

asked whether this form is one assumed by the Lord, for the time being, to bless His devotees. The Lord may be thought of as taking a form for showing His grace to His devotees." Having stated this *prima facie* view, he refutes it by saying, "This form (of the Lord) cannot be perceived by the senses; it can be apprehended only by the mind that is pure: for that is how it is described (in the *sruti*)". Just as *jnana* and other qualities which define the nature of Brahman are considered to be His essential attributes and are, on that account, understood to be eternal, so also, since this form is also spoken of in the *sruti* as defining the nature of Brahman, it should also be considered as eternal just like the essential nature (*svarupa*) of Brahman itself. (Dramidacharya) the commentator (*Bhashyakara*) has explained it as follows:- "This (form) of the Lord who created the world in an instant is not merely an illusory appearance; it cannot be seen with the eye of the flesh; it is apprehended only by the pure mind with the help of other aids; for the *sruti* says, "It is not apprehended by the eye and can be apprehended only by the pure mind". A deity without form would not be taught by the *sruti* as having a form; the *Sastra* teaches the truth about things just as they are. The *srutis* say:— "His raiment is coloured with saffron". "He shines radiant like the sun in a region beyond *tamas*". The statements made by the *srutis* in other contexts are also evidences. "Having the colour of the sun" (*hiranmaya*) means resemblance in radiance and not "made of gold", as in the (phrase) "a face like the moon". So far the words of the *Vakyakara*; it has been commented upon as follows:— "The suffix *mayat* (in *hiranmaya*) does not signify 'made of' because the *Atman* is not a thing made of any thing". Just as from the *sruti* which declares that Brahman has countless qualities like *jnana*, we understand that

Brahman has attributes in the form of innumerable auspicious qualities, so also from the *sruti*: "He has a form radiant like the sun"; we understand that Narayana, who is the Supreme Brahman and Purushottama, has a form which is to His liking and which is suited to His nature.

Similarly from such *srutis* as "The Spouse of Vishnu is the queen of the world, "The goddess of the earth and the goddess Lakshmi are His wives". "The *suris* are always gazing etc.," "beyond *tamas*" "dwelling in a region beyond *rajas*," we learn that He has consorts, attendants, a place of abode and the like. Thus says the *Bhashyakara* (Dramidacharya):- "The *Sastra* teaches things just as they really are". To explain:- Just as from the statement "Brahman is Truth, Knowledge, and Infiniteness", we learn that Brahman is free from all trace of blemish and is the abode of infinite bliss and has no limitations whatsoever and is therefore different from all other things, just as from the *srutis*, "He knows all things; He knows all the characteristics of everything"; "He has various kinds of supreme power, and the strength, knowledge and activity which belong to His nature are also varied and supreme"; "While He shines, everything else shines and that too only by His splendour"—just as from these we have to understand that He has unsurpassed and innumerable qualities which are different from those of all others, so also from *srutis* like "He has a form radiant like the sun", we have to understand that He has a form, attendants, an abode and other things different from those of others, unique and found exclusively in Him and that their nature and character baffle description.

If the Vedas are valid sources of knowledge, *vidhis* or sentences which enjoin an activity, *mantras*

which sing the praises of deities and *arthavadas* which explain the performance of the rites and give reasons for the injunction, should all be considered as valid sources of knowledge, so long as these ideas have not been already established elsewhere and are not opposed to the other *pramanas*. The authority of the Vedas is thus declared in the *Jaimini Sutra*:— “The relation between the word and its meaning is something innate and eternal!” (and not conventional). In the same way as fire is hot and water cold by their very nature (*svabhavika*) — in the same way as the senses like sight have, by their very nature, the power of giving rise to knowledge of a specific kind, even so, the power of a word to give rise to a meaning is innate and natural. It cannot be maintained that the power of a word to convey a meaning is based on convention (*sanketa*), just like conventional gestures made with the hand. The relation between the word and its meaning has continued from time immemorial without any break. Further, no one knows who established any such convention between the word and its meaning. Wherever there is a convention, the author of the convention is (invariably) known directly or indirectly. It cannot be stated that the relation between the word and its meaning is conventional as in the word “Devadatta” used as the name of a person. In such words as “Devadatta”, it is known to be a convention directly or indirectly. (We know who gave the person the name “Devadatta”). But in the case of words like “cow”, though the meaning has been conveyed by the word from beginningless time, no one knows by whom any such convention as in “Devadatta” was first established. Therefore, the power of such words as “cow” to convey their respective meanings should be considered innate or eternal (and not conventional).

It is as natural as the power of fire to burn and the power of the senses to generate perception.

It may be asked, "If the word has the power of conveying a meaning by its very nature just like the senses in giving perceptual knowledge, why should a knowledge of the association (*sambandha*) between the word and its meaning be necessary for conveying the meaning?". The answer is "As in the case of the reason (*linga*) when an inference is made". That is, in the same way as a knowledge of the invariable association between smoke and fire is necessary while making the inference, "Because there is smoke here, there must be fire here", a knowledge of the invariable association between the word and its meaning is necessary for the conveyance of the specific meaning. If so, it may be asked, "Would it not be a case of inference (*anumana*) when the meaning is conveyed by the word?". We answer as follows:- "No. The association or relationship between a word and its meaning is of one kind and that between reason (*hetu*) and the knowledge derived from inference is of another kind. The resemblance is only in respect of knowledge arising out of a knowledge of relationship or association. (In (*anumana*) or inference, the relationship is that between cause (fire) and effect (smoke). Here in the case of words, the relationship is that between the idea conveyed and that which conveys it). Since the power of conveying a meaning is seen whenever the knowledge of the relationship (between the word and its meaning) is present and since, in spite of continuity, from beginningless time, of this power, no one has known of any one who established any such convention, we conclude that, in the word itself, there is an innate or natural power.

Similarly, when a number of words, each with a meaning of its own, are employed to form what is called a sentence, they express or convey a meaning, when the mutual relationship between the different words comes to be known. When the way in which the words are uttered in succession depends upon the intelligence of a man, these sentences are said to be of human authorship. On the other hand, when the order in which the words are uttered depends upon immemorial tradition, they are said to be without human authorship and are called "Vedas". This is what is meant by saying that the Vedas are not of human authorship and that they are eternal. The words in Vedic passages are uttered in a certain order which is invariably followed by a remembrance of the traditional order existing from time immemorial. This is what constitutes non-human authorship and eternal being. These collections of words or syllables existing in a certain order of succession are Vedas and they are four: *Rik*, *Yajus*, *Saman* and *Atharvan* and each has innumerable branches. These Vedas consisting of injunctions (*vidhis*), *mantras* (*hymns*), and *arthavadas* or explanatory comments teach us the essential nature of Narayana, who is the Supreme Brahman, the way of worshipping Him and the fruit of such worship. The collections of words called 'Vedas' which remind us of the Supreme Person, His worship and the fruit of that worship are as eternal as the Supreme Person Himself. Since the Vedas are boundless and hard to understand, some Maharishis directed by the Supreme Person reminded themselves in every *kalpa* of the meaning of the Vedas and composed *Dharmasastras*, *Itihisas* and *Puranas* based on the injunctions, *mantras* and *arthavadas* of the Vedas for the benefit of the whole world. The words employed in ordinary

life were also picked out from the Vedas and have been employed in successive ages to denote their respective meanings as before in the Vedas. "If so", it may be asked, (i. e.) if all words with their meanings have been taken from the Vedas, why should a distinction be made between them saying, "This is so in the Vedas" and "This is so and so in ordinary language?" The answer is, "These words used in the Vedic order of succession have a certain meaning. whereas the same words used elsewhere in a different way have a different meaning."

RECAPITULATION

Thus. Narayana, who is the Supreme Brahman, can be understood only from the Vedas with their auxiliary treatises (*angas*) as elucidated and explained in *Itihasas*, *Puranas* and *Dharmasastras*. He is opposed to all that is objectionable or impure and is different from all else; His essential nature is infinite knowledge and bliss and He has, by His very nature, unsurpassed, wonderful and innumerable auspicious qualities; all things, sentient and non-sentient, owe their origin, their continuance and their varied activities to His will. He has a region of supreme glory (*nityavibhuti*), which is infinite in its nature and in its character. So also He has, for the objects and instruments of His play (*lila*), this world constituted of countless and varied beings, sentient and non-sentient.

In passages like the following:-

† "All this is, indeed, Brahman", "All this has Brahman for its soul". * "That thou art, O Sveta-ketu"; "Some call Him Agni, some call Him Maruts,

† *Chandogya Upanished* (8-14-1)

* The reading in *Manu Smriti* in the Nirnaya-sagara edition is Manu instead of Maruts.

others call Him Prajapati (Brahma), some again call Him Indra, others again call Him Prana, and, yet others call Him the eternal Brahman". "Whatever shining lights there are in this world, the three worlds; the three lords of these three worlds, the three Vedas the three fires, the five kinds of offerings made in the fire, all the gods—all these are only the son of Devaki (i. e.) Sri Krishna". "Thou art the sacrifice, Thou the word *vashatkara*, Thou art the syllable *om*, Thou art the *Vasu* Ritudhama. Thou art Prajapathi among the *Vasus*". "The whole Universe is Thy body; Thy firmness is the earth; Fire is Thy wrath and the Moon Thy grace". All the shining lights are Vishnu; all the worlds are Vishnu; the mountains, the four quarters, the rivers, and the ocean—all these are only Vishnu. He is, O best of Brahmins, everything that exists as perceived by the senses and so also everything that is not perceived by the senses." In all these sentences where there is grammatical apposition or co-ordination (*samanadhikaranya*), it is only Brahman that is denoted by all the words, as He has all things for His body and is in all modes (*prakara*). This has been already stated. The Supreme Brahman, who is omnipotent, willed, of His own accord, to become the many; He himself divided the Primal Element (*Mahabhuta*) which was in a subtle condition from the multitude of souls that lay merged in Him; He then created from the subtle *Mahabhuta* (*Prakriti*) the five primary elements (fire air, water, earth and ether) and caused the experiencing souls to enter into them as their souls. He created the whole world out of these five elements mixed up with one another; He then entered into all as the soul of everything and stands in manifold modes or *prakaras*, with all things as His body, without giving up His nature as the Supreme Being. This Primal Element (*Mahabhuta*)

in its subtle form is what is called *Prakriti*. The experiencing subjects are called *Purushas*; *Prakriti* and *Purusha* are both the bodies of the Supreme Being and are therefore His modes or *prakaras*. The Supreme Being, who has them as His *prakaras* or modes is denoted by the words *Prakriti* and *Purusha*. Everything that has been said so far is stated clearly in the following *sruti*:-

“He willed (saying)” *“I will become the many”. Having created it, He entered into it; having entered into it, He became *sat*, the sentient being, (which remains the same always) and *tyat*, the non-sentient thing (which is ever subject to change). He became the sentient being which cannot be described (in terms of genus or attributes) and the non-sentient thing which can be so described. He became the non-sentient thing which is supported by the sentient being and also the sentient being which supports the non-sentient thing; He became the knowing self and non-sentient matter. He became the sentient being which is not subject to change or modification and is therefore called “the true, (*satyam*)” and the non-sentient thing subject to change and hence called the unreal (*asatya*). In spite of His becoming the unreal, He still remains the True (*satya*).”

* *Taittiriya Upanishad: Brahmananda - valli: 6*

The means of attaining Brahman has already been stated to be only *bhakti* (*parabhakti*) which is of the nature of constant meditation so intense as to become equal to vivid perception (*pratyaksha*). This supreme *bhakti* (*parabhakti*) results from *Bhaktiyoga* promoted by the performance of the duties and rites prescribed for one in accordance with one's *varna* and *asrama* with a knowledge of the truths (*tattva*) obtained from the *Sastras*. The

word *bhakti* is used in the sense of a special form of love (*preeti*) and love is only a form of *jnana* or knowledge.

It may be stated by way of objection: "Pleasure and love are synonymous terms and men of the world say that pleasure is something different from *jnana* or knowledge and that it is the effect of *jnana* and not *jnana* itself." It is not so. The special or particular kind of knowledge from which pleasure is said to result is itself pleasure. To explain:- The knowledge of objects may be of the nature of pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*dukkha*) and that which is neither pleasure nor pain. These acquire their special character as pleasure or pain or that which is neither pleasure nor pain from the nature of the objects. That *jnana* or knowledge which is characterised by a special object and which is said to produce pleasure is itself pleasure. There is nothing other than that knowledge to be called pleasure (*sukha*). From this knowledge characterised by a certain kind of object, we can explain whatever is meant by the word 'pleasure' (and there is no need to postulate an additional entity or category called 'pleasure').

This *jnana* which is of the nature of pleasure (or *sukha*) is, in the case of objects other than Brahman, limited and changeful. In the case of Brahman, this *jnana*, which is of the nature of pleasure, is boundless and constant. Therefore does the *sruti* say, "Brahman is bliss (*Ananda*)."
Jnana or knowledge is concerned with objects and depends upon them. Therefore, Brahman which is of the nature of *sukham* is called *sukha*. The *sruti* says, * "He is indeed *rasa* (delight) and the

* *Taittiriya Upanishad: Brahmananda - valli: 7.*

self (*Jiva*) having attained Him becomes blissful." This means that since Brahman is *sukham* (delight), the soul that has attained Brahman becomes delighted or blissful. Brahman is in Himself blissful and He becomes the cause of bliss in others as well. Since Brahman is a special form of delight or *sukha*, the person who knows Brahman becomes delighted or blissful. The Supreme Brahman is the abode of boundless, unsurpassed, and innumerable, auspicious attributes: He is free from all blemish; He owns endless and supreme glory (*vibhuti*). He is the ocean, as it were, of boundless and wonderful qualities like goodness, beauty, and love. If He is meditated upon as one for whose purposes the soul of the *Jiva* exists and with the knowledge that the individual self exists for the fulfilment of His purposes, the Supreme Brahman himself, having become the object of boundless and wonderful love, will lead the soul to Himself.

It may be asked here by way of objection, "What has been said would mean that absolute dependence (upon the Lord) leads to boundless and unsurpassed pleasure or bliss. But this is entirely opposed to all worldly experience. For to all beings endowed with intelligence, independence is most desirable and dependence (upon others) is always painful. The *smṛiti*, too, says:- "The state of dependence on others is everywhere painful; independence of others or self-sovereignty is always happiness. Service has been described as dog's life and hence it should be given up". This objection can be raised only by those who think that the soul is identical with the body and who have not understood the essential nature of the soul as being different from the body. To explain: The word 'body' refers to a mass (of flesh) characterised by a genus

such as 'humans' and qualities such as belong to 'humans'. The man of the world who is in *samsara* finds the 'I' in his body. The objects that a man considers desirable are in accordance with his view of what the soul is. The objects desired by the lion, the tiger, the boar, the man, the yaksha, the Rakshasa, the demon, the god, the *asura*, and man and woman are such as depend on their respective conception of what their soul is. The essential nature of the soul is different from that of bodies such as those of gods and is of the form only of *jnana*. And this is characterised by entire dependence on the Supreme Self. The *Smriti* says, "The soul is of the nature of *jnana* and is pure". This shows that the soul is wholly of the form of *Jnana*. There are hosts of *Srutis* like "He (Brahman) is the Lord of the Universe", which show that the soul exists only for the fulfilment of the Lord's purposes (*sesha*). Therefore, we should understand that this desire for independence is, like the identification of the soul with bodies like those of the lion and the tiger, due to past *karma* and false knowledge. Therefore, the notion that things other than the Supreme Being are objects of pleasure is due only to past *karma*. That is why they are only pleasant to a very limited extent and for a very short time. Only the Supreme Being is, by His very nature, bliss. Therefore, the bliss attained from Him is permanent and boundless.

The *Sruti* says "Brahman is *sukham(kam)*".

Everything else except Brahman is, by its nature, not pleasant. That the pleasure arising from objects is due to *karma* and is transient is stated as follows by Bhagavan Parasara:-

"O best of Brahmins, what are called Hell and *Svarga* are due respectively to the demerits (*papa*)

and merits (*punya*). The same (thing) causes pain to one man, pleasure to another, jealousy to a third and anger to yet another; how then could these be called objects having permanent qualities like pleasure or pain? This means:- These are not objects, as they cause neither pleasure nor pain exclusively. When they appear exclusively as pleasure or as pain, it is due to the man's past *karma*, good or bad. Thus having shown that among many persons, the same object causes pleasure to one man and pain to another, he (Parasara) next proceeds to say that, even in the same person, there is no certainty of an object continuing to give pleasure or pain.

“The same object having previously caused pleasure, now, causes pain; later it may cause anger and later still, peace of mind. Therefore, there is no object that is exclusively pleasant or exclusively painful.” That is, an object is pleasant or painful in accordance with past *karma* and not by its own nature; as soon as that *karma* is worked out, the pleasure or the pain ceases.

The remark that dependence in any form is painful is true only in the case of others and not of the Supreme Brahman. Dependence on beings other than the Supreme Person is, of course, painful, because they are not *seshis* for whose purposes we exist as *seshas*. The saying that service is dog's life is true only of the service of those who are unfit to be served. It has been stated that He alone is to be worshipped by all, whatever their *asrama* may be; (i. e.) by all who understand the true nature of the soul, the only person to be served is Purushottama. As Bhagavan Himself says:—

"He who adores me exclusively by means of *bhakti yoga* — he will pass beyond the *gunas* (of *prakriti*) and attain *moksha*." This adoration or *bhakti*, which is a form of service, is expressed by the word 'know' (*vedana*) in such texts as:—

"He who *knows* Brahman attains the Supreme."

"Having *known* Him in this way, he becomes immortal." This has already been explained.

In the *sruti* text: "He *whom this (Brahman) chooses—by him alone can He be attained," from the qualification it is evident that the person should be capable of being chosen (or should deserve being chosen). He who deserves to be chosen should be dearest. Dearest to Bhagavan is he who has boundless and unsurpassed love to Him. So Bhagavan says:—

"I am, indeed, dear to the *jnani*, the man who has knowledge or wisdom and he too is dear to me". *Gita*: 7—7.

Therefore, only that knowlege or *vedana* which has reached the intensity of supreme devotion (or *parabhakti*) is, in reality, the means of attaining Bhagavan.

The same teaching is conveyed by Bhagavan Dvaipayana (Vyasa) in his *Moksha Dharma*, which is, as it were, a commentary on all the Upanishads:—

His (Brahman's) form does not appear before our sight and no one can see Him with his eyes. He who has attained peace of mind by his firmness (*dhriti*) sees Brahman, who is of the nature of *jnana* by his devotion (*bhakti*). The meaning is that he who has attained mental peace by his firmness

* *Mundaka Upanishad*: 3—3.

of discipline (*dhriti*) will see Purushottama by his *bhakti* or devotion. It means the same as the sentence, "By exclusive devotion He can be attained." As *bhakti* or devotion is only a form of knowledge, all that has been said here is appropriate.

Note:—The first half of the *sloka* in *Moksha Dharma* (*Mahabharata*) is identical with a passage found in *Kata Upanishad*. The second half of the *sloka* might, at first sight, appear to mean, "He who has attained peace of mind by *dhriti* and *bhakti* will see Brahman who is of the nature of knowledge". But Sri Ramanuja has interpreted it differently, because *bhakti* alone is declared in the *Sastras* to be the means of attaining Brahman.

Concluding Sloka: There are some great men who can distinguish between what is essential and what is not, who are free from rancour, and are guided only by the *pramanas*. It is for them that this *Vedantha Sangraha* has been written.

Appendix.

(See page 144)

The *Anuvaka* called “*Uttara Narayananuvaka*” and the eight *riks* beginning with ‘*Hiranyagarbha*’:-

From the waters and the essence of the earth (*prithivi*), all creation arose as the work of the Creator of the Universe. The Creator of the world assigned to every (created) thing, its peculiar form (and so also its attributes) and pervaded all things. Therefore, I knew, at the very beginning, that the Universe was for the fulfilment of His purposes.

I know this Supreme Person (*Purusha*) who is radiant in form like the sun and who dwells in the region beyond *tamas* (i. e., the world of *prakriti* or matter). He who knows Him to be of this nature (as described in the *anuvakas*) becomes immortal even here (i. e.) enjoys the bliss of Bhagavan even in this state of *samsara*. There is no other way or means of attaining Him (than that indicated here).

Prajapati moves about in the womb (of the Universe). Though He is never born as the result of *karma* (and is therefore changeless), He is born in many forms (as *avatars*); the wise have a comprehensive understanding of the cause of His being born. The gods like Brahma and Rudra, whose bondage and release are dependent on His *lila*, aspire to the abode of the Marichis (i. e.) the eternal *Suris*).

Note:—*Prajapati* here refers not to Brahma but to the Supreme Being Narayana.

I bow to that Splendour which is revealed in the Vedas (and surrender myself and everything that is

mine to Him) — to Him who burns (the *Asuras* and the *Rakshasas*), for the sake of the *devas*, who ever stands before them to remove their sufferings and to reveal Himself, and who was born for the sake of the gods (as *avatars*).

The *Devas*, who rose to a manifestation of their real nature resembling the light of Brahman, offered, of old, their adoration to Him (by saying *namas*). The student of the Vedas who comes to know of the potency of this adoration—to him, (even) the gods (like Brahma and Indra) become subject.

(O Lord) The goddess of the earth and Lakshmi are Thy consorts. Day and night are Thy sides; Thy form or body is the stars and the Asvins are Thy palates (upper and lower); vouchsafe unto us whatever is desired (by us); grant us this (Thy feet); give us everything.

The Eight Riks beginning with the word 'Hiranyagarbha.'

1. Before (creation), Hiranyagarbha (He who is in the womb or centre of the region beautiful and resplendent like gold) existed (in His divine abode). After creation, He became the sole Lord of all created beings. He supported the earth and the heavens and to that deity denoted by the word *Kim* meaning Prajapati, let us make our offerings (let us surrender ourselves to Him):

2. By His greatness, He became the sole King and Saviour of all beings, those that breathe (and move not), those (that crawl) and wink (their eyes) and those that move (from place to place). He ruled over the bipeds and the quadrupeds and to

that deity denoted by the word *Kim* meaning Prajapati, let us make our offerings (let us surrender ourselves to Him).

3. He who gives Himself (to His devotees), and the strength to enjoy that bliss), whose command is obeyed with reverence by all beings and even by the gods, whom the world of immortality follows like His shadow, whose orders are executed by Death—to that deity denoted by the word *Kim* meaning Prajapati, let us make our offerings (let us surrender ourselves to Him).

4. They say that the mountains covered with snow and the ocean and the earth exist for Him by virtue of His greatness. These directions or quarters are (as it were) His arms — to that deity denoted by the word *Kim* meaning Prajapati, let us make our offerings (let us surrender ourselves to Him).

5. The earth and the heavens cry and look up to Him for succour, (when threatened by the Asuras), though they are radiant; since He is the ruler, the sun rises and sets — to that deity denoted by the word *Kim* meaning Prajapati, let us make our offerings (let us surrender ourselves to Him).

6. By Him is the region of the heavens (inhabited by the Gandharvas) fiery (and resplendent); by Him does the earth stand firm; the world of *Svarga* was set firm by Him, the world of Brahma, namely, *Naka*, was rendered by Him free from all unhappiness and suffering; He dwells in the region of the Supreme Ether or *Akasa*, which is beyond *rajas* or the world of matter and He is beyond all comprehension—to that deity denoted by the word *Kim* meaning Prajapati, let us make our offerings (let us surrender ourselves to Him).

7. The wide waters which generated Agni (Brahma) and had in them the energy required to create the world pervaded the Universe, Then did He become the very life of the *devas*—to that deity denoted by the word *Kim* meaning Prajapati, let us make our offerings (let us surrender ourselves to Him).

8 By His greatness, He saw to it that the waters possessed of power created Agni. He is the sole God of all gods—to Him denoted by the word *Kim* *meaning Prajapati, let us make our offerings (let us surrender ourselves to Him).

*Note:—*Kasmai devaya havisha vidhema*: This refrain in the eight *riks* is translated as follows by Prof. A. A Macdonnell: "To what god should we pay worship with oblation?" His comment on the word *Kim* from which the nominative singular form *Ka* is derived may be of interest to the reader: "This led to the word *ka* 'who?' being used in the later Vedic literature as an independent name, *Ka*, of the supreme god."

Sanskrit Words in the Text and Their Transliteration
in
THE TRANSLATION

<i>Transliteration</i>	<i>Sanskrit</i>	<i>Transliteration</i>	<i>Sanskrit</i>
A			
abhyasa	अभ्यास	aniyastvam	अणायस्त्वम्
acchadika	आच्छादिका	anrita	अनृत
avidya	अविद्या	antahkaranam	अन्तःकरणम्
acit	अचित्	anu	अणु
achit	अचित्	anubhuti	अनुभूति
adhara	आधार	anukula	अनुकूल
adheyatvam	आधेयत्वम्	anumana	अनुमान
adesa	आदेश	anuvaka	अनुवाक
adhyasa	अध्यास	aparamartha	अपरमार्थ
Aditya- mandala	आदित्यमण्डल	Apastamba	आपस्तम्ब
adrishta	अदृष्ट	aprakrita	अप्राकृत
agama	आगम	aprapta	अप्राप्त
ahankara	अहङ्कार	aprapti	अप्राप्ति
ajayamano	अजायमानो	apurva	अपूर्व
akara	आकार	arabhyate	आरभ्यते
akasa	आकाश	aranyaka	आरण्यक
ambhasyapare	अम्भस्यपारे	arthapatti	अर्थापत्ति
amsa	अंश	asamavayi- karana	असमवायिकारण
anadi	अनादि	asatkaryavada	असत्कार्यवाद
ananda	आनन्द	asrama	आश्रम
anantam	अनन्तम्	asti	अस्ति
anavastha	अनवस्था	asurio	आसुरी
		ativyapti	अतिव्याप्ति
		atma	

Transliteration Sanskrit

jivatma	जीवात्मा
jna	ज्ञा
jnanam	ज्ञानं
jnanendriyas	ज्ञानेन्द्रियाः
jnani	ज्ञानी
jnapati	ज्ञप्ति
jiyastvam	ज्यायस्त्वम्

K

kala	कला
kala	काल
kama	काम
karana	कारण
karma	कर्म
karya	कार्य
karyarthavada	कार्यार्थवाद
kashta	काष्ठा
Katopanishad	कठोपनिषत्
kaustubha	कौस्तुभ
krama	क्रम
krodha	क्रोध
kshana	क्षण
kshetrajna	क्षेत्रज्ञ
Kusa	कुश

L

Lava	लव
laya	लय
lakshana	लक्षणा
lila	लीला

Transliteration Sanskrit

M

Maitreyi	मैत्रेयी
Mandodari	मन्दोदरी
Mahabharata	महाभारत
maya	माया
medha	मेधा
Mimamsaka	मीमांसक
moksha	मोक्ष
muhurtha	मुहूर्त
mukti	मुक्ति
Mundaka- Upanishad	मुण्डकोपनिषत्

N

nabhi	नाभि
naka	नाक
nana	नाना
neha	नेह
neti	नेति
nimesha	निमेष
nimitta	निमित्त
niravayava	निरवयव
nirguna	निर्गुण
nirvikalpaka	निर्विकल्पक
nishkriyam	निष्क्रियं
nitya	नित्य
niyamyatvam	नियाम्यत्वम्
niyanta	नियन्ता
niyojya	नियोज्य

<i>Transliteration</i>	<i>Sanskrit</i>	<i>Transliteration</i>	<i>Sanskrit</i>
<i>P</i>		rishi	ऋषि
padam	पदं	rukma	रुक्माभ
papa	पाप	<i>S</i>	
Paramapada	परमपद	sadhana	साधन
Parasara	पराशर	Sadhyas	साध्याः
paramarthika	पारमार्थिक	saguna	सगुण
parardha	पराध	sakara	साकार
parijananti	परिजानन्ति	sakha	शाखा
parinama	परिणाम	sakti	शक्ति
pasu	पशु	samadarsanas	समदर्शनः
Prabhakaras	प्राभाकराः	samanadhi- karanyam	सामानाधिकरण्यं
Prajapati	प्रजापति	Sambhu	शम्भु
Prajna	प्राज्ञ	saman	सामन्
prakara	प्रकार	samagri	सामग्री
prana	प्राण	samavayi	समवायि
prasada	प्रसाद	samindhate	समिन्धते
prarabdha	प्रारब्ध	samkirna	संकीर्ण
pratibhasika	प्रातिभासिक	samsara	संसार
pratyaksha	प्रत्यक्ष	samsthana	संस्थान
prithivi	पृथिवी	Sanaka	सनक
punya	पुण्य	Sanandana	सनन्दन
purushartha	पुरुषार्थ	samgraha	सङ्ग्रह
Purushottama	पुरुषोत्तम	sankalpa	संकल्प
purvapaksha	पूर्वपक्ष	sanketa	सङ्केत
purvapakshin	पूर्वपक्षिन्	sankha	शङ्ख
<i>R</i>		Sankhyas	साङ्ख्याः
raga	राग	saranagati	शरणागति
rajas	रजस्	sarnga	शार्ङ्ग
rina	ऋण	sastra	शास्त्र

<i>Transliteration</i>	<i>Sanskrit</i>	<i>Transliteration</i>	<i>Sanskrit</i>
Sastra	शास्त्र	tamasa	तामस
sasvatam	शाश्वतम्	tasya	तस्य
satta	सत्ता	tattva	तत्त्व
sattvam	सत्त्वम्	tirodhana	तिरोधान
sattvic	सात्त्विक		
satyam	सत्यं	U	
sesha	शेष	ubhaya	उभय
seshi	शेषी	upabrihma-	
seshin	शेषिन्	nam	उपबृह्मणम्
siddhanta	सिद्धान्त	upadana	उपादान
Siva	शिव	upadesa	उपदेश
smritis	स्मृति	upadhi	उपाधि
soonya	शून्य	upalaksha-	
sraddhas	श्राद्धाः	nam	उपलक्षणम्
sthula	स्थूल	upanishad	उपनिषत्
Subalopani-	सुबालोपनिषत्	upasana	उपासन
shad		upaya	उपाय
subhasraya	शुभाश्रय	V	
sukshma	सूक्ष्म	vacharam-	
Sunyavadin	शून्यवादिन्	bhanam	वाचारम्भणम्
Suta	सूत	Vamadeva	वामदेव
sushupti	सुषुप्ति	Vaiseshikas	वैशेषिकाः
sutra	सूत्र	vaikarika	वैकारिक
svabhavika	स्वाभाविक	Vaikunta	वैकुण्ठ
svatassiddha	स्वतःसिद्ध	vanamala	वनमाला
Svetaketu	श्वेतकेतु	vasi	वशी
T		Vasudeva	वासुदेव
Taittiriya	तैत्तिरीय	Vedanta	
tamas	तमस्	Deepa	वेदान्तदीप
		Vedanta Sara	वेदान्तसार

<i>Transliteration</i>	<i>Sanskrit</i>	<i>Tranaliteration</i>	<i>Sanskrit</i>
Vedārtha- sangraha	वेदार्थसङ्ग्रह	vivarta	विवर्त
vibhuti	विभूति	vyavahara	व्यवहार
vidhi	विधि	vyavaharika	व्यावहारिक
vidhyakshe- pa	विद्याक्षेप	vyoman	व्योमन्
vidya	विद्या	Vyomatit- avadin	व्योमातीतवादिन्
vijayate	विजयते	vyutpatti- vada	व्युत्पत्तिवाद
vipanyavah	विपन्यवः		
viprasas	विप्रासः	Y	
virya	वीर्य	Yadava- prakasa	यादवप्रकाश
viseshana	विशेषण	Yamun- acharya	यामुनाचार्य
viseshya	विशेष्य	yonih	योनिः
visishta	विशिष्ट		

(The following are among the errors found in the text. I regret also that quotations do not, in some places, begin or close with the proper marks.)

ERRATA

Page	Line	For	Read
13	6	ot	or
15	9	<i>karma</i>	<i>krama</i>
29	2	Brahmae	Brahman
37	14	He	he
42	14	Srarga	Svarga
42	29	predicted	predicated
43	16	likwise	likewise
72	2	asatryavada	asatkaryavada
81	4	krama	karma
84	3	and	and
97	7	thh	the
99	18	oontradictory	contradictory
99	34	end	and
108	38	Brahmin	Brahman
110	2	<i>vaishamaya</i>	<i>vishamya</i>
135	2	to	te
136	1	menta	mental
146	5	Thu	The
160	8	Note	* Note
169	15	sigifance	significance
178	26	indenpendently	independently
182	24	of	of
200	29	<i>samiadhate</i>	<i>samindhate</i>
Do	32	begining	beginning
208	15	connot	cannot
211	34	<i>Snriti</i>	<i>Smriti</i>

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